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ABSTRACT
Preventing accidents in complex socio-technical systems requires an approach to risk
management that continuously monitors risk and identifies potential areas of concern
before they lead to hazards, and constrains hazards before they lead to accidents. This
research introduces the concept of continuous participative risk management, in which
risks are continuously monitored throughout the lifetime of a system, and members from
all levels of the organization are involved both in risk analysis and in risk mitigation.
One aspect of effective risk management is accurate risk analysis that takes account of
technical, human, and organizational factors. This research develops a new approach to
risk analysis that improves on event-based models to include risks that do not depend only
on component or subsystem failures, and incorporates both human and organizational fac-
tors. The approach enables the early identification of risk mitigation strategies, aids in the
allocation of resources to best manage risk, and provides for the continuous monitoring of
risk throughout the system lifecycle.
Organizational factors have been identified as a significant aspect of accidents in complex
socio-technical systems. Properly managing and assessing risk requires an understanding
of the impact of organizational factors on risk. Three popular theories of organizational
risk, normal accidents theory (NAT), high reliability organizations (HRO), and normaliza-
tion of deviance, are reviewed. While these approaches do provide some useful insights,
they all have significant limitations, particularly as a basis for assessing and managing
risk. This research develops the understanding of organizational risk factors by focussing
on the dynamics of organizational risk. A framework is developed to analyze the strategic
trade-offs between short and long-term goals and understand the reasons why organiza-
tions tend to migrate to states of increasing risk. The apparent conflict between perfor-
mance and safety is shown to result from the different time horizons applying to
performance and safety. Performance is measured in the short term, while safety is indi-
rectly observed over the long term. Expanding the time horizon attenuates the apparent
tension between performance and safety. By increasing awareness of the often implicit
4trade-offs between safety and performance, organizations can avoid decisions that unwit-
tingly increase risk.
In addition to this general dynamic, several specific common patterns of problematic orga-
nizational behaviour in accidents in diverse industries are identified. While accidents usu-
ally differ in the technical aspects, the organizational behaviour accompanying the
accident exhibits commonalities across industries. These patterns of behaviour, or arche-
types, can be used to better understand how risk arises and how problematic organiza-
tional behaviours might be addressed in diverse settings such as the space industry and
chemical manufacturing. NASA specific archetypes are developed based on historical
accounts of NASA and investigations into the Challenger and Columbia accidents. The
NASA archetypes illustrate several mechanisms by which the manned space program
migrated towards high risk.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Nancy G. Leveson
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1
RISK IN MODERN SYSTEMS
A life without adventure is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is
allowed to take whatever form it will, is likely to be short.
Bertrand Russell, 1968
We often think, naively, that missing data are the primary impediments to intellectual
progress-just find the right facts and all problems will disappear But barriers are often
deeper and more abstract in thought. We must have access to the right metaphor not only
to the requisite information.
Stephen Jay Gould, The Flamingo's Smile, 1985
Socio-technical systems are becoming more complex in response to increasing perfor-
mance and cost requirements. This increasing complexity makes it more difficult to ensure
that the systems meet safety requirements. In particular, complex systems are susceptible
to system accidents, which are caused by dysfunctional interactions between components,
rather than by component failures alone. Such accidents are particularly difficult to predict
or analyse.
In the past, safe design principles and operating procedures were developed over long
periods of time, applying experience acquired by trial and error. Now, new types of sys-
tems are being developed and fielded so rapidly that learning solely from experience is not
sufficient.
Risk management is the process of maintaining an acceptable level of risk throughout a
system's lifetime. Risk analysis, or the identification and assessment of risk and mitiga-
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tion options, is a crucial part of this process. Existing risk assessment methodologies do
not provide a good understanding of the risks associated with complex socio-technical
systems. These methodologies are appropriate for simple systems where 'mechanical'
failures prevail. But they are fundamentally limited when it comes to complex socio-tech-
nical systems because they are all event-based and do not adequately capture emergent
behaviour.
1.1 Origins of Risk
Risk arises from uncertainty about the future behaviour of a system. In the absence of
uncertainty there would be no risk. We would know with complete certainty what would
go wrong, when it would happen, and what the consequences would be. With sufficient
investment of time and resources, we could then make completely informed decisions
about whether or not to accept these future events. Unfortunately, the very characteristics
of systems that make them useful also give rise to uncertainty and hence to risk. One goal
of risk management, and system development and operation in general, is to reduce uncer-
tainty as much as possible, and to make sure that the remaining uncertainty is identified
and understood.
1.1.1 Uncertainty
The literature provides innumerable and often conflicting definitions of uncertainty. For
the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to define uncertainty as an inability to predict the
future behaviour of a system. This inability is seen as arising from a lack of information.
Uncertainty can be grouped into three types based on the type of information deficiency.
The first two are uncertainties of fact, that is, it is not known how close to the truth the
measurements or beliefs are. The last one is stochastic, that is, the uncertainty is due to the
random part of a system or process.
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- Measurement uncertainty: Any measurement is limited in its accuracy. This
uncertainty can be reduced, but not eliminated, by improving the measure-
ment process.
- Epistemic or lack-of-information uncertainty: We cannot be certain about
what we do not know. For example, it is not guaranteed that a specific risk
does not exist simply because it has not been convincingly proven that it
does exist. Lack-of-information uncertainty can be reduced by expending
more resources to gain more information.
- Stochastic or aleatory uncertainty: This uncertainty results from the inher-
ently random part of a system or process. Note that some events may appear
random because we do not understand the underlying mechanism of the pro-
cess generating the events. In this case, uncertainty that appears to be
stochastic is in fact due to a lack of information1 . Alternatively, measure-
ment error may give rise to an apparently random distribution.
In risk analysis, there is uncertainty at all levels. Predictions based on the models that
underlie all risk assessments are subject to both uncertainty of fact and stochastic uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty of fact arises because a model is always an incomplete representation
of a system, and the parameters used to define the model contain measurement and
epistemic uncertainty. Stochastic uncertainty in the system being modeled can be repre-
sented by means of probability distributions. But these distributions are again only best-
guess approximations of the underlying stochastic process.
There is uncertainty about the coverage of the analysis: Are we aware of all the risks?
There is uncertainty about the likelihood of the risks: Do we have a good understanding of
the likelihood of a risk being realised? And there is uncertainty about the consequences
attached to the risks: How well do we know what will happen if a risk is realised, and how
much we will care about the consequences?
1. For example, chaos theory has shown that many apparently random phenomena are actually driven by an
highly structured underlying process. The phenomena appear random because the underlying process is
highly non-linear and is not visible to the observer.
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1.1.2 Complexity
Complexity is an important source of uncertainty and hence risk. Complexity makes it dif-
ficult to understand or predict a system's behaviour, thus giving rise to epistemic uncer-
tainty. The more complex a system is, the more opportunity there is for components to
interact in unforeseen and possibly undesirable ways.
Systems become complex for various reasons. One reason is attempts to satisfy increas-
ingly demanding requirements on their performance. Complexity allows systems to satisfy
multiple and changing requirements. Although there are approaches to system design that
can decrease complexity while retaining functionality [Leveson, 1995], there is a mini-
mum level of complexity, or essential complexity, that arises from trying to satisfy a sys-
tem's requirements.
Complexity also arises from the sheer scale of systems. Chaos theory tells us that any real
system is at least partially non-linear and that no matter how accurately such a system is
characterised, this non-linear nature implies that we cannot accurately predict all the
behaviour of the system all of the time. We may not even be able to identify or character-
ize all the non-linear aspects of a system. For example, the number of possible pair-wise
interactions between system components increases combinatorially with the number of
components. A relatively modest system with 100 components has (12, or 4950, possi-
ble pair-wise interactions. Anticipating the nature of all the interactions between compo-
nents rapidly becomes impossible as the number of components increases beyond the
trivial.
Systems tend to become more complex as they age. Changes in the system's design result-
ing from changing requirements (e.g. adding functionality) or a changing operating envi-
ronment (e.g. unavailability of obsolete computer chips) will generally increase the
complexity of a system. In the case of socio-technical systems, bureaucracy tends to
increase over time [McCurdy, 1993], thus increasing the system's complexity (and bureau-
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cracy). While efforts can be made to roll this acquired complexity back, it is usually diffi-
cult or impossible to strip a system back to its essential complexity.
Systems will in general therefore be more complex than is strictly necessary, but reducing
the complexity may not always be feasible or necessary. Complexity does not always
result in sufficiently inefficient, risky, or otherwise undesirable behaviour to make a
reduction in complexity necessary.
Much has been written about different types of complexity and how they should be mea-
sured. See, for example [Moses, 2002]. For the purpose of this thesis, the following types
and definitions of complexity are sufficient.
Dynamic Complexity. Systems that exhibit unexpected or unpredictable behaviour over
time are said to be dynamically complex. Systems are not static: they change over time,
and different aspects of a system change at different rates. This change is driven by vari-
ous factors, such as changing user requirements, changes in the environment, and the
physical ageing of components. The rates of changes are not necessarily constant-a slow
rate of change may suddenly become rapid. For example, a crack in an aircraft wing that
has been gradually growing may suddenly and rapidly propagate, causing a structural fail-
ure. The behaviour of a system at some future time will be different from its behaviour at
the present. While it is expected that any prediction about future behaviour is subject to
error, unpredictable or rapid rates of change can make predictions meaningless.
Dynamic complexity can arise in even structurally simple systems. For example, the Beer
Distribution Game [Senge, 1990], which simulates a simple supply chain, illustrates how
delays in the supply chain can lead to wild fluctuations in production and inventory. Lack-
ing an appreciation for the impact of supply chain delays, players are unable to maintain
production and inventory levels at the optimum level. Once the delay effect has been
pointed out, players fare better, but a change in the delay at any point in the chain can
again wreak havoc. Knowing why a system exhibits dynamic complexity does not guaran-
tee that its behaviour can be predicted.
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Dynamic complexity arises as a result of latency and non-linearity in systems. Latency is a
delay between action and response. Such delays can result in dynamic complexity, as
demonstrated by the Beer Distribution Game. In control systems, latency can drive a sys-
tem into unstable, or dynamically complex behaviour [Ogata, 1990]. A system can exhibit
a range of latencies. Zero latency means that a response immediately follows the action. In
some cases zero latency may be desirable, for example, activating the "dead-man" switch
on a machine should immediately cause operation to cease. In other cases, a delay
between action and response may be desirable. For example, in cases where actions with
potentially devastating consequences are accidently taken, a time delay may provide the
opportunity to devise a compensating strategy.
Large delays between action and effect can make the effect appear unrelated to the origi-
nal action. This lack of apparent connection can create the impression that the action has
no effect. In the case of desirable effects, it may be unclear how to obtain the same effect
again.
When a system output is not proportional to the corresponding input, the input-output rela-
tionship is said to be non-linear. Non-linearity makes it difficult to predict system behav-
iour, because a small change in input, or in system elements, can have a large effect on
system behaviour. Non-linear behaviour can result from the physics of the system. For
example, "clipping" occurs in an amplifier when the amplitude of the amplified signal is
larger than the output capability of the amplifier. This gives rise to the familiar "distor-
tion" on audio speakers when the volume is turned up too high. Non-linear behaviour also
arises from positive feedback loops. For example, the irritating squeak on public address
systems occurs when the output of the speakers feeds back into the microphones and is
repeatedly amplified.
Non-linearity can also be observed in the characteristics of a system. Systems with a large
number of different elements are said to be combinatorially complex, reflecting the non-
linear increase in the number of possible element interactions as the number of elements
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increases. In system modelling, "state explosion" refers to the exponential increase in the
possible number of states as the number of state space variables increases.
Interactive Complexity. systems are interactively complex when there are many unfa-
miliar or unplanned and unexpected sequences of events in a system that are either not vis-
ible or not immediately comprehensible [Perrow, 1999a; Leveson, 1995]. A similar view
comes from organizational theory, where an organization is seen as being complex to the
extent that its parts mutually sustain each other [March and Simon, 1993].
Social Complexity. Organizations that have a large number of stakeholders are socially
complex. When these stakeholders are very different the social complexity increases fur-
ther.
1.2 Accidents: Definitions and Models
To manage risk in modern complex socio-technical systems, an understanding of how
accidents happen is necessary. This section first discusses the nature of accidents in mod-
ern systems. Next, an accident modelling technique based on systems theory is reviewed.
The section concludes with some definitions of accidents and related concepts that will be
used in this thesis.
1.2.1 Accidents in Complex Socio-Technical Systems
Accidents are rarely caused by simple, random component failure. Component failures
that appear random at first sight often turn out to be caused instead by inadequate mainte-
nance or by using the component in a way for which it was not designed. Similarly, acci-
dents are usually not caused by simple human error either: humans often take actions that
contribute to accidents because those actions appear rational given their understanding of
the situation or because the system design encourages incorrect behaviour.
Further, even in high-technology systems using unprecedented designs and technologies,
accidents are rarely caused by unforeseen or unforeseeable physical phenomena. For
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example, the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded shortly after take-off when the 0-rings
failed to seal the solid rocket booster joints. It was well-known that rubber loses its elastic-
ity in cold temperatures, like those on the day of the launch, but somehow this knowledge
did not translate into delaying the launch.
Component failure and human error are inadequate explanations for accidents. Investiga-
tions into accidents have shown that the causes of accidents are much more complex,
involving factors at all levels of the system, from component failure to organizational and
social factors. For example, the investigation into the Space Shuttle Columbia accident
placed extensive blame on organizational factors [Gehman, 2003, p. 177]:
The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program's his-
tory and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval
for the Shuttle Program, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities,
schedule pressures, mischaracterizations of the Shuttle as operational rather than develop-
mental, and lack of an agreed national vision. Cultural traits and organizational practices
detrimental to safety and reliability were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past
success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why
systems were not performing in accordance with requirements/specifications); organiza-
tional barriers which prevented effective communication of critical safety information and
stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program
elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making pro-
cesses that operated outside the organization's rules.
Perrow famously noted that in complex socio-technical systems accidents are "normal",
that is, the complexity of these systems makes accidents almost inevitable [Perrow,
1999a]. He also popularized the concept of system accidents. Perrow's original formula-
tion of system accidents referred to accidents that involved some degree of component
failure. The current understanding of system accidents is that they are accidents that are
caused not by the failure of one or more components, but by dysfunctional interactions
between components (some of which may have failed). Such accidents can occur despite
every component performing as required.
Any attempt to understand accidents or manage risk requires an underlying model of how
accidents happen. Many accident models have been proposed, from very simple chain-of-
event models (see [Leveson, 2004a] for a review) to models based on a systems perspec-
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tive [Leveson, 2004a; Rasmussen, 1997]. While chain-of-events models are intuitively
appealing, they do not provide an adequate explanation of how accidents occur in modem
socio-technical systems. For example, they cannot incorporate the effects of feedback.
More sophisticated models are necessary to provide a more complete understanding of
accidents in these systems. In this thesis the STAMP model proposed by [Leveson, 2004a]
is used.
1.2.2 A Control Theoretic View of Safety
STAMP (Systems Theory Accident Modelling and Processes) [Leveson, 2004a] is a new
accident modelling technique that describes each level of the socio-technical structure of a
system in terms of levels of control over safety. Accidents are seen as occurring as a result
of an ineffective control structure not enforcing safe behaviour at each level of the system
development and operation structures. The lack of control at each level leads to compo-
nent failures, dysfunctional interactions among components, and unhandled environmen-
tal disturbances at a lower level. The most basic concept in the new model is not an event,
but a constraint. The cause of an accident, instead of being understood in terms of a series
of failure events, is viewed as the result of a lack of constraints imposed on the system
design and operations. This definition of accidents fits both classic component failure
accidents and system accidents, but it allows effectively incorporating software, human-
decision making, adaptation, and social and managerial factors into the analysis. Acci-
dents can then be understood in terms of why the controls that were in place did not pre-
vent or detect maladaptive changes, which safety constraints, if any, were violated at each
level, and why the constraints were inadequate or were not adequately enforced.
1.2.3 Definitions
Although the meaning of "accident" is intuitively clear, when performing a risk assess-
ment a rigorous definition is necessary. The following definition from the safety literature
is apt [Leveson, 1995]:
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Accident. An accident is defined as an undesired and unplanned, but not necessarily
unexpected, event that results in at least a specified level of loss.
Note that this definition does not restrict accidents to be events leading to injury or loss of
life. The level of loss at which a particular event is referred to as being an accident is sub-
jective, and depends on social, economic, technical and other factors. Safety is then
defined as follows [Leveson, 1995]:
Safety. Freedom from accidents or losses.
These definitions for accidents and safety can be applied to all types of losses, not only
those losses that result in injury or loss of life. For example, if a telecommunications satel-
lite does not achieve the desired transmission rate, it has violated the constraint that it
achieve a specified minimum transmission rate. In this case the loss is the loss of income
associated with the satellite not delivering the required service. In project management,
cost and schedule overruns may be viewed as violations of financial and time constraints
by the project management system. The associated losses may include cancellation of the
project or loss of income due to late delivery.
Note that accidents are often said to result from some kind of 'failure'. The term failure is
used to refer to anything from component failure (e.g. a light bulb burning out) to software
'failure' (i.e. where the software does something that contributes to an accident) to human
error (e.g. an operator pressing the wrong button). Failure is used in so many ways that it
has become almost meaningless. In this thesis failure will be used only in the sense of
mechanical failure, that is, when something has broken and cannot start functioning again
without being repaired.
1.3 Aspects of Risk
While there are many competing definitions of risk, there seems to be a common under-
standing of the general concept of risk as the possibility that human actions or other events
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lead to consequences that harm aspects of things humans value [Klinke and Renn, 2002].
There is general agreement that probability and consequence are two dimensions of risk.
But does risk have other dimensions? Who defines these dimensions and how they are
measured? This section explores this problem. First, the definitions of risk and associated
concepts that will be used in this thesis are given. Second, the standard 'scientific' or real-
ist view of risk is discussed. Then, an alternative view of risk, as a concept constructed by
society, is discussed. This view introduces additional non-physical dimensions of risk that
affect how risk is perceived.
1.3.1 Definitions
In defining risk it is useful to begin with the concept of a hazard, which is used in system
safety to identify system states that could lead to an accident under particular conditions:
Hazard. A hazard is a state or set of conditions of a system that, together with other con-
ditions in the system's environment, will lead inevitably to an accident [Leveson, 1995].
In the STAMP approach, hazards are states that violate the system safety constraints. They
arise as a result of inadequate enforcement of control actions.
Note that hazards are defined relative to a system. What are considered 'environmental'
conditions and what are considered system states depend on where the system boundaries
are drawn. From the point of view of attempting to manage risk, the boundaries should be
drawn to include those parts of the system over which the system developers have, or
should have, some control. For example, there is no point in defining climate to be part of
a system because at this time there is no way reliably to control the weather.
A hazard has two important properties: the severity or damage, and the likelihood of the
hazard occurring [Leveson, 1995]. These two quantities together define the hazard level.
Often neither quantity is fully defined. The likelihood may be unknown or may be only
subjectively defined. The potential damage associated with the hazard may be known only
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partially. For example, some consequences of accidents associated with the hazard may
not be known beforehand.
In the case of air traffic control, a hazard can be defined as two aircraft being closer
together than the minimum separation distance [Leveson, 1995]. The constraint is that air-
craft may not violate the minimum separation distance. The control requirement is to
maintain minimum separation. The damage associated with this hazard is a mid-air colli-
sion, which could lead to complete or partial loss of one or both aircraft. There is also a
possibility that people or property on the ground could be damaged by falling debris. The
likelihood of the hazard is the likelihood of two aircraft violating the minimum separation
distance.
The hazard exposure, or duration, is the length of time that the hazardous state exists
[Leveson, 1995]. In the air traffic control example, the duration is the period of time that
the two aircraft violate the minimum separation distance. Generally, the longer a hazard-
ous state persists, the greater the likelihood that the necessary conditions will be present
for an accident to occur.
A violation of the minimum separation distance is in itself not guaranteed to cause an acci-
dent. If the hazardous condition is noted sufficiently quickly the aircraft can execute eva-
sive action and restore minimum separation. There are various ways in which this state
could lead to a mid-air collision. For example, the two pilots could only become aware of
each other when it was too late to execute evasive action, perhaps because of restricted
visibility. Or one or more of the aircraft could execute an inappropriate evasive action and
fail to avoid the collision. The likelihood that the hazardous condition is not noted or cor-
rected before a mid-air collision occurs is the likelihood of the hazard leading to an acci-
dent.
Hazards should be defined in a pragmatic way. There is no point in defining hazards in
such a way that nothing can be done about them. For example, continuing the air traffic
control example, defining the hazard as two aircraft being in the same airspace is not use-
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ful. Air traffic volumes make such a requirement impractical. However, defining a mini-
mum separation distance based on the capabilities of air traffic controllers, aircraft, and
their pilots reduces the likelihood of mid-air collisions.
The risk associated with a hazard, then, is the possible hazard damage (consequences),
combined with the likelihood of an accident occurring:
Risk. Risk is the likelihood and consequences of an accident occurring in a system.
In risk assessment, the damage associated with a hazard is usually referred to as the conse-
quences or costs of the risk. These consequences may be foreseen or unforeseen, that is,
all the consequences associated with a risk are not necessarily known beforehand.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship between hazard and risk.
Risk
Hazard Level
Risk Likelihood
Likelihood
Hazard Hazard LklhoHazardar of hazard
Severity/ HaadExposure/ofhzr
DeI Likelihood Duration leading to
an accident
Risk Consequences and Costs
Foreseen feseen
Figure 1.1 Components of Riska
a. Based on [Leveson, 1995]
The likelihood of an accident has three components: the likelihood of the hazard occur-
ring, the hazard duration or exposure, and the likelihood of the hazard leading to an acci-
dent. Where these probabilities are quantified and independent, they can be multiplied to
yield a single probability. Unfortunately, they are rarely independent, as discussed in
Chapter 2. Looking at each probability individually may be useful as it provides better
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understanding of the way that an accident could occur. In the STAMP model, the likeli-
hood of a particular risk is the likelihood of the system moving outside the constraint(s)
associated with that risk.
1.3.2 Risk, Probability, and Consequence
Risk is usually measured in two 'physical' dimensions: probability and consequence. The
expected value of risk is the combination of the probability and consequence.
Probability
There are two dominant philosophical concepts of probability. The frequentist approach
views uncertainty as a true property of nature and considers probabilities to refer to the
relative frequencies of objective physical events in repeated trials.
This approach is best illustrated by means of an example. Begin with a pair of fair dice.
There are thirty-six possible combinations, but only eleven possible totals can be obtained
from a single throw of the pair. There is only one way of throwing a double-six, so the
probability of obtaining a total of twelve is 1/36. There are four ways of obtaining a total
of five, so the probability is 4/36 = 1/9. This reasoning is familiar, and the understand-
ing is that if a large number of throws are made, 1/9 of them will result in a total of five.
Now look more closely at how these probabilities are obtained. The frequentist view of
probability begins by saying that if a large number of trials is conducted, and the number
of times that an event of interest occurs is counted, then the estimated probability of the
event occurring in a future trial is the number of prior occurrences divided by the number
of trials:
P(event) _>-"* " (1.1)
Ntrials
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Conducting large scale trials is often impossible, so the probability of an event is esti-
mated based on a model of the system. In the dice example, it is assumed that each of the
six faces of the die is equally likely to appear:
__1P(any given face) = (1.2)
This assumption is a model of a single die. By combining two such models the probabili-
ties of the compound events corresponding to throwing two dice can be calculated. The
rules of probability allow for the combination of multiple simple events to create probabil-
ities for compound events. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), discussed in Chapter 2,
is based on combining the probabilities of simple events to obtain the probabilities of sys-
tem failures.
The epistemic, or Bayesian, approach views probability as a subjective measure of uncer-
tainty used to express rational agents' degrees of belief in specific hypotheses. In this view
probabilities can be assigned not only to random events, but to any other kind of state-
ment. So, for example, a frequentist and a Bayesian might both assign a probability of 1/2
to the event of getting a head on a coin toss, the Bayesian could also assign a probability to
a personal belief, such as there being life on Mars, without making any assertion about rel-
ative frequency. In this sense, the Bayesian view of probability is wider. Bayesian infer-
ence can be used to update probabilities in a consistent and logical way to reflect a change
in the state of knowledge. Under a Bayesian view of probability, all uncertainty results
from a lack of knowledge. Thus there is no place for concepts like stochastic or random
error.
Probability can also be expressed in different ways. For example, the reliability of a com-
ponent could be defined as the probability of failing on demand or in terms of the mean
time between failure (MTBF), which is actually an inverse probability. When probabilities
are combined, care should be taken that they are all expressed in the same way.
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Consequences and Costs
An accident may have many undesirable consequences, sometimes referred to as costs.
Consequences can be financial (loss of income), human (loss of life or injury), loss of
property etc. For example, the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia resulted not only in the
tragic deaths of astronauts, but also in the (temporary, it is hoped) grounding of the
remaining shuttles.
When considering risks, all the associated consequences should be considered. The types
of cost considered will affect the decisions that are made on the basis of the risk assess-
ment. Should estimates be based on the worst possible consequence, or the most likely
consequence, or on something else? How costs are defined determines which options are
the most cost-effective or the safest. If the selected cost measures exclude an important
cost, informed decision making is not possible. For example, launching a space mission
without considering the cost of a loss of public support should the mission fail can result
in an underestimation of the risk and in contingency measures to ensured continued public
support not being put in place. Unfortunately, it may often be impossible to foresee all the
possible consequences.
Costs range from direct and easily quantifiable to indirect and unquantifiable. For a
project manager, a direct, quantifiable, cost of late system delivery is loss of revenue as a
result of late-delivery penalties. An indirect, quantifiable, cost is unavailability of man-
power for other projects. An indirect, unquantifiable, cost is loss of prestige by the project
manager. For the space launch company direct, quantifiable costs associated with the
launch failure are replacement costs for the rocket and possibly satellite (although these
are usually partially covered by insurance so that the cost is partially transformed into
increased insurance premiums). An indirect, less easily unquantifiable cost is satellite
industry mistrust resulting from the failed launch.
Defining and estimating the costs associated with an accident is difficult because accident
scenarios are usually not clearly defined or 'waiting to be measured'. What is seen as
Aspects of Risk 37
undesirable and how undesirable it is relative to other options depends on individual value
systems (cf. social complexity). For unprecedented accidents, it can be difficult to predict
all the types of costs and how big they will be. The process of defining and estimating
costs is subjective. For example, should human life be given a monetary value, and if so,
how? Should only immediate loss of life be considered, and if not, how long into the
future should the time horizon be extended? Different cost measures emphasise different
values. When cost is measured in terms of loss of life expectancy, younger people are
implicitly valued more than older people. There is no purely scientific way to answer this
type of question.
Costs can be converted into a common form to allow comparison or summation of risks.
The most common measurement of cost is monetary value. This conversion from one
measurement to another assumes a common value system, is necessarily subjective, and
may raise ethical issues.
Even when common cost measures can be found, accurately projecting costs is difficult.
Usually the costs fall within a range of values. Both the endpoints of the range for a partic-
ular cost as well as the distribution of the cost within that range may not be known with
certainty. Consider the simple case where a risk only has one cost associated with it.
Assuming that the probability of the risk is accurately known, the cost could then be repre-
sented as spanning a range of values, and provide an indication of the uncertainty about
the range limits and the distribution within the range. Generally there are multiple costs.
Assuming that all the costs are expressed in commensurable form, how should they be
combined? One approach is to sum over all the lowest and highest projected costs, gener-
ating worst and best case risks respectively. If the distribution of each cost within its
range, and the uncertainty of the range limits, are known, they can be combined to yield
the risk distribution and uncertainty. The distributions are often not known, however. The
resulting risk limits then provide only a rough estimate of the risk, and determining the
uncertainty associated with this number is difficult. Although combining all the costs into
a single number is tempting, the resultant loss of information may be so severe that this
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number has little meaning. Simple metrics for complex systems are bound to fail in this
way.
The Expected Value of Risk
Risk is often defined risk as some combination of probability and consequence, usually
the expected value of risk:
E[Risk] = Probability x Consequence (1.3)
Conceptually, this definition should enable easy ranking of risks and thus simplify deci-
sion-making. In practice, it has limited use. It is not applicable to rare events or to events
with widely differing costs. For example, consider two different lotteries where you pay
$10 for a ticket. In the first lottery, you have a 1 in 10 chance of winning $100. The
expected value, or risk, of this lottery is $10. In the second lottery you have a 1 in 10 000
chance of winning $100 000. Like the first lottery, this lottery has an expected value of
$10. However, you are unlikely to value both lotteries equally.
The expected value definition further assumes that the consequences of different events
can be estimated and are commensurate. When comparing two risks with different types
of consequences, e.g. financial loss and loss of life, formula (1.3) is not readily applied.
Risk is not a simple concept and the expected value of risk is not useful except in the sim-
plest cases. It permits easy ranking of options, but because the calculation allows so many
inaccuracies, such a ranking is suspect. By keeping the factors separate, the risk associated
with a particular choice can be better understood.
1.3.3 The Dual Nature of Risk: Objectivism and Constructivism
A major debate in risk management centers on the philosophical question of objectivism
versus constructivism [Klinke and Renn, 2002]. Objectivism, or realism, holds that techni-
cal estimates of risk are true representations of observable hazards regardless of the beliefs
or convictions of analysts. This approach can also be described as the technocratic mode
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[Cotgrove, 1981], where values and beliefs are excluded and emphasis is placed instead
on 'scientific' data. Figure 1.2 illustrates the technocratic thinking process, and its appli-
cation to risk assessment and management.
Technocratic thinking...
Scientific Logical Rational
Facts Processing Decisions
... applied to risk
Calculated 10Risk/Cost/Benefit 10Rational
Risks Comparison Decisions
Figure 1.2 Technocratic Thinking in Risk Assessmenta
a. Adapted from [Cotgrove, 1981]
Many scholars have questioned the possibility of conducting objective analyses of risk.
Perhaps 'technical' risk assessments reflect only the convictions of the professional risk
assessors and as such have no more validity or universality than the assessments of other
stakeholders, such as the lay public. The results of a risk assessment are affected by the
values and backgrounds of those assessing risks. Extra-scientific or 'soft' factors always
affect estimates of risk, but their effect is only noticed or manifested when there are value-
based disagreements [Hatfield and Hipel, 2002]. For example group of engineers assess-
ing risk in a plant probably have the same backgrounds and training and hence similar
views of risk. It may be necessary to introduce an outside investigator with a different
background to reveal underlying assumptions that affect the risk assessment. Constructiv-
ism, then, holds that risk assessments constitute mental constructions that can at best be
checked against standards of consistency, cohesion, and internal conventions of logical
deduction. These assessments have no validity outside the assessor's logical framework. If
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risk assessments are nothing but social constructions, then they have no more normative
validity for guiding regulatory action than stakeholder estimates or public perceptions.
Taking a purely objectivist view of risk ignores the social processing of risk information.
Our attitude to risk, with its element of uncertainty, depends both on beliefs about risk and
on value systems. Briefly put, beliefs x values = attitudes [Cotgrove, 1981]. When
considering a given course of action, individuals have certain beliefs about the possibility
of consequences, which do not necessarily coincide with 'scientific' assessments. Individ-
uals do not all necessarily have the same perceptions of the consequences of a particular
course of action. Value systems determine whether we view the consequences are desir-
able or undesirable and to what degree. Thus people may have completely different per-
ceptions of risks and their origins. For example, consider the thousands of people who die
every year on US Highways [Clarke and Short, 1993]. This statistic is often used to ques-
tion why people are afraid of a one in a million cancer risk from toxic chemicals, when
there are obviously much more likely dangers to worry about. Part of the answer is that
people feel they have little control over their exposure to toxic chemicals. But another pos-
sible question is why so many people are killed on highways. The standard response is
human error, but one could just as easily question the road design, lack of public transpor-
tation, or automobile design. Or one could question how the statistic was created in the
first place, or how the data are defined, collected, and analyzed.
By acknowledging the constructivist aspect of risk, a better understanding of the way that
people perceive risk can be gained. Socially constructed dimensions of risk affect how
people perceive risk. This, in turn, affects which risks they will consider acceptable in a
given situation. Because these dimensions are socially constructed, they will tend to differ
from one situation to another. There is no master set of dimensions. Nevertheless, some
example dimensions are useful as a start. Table 1.1 suggests dimensions that reflect both
the technical and socially constructed aspects of risk.
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TABLE 1.1 Aspects of Riska
Aspect
Extent of damage
Probability of occurrence
Incertitude
Ubiquity
Persistency
Reversibility
Delay effect
Violation of equity
Potential of mobilization
Description
Adverse effects such as deaths, injuries, property damage.
Estimate of the frequency of the loss event.
Overall indicator for the uncertainty components (e.g. uncertainties in
probability distributions).
Geographic dispersion of potential damage.
Temporal extent of potential damage.
Possibility of restoring the situation to its state before the damage
occurred (e.g. oil spill cleanup).
Latency between the initial event and the actual impact of damage.
Discrepancy between those who enjoy the benefits and those who bear
the risks.
Potential for social action arising from inequity and injustice; psycholog-
ical stress and discomfort; potential for social conflict and mobilization;
spill-over effects (e.g. highly symbolic losses).
a. Adapted from [Klinke and Renn, 2002]. See also [Slovic, 2000] for additional dimensions such as
controllability-the extent to which people can control their risk exposure.
On the other hand, taking a purely constructivist viewpoint can lead to the technical,
human, organizational and other factors underlying the risks being underemphasized and
so reduce understanding of how best to deal with the risks. A purely constructivist or
purely objectivist view of risk provides incomplete understanding. It is not obvious, how-
ever, how to reconcile these different viewpoints. Two things are clear: the consequences
of realized risks are real; and the socially constructed aspects of risk strongly affect how
people feel about risks and their exposure to them. However these additional dimensions
are not criteria for determining whether someone is at risk, they merely determine peo-
ple's attitudes towards risks. One approach to reconciling the two viewpoints is to use
social, political and other processes to set the thresholds of acceptable risks (criteria for
evaluating risks), and technical assessments to determine the extent of risks [Klinke and
Renn. 2002].
----------------t__
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1.4 Terminology
This section defines the various processes that will be referred to in this thesis.
Hazard Analysis. The identification of hazards and the assessment of hazard levels
[Leveson, 1995].
Risk Analysis. The identification and assessment of risks.
Risk Identification. The process of identifying hazards and the associated environmental
conditions that will inevitably lead to an accident.
Risk Assessment. The process of determining the likelihood and/or consequences and
costs associated with identified risks.
Risk Evaluation. The process by which societal institutions such as agencies, social
groups, or individuals determine the acceptability of a given risk [Klinke and Renn, 2002].
Risk Communication. The communication of the results of a risk analysis to stakehold-
ers such as company executives and potentially affected communities.
Risk Management. The process of maintaining risk at an acceptable level throughout the
lifetime of a system.
1.5 Research Goals and Thesis Outline
Complex socio-technical systems pose a challenge to risk managers. The complexity of
these systems makes it difficult to identify and assess risk. When risks are not identified or
are underestimated disaster, can ensue. In particular, recent accidents have demonstrated
that an understanding of the way organizational behaviour contributes to risk is critical to
effectively managing risk.
This thesis develops an approach to risk analysis that is applicable to modem, complex
socio-technical systems. The research follows a two-fold approach to developing an alter-
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native approach to risk assessment: theoretical and empirical. The theoretical approach
draws on various disciplines and concepts to draw up a conceptual framework for assess-
ing risk. The empirical approach uses examples of systems to identify common properties
or behaviours that have an effect on safety. Figure 1.3 illustrates how these fields and con-
cepts contribute to the development.
Figure 1.3 Research Foundations
Chapter 1 has introduced the concept of risk and the nature of accidents in modern com-
plex socio-technical systems. Chapter 2 looks at risk management as a decision-making
process and develops a set of criteria for what makes a good risk analysis. Based on these
criteria, current risk analysis techniques are evaluated. These techniques do not appear to
provide a good basis for decision making. An alternative approach is needed.
The importance of organizational factors in accidents has gained increasing acceptance.
Numerous authors have written on the topic. In particular, sociologists have developed
several theories to explain why accidents occur and how they can be prevented. Chapter 3
reviews three of the most popular sociological and organizational approaches to safety:
normal accidents theory, high reliability organizations, and normalization of deviance.
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Chapter 4 discusses the dynamic aspects of risk in organizations. First, a framework is
developed to analyse the strategic trade-off between short and long term goals and under-
stand why organizations tend to migrate to states of increasing risk. Next, a set of arche-
types of organizational safety are developed. These archetypes describe specific
mechanisms by which organizations unintentionally or unknowingly increase or fail to
decrease risk, despite their best intentions. Each archetype is illustrated by means of
examples from various industries.
Chapter 5 proposes an alternative approach to risk analysis and management based on sys-
tems theory. The proposed approach moves beyond event-based models to include risks
that do not depend only on component or subsystem failures, and incorporate human,
organizational, and societal factors. By taking an explicit lifecycle view of systems, the
approach enables (1) the early identification of risks and risk mitigation strategies, (2) aids
in the allocation of resources to best manage risk, and (3) provides for the continuous
monitoring of risk throughout the system lifecycle. In addition, the approach emphasizes
and enables the participation of members at all levels of the organization as well as other
stakeholders in order to best identify, assess, and manage risks. The proposed approach
addresses technical, human, organizational, and other factors.
Chapter 6 presents conclusions and suggestions for further work.
Chapter 2
ASSESSING RISK ASSESSMENT
Unless a person has calculated a risk, with its uncertainty, outlined his procedure, and
highlighted the omissions, we cannot be sure he has made a reasoned, rational, decision...
Risk assessment should not be an arcane discipline, carried out by narrowly focused
experts in a back room.
Richard Wilson and Edmund Crouch, 2001
Risk is a construct that we use to help us in choosing between different courses of action.
We make decisions based on risk every day, whether explicitly or implicitly. For example,
at a road crossing we may implicitly decide that it is too risky to cross when the traffic
light is red. Risk assessment is the explicit identification and evaluation of the risks associ-
ated with different courses of action. Its purpose is to act as a decision-aiding tool. For
example: Should a nuclear plant be built in a particular location? Therefore, in designing a
risk assessment methodology, the aim should be to represent risks in a way that aids deci-
sion making. What, then, determines whether or not a risk assessment is good? This chap-
ter develops a set of criteria for evaluating risk analysis methodologies. Then, current risk
analysis techniques are reviewed and evaluated with respect to these criteria.
2.1 Criteria for Evaluating Risk Analysis Methodologies
Risk analyses are used to aid decision-making about uncertain situations. A risk analysis is
good if it enables good decision-making. There is some debate about what makes a deci-
sion 'good'. One way of defining decisions is by their outcomes: good decisions are those
with good outcomes. But in some cases this approach equates good decision-making with
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good luck and bad decision-making with bad luck. An alternative definition of good deci-
sions is decisions that reflect the best judgement given the information that was available
at the time. For the purpose of this research, it is sufficient to note that it is difficult to
make good decisions when the data on which the decisions are based is incomplete, inac-
curate, or of questionable veracity.
This section develops a set of criteria for risk analysis based on the characteristics of
socio-technical systems.
2.1.1 Criteria in the Literature
Although the literature on risk assessment, management and related fields is extensive,
surprisingly little has been written about how one should evaluate a risk analysis method-
ology. In an early work, Fischhoff et al. discuss the generic complexities that decisions
about acceptable risk present [Fischhoff et al., 1983]:
1. Uncertainty about how to define the decision problem;
2. Difficulties in assessing the facts of the matter;
3. Difficulties in assessing the relevant values;
4. Uncertainties about the human element in the decision-making process; and
5. Difficulties in assessing the quality of the decisions that are produced.
Using these complexities as a starting point, the authors develop a list of seven criteria for
evaluating approaches to analysing risk. A risk assessment methodology must be
1. Comprehensive
2. Logically sound
3. Practical
4. Open to evaluation
5. Politically acceptable
6. Compatible with institutions
7. Conducive to learning
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More recently, Haimes has built on these characteristics to provide ten characteristics of a
good risk assessment, unfortunately without any explanation of how the additional criteria
were derived [Haimes, 1998]:
1. Comprehensive
2. Adherent to evidence
3. Logically sound
4. Practical
5. Open to evaluation
6. Based on explicit assumptions and premises
7. Compatible with institutions
8. Conducive to learning
9. Attuned to risk communication
10. Innovativel
The next section adapts and augments these criteria to reflect the role that risk analysis
should play in managing risk over the entire lifecycle of a system.
2.1.2 Criteria for Continuous Participative Risk Analysis
The traditional view of risk assessment is that it is an activity that is carried out at the
beginning of a system's lifecycle, thus providing a 'snapshot' of the risk associated with
the system design. Based on this view, a set of static requirements can be developed,
focussing on the accuracy of the risk assessment of the system design. By next expanding
the view to consider risk over the lifecycle of the system (a constantly evolving picture), a
set of dynamic requirements can be developed, focussing on providing the best informa-
tion for managing risk over the lifetime of the system.
1. This criterion is rather odd. It would seem that Haimes is pushing innovation for the sake of innovation!
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2.1.3 Static Requirements
The first concern for a risk analysis methodology is that it can be used in practice by peo-
ple other than academics. That is, the methodology must be practical (1), and compatible
with the institutions (2) with which and in which it is intended to be used. Impractical and
incompatible tools are rarely adopted outside academia.
From an engineering standpoint, the two 'physical' attributes of risk, probability and con-
sequence, may appear to sufficiently characterize risk. But Chapter 1 argued that the per-
ception of risk is also affected by social and psychological attributes, such as incertitude,
ubiquity, persistency, irreversibility, latency, and inequity in distribution of risk [Klinke
and Renn, 2002]. These attributes, though often ignored by the technical community,
affect attitudes towards risk and whether or not a given risk is found to be acceptable, both
inside and outside the organization. In developing a risk assessment methodology these
attributes must therefore be taken into consideration, both in the evaluation and in the
communication of risks (3).
Risks that are not known cannot be managed. The assessment must be comprehensive (4).
It should consider more causal factors than component failure and deal with emergent
behaviours such as system accidents. It should provide for the inclusion of non-technical
factors such as human, organizational, political, and societal factors. If the assessment is
not logically sound or does not adhere to the available evidence, risks be may under- or
overestimated, and some risks may not be identified at all. In such cases the risk manage-
ment program is hobbled and will be limited in its effectiveness. The assessment must be
logically sound (5) and adherent to the evidence (6).
The purpose of risk assessment is to aid decision making about risks. Making good deci-
sions requires understanding the results and limitations of the assessment. The results of
the assessment must be represented in such a way that decision makers can understand the
risks and where they come from (7). Any risk assessment must make assumptions and will
therefore be subjective. The risk assessment technique itself has underlying assumptions
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about how accidents occur and about how risk should be modelled. For example, Probabi-
listic Risk Assessment (PRA) assumes that accidents happen only as a result of compo-
nent failure, thus excluding most system accidents. When performing a risk assessment,
the analyst must make assumptions about what is important and what is not. These
assumptions must be made explicit to reveal the limitations of the assessment and so that
they can be challenged and changed if necessary (8). Undocumented or implicit assump-
tions expose the entire risk evaluation process to second-guessing'. To build trust in the
process inside and outside the organization, the assessment and its results must be open to
evaluation (9). For example, varying levels of confidence in data should be made explicit.
The methodology should not require such a high degree of specialised knowledge that
other people in the organization cannot follow or understand the process or its results.
Static Requirements. The static requirements can be summarised as follows:
1. Be practical
2. Be compatible with institutions
3. Allow for inclusion of 'non-physical' risk attributes
4. Be comprehensive
5. Be logically sound
6. Be adherent to evidence
7. Represent results in a way that facilitates understanding
8. Explicitly document assumptions and premises
9. Open the process and results to evaluation
This list includes all the requirements given by [Fischhoff et al., 1983] and [Haimes,
1998], except for "politically acceptable", which is here subsumed under (2); "innovate",
1. In the 1980s, questions were raised in Canada about the safety of the herbicide Alachlor. A controversy
arose when three different stakeholder groups performed what they saw as objective, scientific assess-
ments of the carcinogenic risk posed by Alachlor, only to come to three different answers. The different
results arose not from bad science or incompetence, but from underlying value differences [Brunk et al.,
1991]. Perhaps more explicit documentation and communication of the underlying values and assump-
tions would have revealed the underlying causes of the controversy and allowed an agreement to be
reached [Hatfield and Hipel, 2002].
49
50 ASSESSING RISK ASSESSMENT
for which the reasoning is not clear; and "conducive to learning" and "attuned to risk com-
munication", which are included under dynamic requirements.
Now consider the requirements that arise from a view of risk as dynamic.
2.1.4 Dynamic Requirements
Risks are either accepted or rejected. They are accepted if they are judged to be suffi-
ciently low, and they are rejected if they are judged to be too high. This judgement process
may involve negotiation: risks that are initially deemed too high are sometimes accepted if
no plausible alternatives can be found. If a risk is accepted, 'coping' strategies for dealing
with the potential consequences of the risk must be devised and assessed. If a risk is
rejected, system developers have two general options. They can abandon the system con-
cept. Second, they amend the design to reduce risk to an acceptable level. This choice may
entail a compromise on system performance or cost.
One approach to risk management is to perform the risk analysis once the system design
has been completed. If necessary, the design is then adapted to bring risk to an acceptable
level. Alternatively, if the risk is unacceptably high and cannot be lowered the project
must be abandoned, and the time and money invested to that point lost.
This approach has obvious disadvantages. Once design decisions have been made, they
are often not easily adaptable or reversible. Developing alternative designs late in the sys-
tem development process is often not feasible. Manufacturing may already be in process,
or there may not be sufficient time or resources to develop or implement alternative
designs. Designers may in many cases be forced to rely on after-the-fact risk mitigation.
Risk mitigation strategies developed after the system has been designed tend to have a
'band-aid' nature, since more elegant solutions often require fundamental changes in the
system design. Such mitigation strategies are often less effective or reliable. For example,
extensive and complicated operating instructions will in general not be followed without
mistakes. The result is a system design that manages risk retroactively, which may
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increase cost, decrease performance, and leave the system with greater than necessary
risk.
One of the reasons for using this apparently suboptimal approach to risk management is
that existing risk assessment methods require a nearly complete system design as input.
For example, as will be discussed in detail later, PRA works by assembling component
data into system-level failure probabilities; it cannot be performed without detailed
knowledge about components and their place in the system. A better approach is to start
the risk analysis as soon as a system concept is considered, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Risk assessment should aid in the development of coping strategies (10), alternative
designs (11), and mitigation strategies (12). Each time a decision is made, the impact of
the decision on the system must be considered. Activities aimed at reducing one risk often
give rise to a new risk elsewhere in the system. For example, the introduction of comput-
ers and software as a way of reducing the impact of human error has brought with it a
whole new set of potential accident scenarios [Leveson, 1995]. The risk assessment
should facilitate analysis of mitigation strategies and alternative designs and their impact
on the system and its risk.
Chapter 4 will discuss the concept of adaptation in systems and how systems tend to
migrate to the boundaries of safety. Safety tends to degrade in the absence of conscious
effort [Rasmussen, 1997]. The risk assessment must allow for this dynamic behaviour in
two ways. First, it must be structured in a way that allows convenient updating of the
assessment as the system or its environment change (13). The results and method of the
assessment must be open to examination and updating. Second, the assessment should
indicate where and how adaptation may occur, so that risk managers can become aware
when the boundaries of safe behaviour are being approached (14). The assessment should
provide for the explicit representation of this migration, in order that it can be made obvi-
ous to decision makers before the boundaries are passed.
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Employees can be a good source of information about an organization and the risks it
faces. While expert risk assessors (should) have a good understanding of the risk assess-
ment methodology and system safety, employees may have insights that are not formally
documented. Maintaining or improving safety requires active participation from workers
[Backstrum, 1997]. The results of the communication should be comprehensible and cred-
ible not only to management, but also to workers, at least as it pertains to their spheres of
influence. Comprehensibility and credibility can be obtained by involving workers in the
entire risk assessment process, from the structuring of objectives to the decision-making
process. Alternatively, workers should be able to visualize the process and results of the
assessment in an understandable way. By including employees in the risk assessment pro-
cess (15), their insights can be used to obtain a more complete and accurate view of the
risk. Furthermore, employees who are included in the risk assessment process will have a
better understanding of how employees' behaviour affects risk. Including employees can
encourage them to monitor risk in their part of the system and can empower them to speak
up when problems arise.
Finally, the risk assessment must facilitate learning so that risk in the current and possible
future systems can be better managed (16). The organization can avoid future mistakes by
learning which risk management strategies work and which do not. For example, if a risk
assessment reveals that a particular system design introduces unnecessary risks, such a
design should be avoided in the future. Instead of relying on institutional memory, the risk
assessment should provide mechanisms to retain this knowledge.
Dynamic Requirements. By viewing risk assessment as part of an iterative risk manage-
ment process, the importance of taking a dynamic view of risk becomes apparent. This
view gives rise to additional risk assessment criteria that are not traditionally considered.
The dynamic requirements can be summarised as follows:
10. Aid in the development and assessment of coping strategies.
11. Aid in the development and analysis of mitigation strategies.
12. Be convenient to update to reflect changing risks.
Qualitative Risk Representation
13. Aid in identifying when the boundaries of safe behaviour are being
approached.
14. Encourage and enable worker involvement.
15. Facilitate learning.
The next section reviews existing approaches to risk assessment of engineering systems
and shows that, for modern socio-technical systems, these approaches do not satisfy the
criteria for a good risk assessment methodology.
2.2 Qualitative Risk Representation
Risk analysis methods can be roughly classified as being quantitative or qualitative. In
practice, specific instances fall somewhere on the continuum between being purely quali-
tative and being fully quantitative. Risks are usually classified according to their likeli-
hood and/or consequences. High-consequence, high-likelihood risks are deemed the most
critical, while low-consequence, low-likelihood risks are deemed less important. Although
psychological and social dimensions of risk have been identified (see above), these are
rarely used in practice, because they are difficult to assess, quantify or communicate.
Critical Item Lists (CILs) are used to maintain a record of those items whose failure could
result in an accident. As such they can be useful in ensuring that attention is paid to these
items. NASA classifies items whose failure could lead to a loss of the shuttle and crew as
Criticality 1 (C1) and Criticality IR (CIR), when there are redundant critical components.
But this classification is easily changed and may even lead to problems. On the Space
Shuttle Challenger the primary and secondary O-rings were mistakenly classified as CIR,
under the erroneous belief that they provided redundant protection. The cold temperatures
on the day of the launch affected both 0-rings in the same way, an instance of a common-
mode failure.
Risk matrices, or, likelihood-consequence grids, as shown in Figure 2.1, are commonly
used to document the perceptions (inside or outside the organization) of the most critical
risks in a system. They are usually used to prioritize hazards. Engineers may use their 'gut
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feel' to estimate the risk of a system failure. Or the matrix may be used to represent per-
ceptions of risks by different sectors of the public. Risk matrices may also provide a con-
venient summary of the results of another risk assessment.
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Figure 2.1 Risk Matrix
Strictly speaking risk matrices are not a risk analysis technique, but rather a way of elicit-
ing or summarising perceptions of risks. They are included here however because they are
often used instead of other risk assessment techniques.
Risk matrices have three major limitations. When they are constructed at the component
or subsystem level, it is difficult to combine the information to estimate the risks for the
entire system. When they are constructed at the system level they are of limited use in
identifying leverage points for reducing risk (12, 13). Finally, they cannot be used for soft-
ware design errors for which probability of failure is meaningless or unknowable.
2.3 Quantitative Risk Assessment
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) also classifies risks according to their likelihood or
consequence, but attempts to quantify these dimensions. Because the problem of deter-
mining the consequences of risks is difficult, fraught with ambiguity, and highly domain-
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specific (see Chapter 1), the focus is primarily on quantifying the likelihood of risks. Spe-
cialised techniques for estimating consequences are sometimes added to the standard
QRA techniques to gain a more complete picture.
2.3.1 FMEAs and FMECAs
FMEAs and FMECAs attempt to identify a system's weak points or components (critical
items) whose failures could lead to accidents. By identifying weak points, FMEAs can be
useful in identifying which parts of the system should be changed to reduce risks. While
FMECAs are usually performed for parts with known failure rates, risk matrices can also
be used to classify the estimated severity and frequency of each failure, as discussed
above. The analysis considers each failure individually without regard to other failures in
the system. Therefore FMECAs are not suitable for systems with a fair degree of redun-
dancy or for those where common mode failures are a significant problem [Rausand and
Hoyland, 2004]. More important, most accidents are caused by multiple interacting fail-
ures, a possibility that is ignored by these techniques. FMEAs and FMECAs examine and
document all component failures, including those that do not have significant conse-
quences. The resulting documentation burden is often unnecessarily large [Rausand and
Hoyland, 2004]. Like other component failure based models, they are of no use in predict-
ing accidents that are not caused by component failure (4). FMEAs and FMECAs are reli-
ability engineering tools and have their uses in that area. But like other bottom-up
approaches, they are of limited value in examining and ensuring the safety of complex
socio-technical systems.
FMEAs and FMECAs have their place in system development and operation. They should
not be mistaken for system level risk assessment tools however.
2.3.2 Actuarial Approaches
The two most common approaches to QRA are the actuarial approach and Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA) [Rasmussen, 1991]. The actuarial approach uses past accident
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data to estimate the future probabilities of accidents. This method is useful when there is a
substantial record of past experience on which to base the estimate of accident frequency.
When applying this estimate to future accidents, care must be taken to account for changes
in the system or its environment that may affect the accident rate. For example, changes in
technology may affect the accident rate. When Airbus introduced the A320, the first air-
craft with substantial automation, the accident rate increased above the average for com-
mercial jet airliners until unforeseen problems with the automation were resolved.
Because it relies on past accident data, the actuarial approach is not applicable to new sys-
tems that do not yet have an operating history, systems that have changed significantly, or
to systems where the accident rate is very low. An alternative approach that uses the sys-
tem's design and operating environment to estimate risk is needed.
2.3.3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PRA was developed in the nuclear industry in the 1960s to estimate the probability of
accidents in both existing and new nuclear plants in the absence of historical accident
rates. The probability may be either an accident frequency or the probability of failure on
demand, for example, the probability that a car will fail to start when the ignition switch is
turned [Rasmussen, 1991]. PRA works by breaking a system down into subsystems and
components, until a level is reached where reliability data for the subsystem or component
can be estimated. For example, even though very few actual core melt accidents have
occurred, significant data on the reliability of the pumps and valves in a nuclear plant may
be available. The data are then re-aggregated, using some form of system models, such as
event and fault trees, to estimate the overall probability of accidents for the entire system.
The technique is therefore dependent on the concept of component failure as the driver for
accidents. Component reliability data are estimated on the basis of test and experimental
data, extrapolations of historical data, surrogate or generic data, and/or expert judgment.
Obviously the accuracy of the results depend firstly on the accuracy of the model (e.g. are
crucial failure modes included?), and secondly on the accuracy of the component reliabili-
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ties. Apart from the problem of estimating component reliabilities, there are insurmounta-
ble problems resulting from the bottom-up modelling approach.
A PRA of a system begins by defining a set of undesirable consequences, or end states
(accidents). PRA assumes that each end state can be traced back to an initiating event (IE)
through a sequence of discrete events. These IEs are identified as disturbances to normal
operation, such as hardware failures, human errors, or natural phenomena. It is assumed
that the likelihood of lEs can be estimated using physical models (e.g. structural analysis
of a damwall), models of human performance' (e.g. human error rates), historical data
(e.g. component failure rates), expert opinion, and so forth. The postulated sequence of
events between the lEs and undesirable end states is identified using logic diagrams such
as event and fault trees.
Figure 2.2 Fault Tree
1. The only existing models of human performance are for extremely simple skills. Individual differences
make it difficult to use even these physical skill estimates.
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Fault Trees. A fault tree is a directed graph that uses Boolean logic to represent how
binary-valued primary conditions combine to result in the top event. A fault tree analysis
begins with an undesirable end state and then works backwards (deductively) to find
which combinations of component failures can result in the end state. For example, for a
nuclear plant the top event may be 'loss of electric power' [Rasmussen, 1991], as shown
in Figure 2.2. In the nuclear plant both AC and DC power sources are required to power
the safety systems. In other words, if the AC or DC power or both fail, the safety systems
lose power, as indicated by the "OR" gate in the diagram. AC power is supplied from both
an off-site grid and from an on-site generator. Either is sufficient, as indicated by the
"AND" gate in the diagram. Using Boolean logic, an expression for the top event can be
derived:
PowerLoss = AllDC u (ACCoffsite n ACgenerator) (2.1)
The analysis continues downwards in this manner until it reaches components for which
reliability data are known. A detailed expression for the top event can then be derived, and
the probability of the top event can be obtained by filling in the probabilities for the indi-
vidual components. In practice it is computationally difficult to propagate the probabili-
ties, and a Monte Carlo analysis is often used to estimate the top event probability.
Event Trees. Event trees are almost the reverse of fault trees in that they work forward
(inductively) from an initiating event and develop a time-sequence of events to determine
which, if any, undesirable end states can be reached from the initiating event [Rasmussen,
1975]. The outcomes of each intermediate event are usually assumed to be binary (yes/no)
but may also include multiple outcomes (yes, partly, no).
Fault and event trees can be combined in 'bowties' where the top event in each fault tree is
propagated forward using an event tree, as shown in Figure 2.4. The fault tree is used to
identify how the initiating event could occur and with what probability, while the event
tree is used to model the possible end states and their severity.
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Figure 2.4 Fault Tree and Event Tree combined in a 'Bowtie'
Thus, using fault and event trees, sets of accident scenarios are developed for each unde-
sirable end state. When used in a quantitative analysis, probabilities for the individual
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events are combined to obtain probabilities for the end states. Theoretically, common-
cause and other dependent failures can be accounted for using probability techniques. In
practice coverage is limited both by the difficulty of identifying dependencies and by the
computational costs of accounting for these dependencies.
Fault and event trees for complex systems rapidly become very complex themselves. For
example, a fault tree for the International Space Station (ISS) was constructed with 28
undesirable end states. It has 65 event trees, 450 fault trees, and 1500 basic events (com-
ponent failures) [Futron, 2000]. This fault tree omits all human and software errors.
PRA is widely used in the nuclear industry, where it is seen as a cost-effective approach to
risk reduction [Garrick, 1987]. In other industries it is less widely used (2). For example,
its use in the U.S. space program remains contentious [cf. NASA, 1995; and Pate-Cornell
and Dillon, 2001]. The first PRA on the shuttle as a whole, in 1988, gave a then shock-
ingly high probability of 1/78 for the loss of the shuttle [Buchbinder, 1989]. Subsequent
studies have steadily improved the odds, from 1/90 (1993) [SAIC, 1993], to between
1/76 and 1/230 (1995) [SAIC, 1995], to 1/245 (1998)1. In each case the assumptions
behind the assessment changed, as well as the definition of the failure space (e.g. which
mission phases were included in the assessment). Whether this improvement in the esti-
mated odds is a clearer reflection of the true probability of failure is not clear. Currently
the historical frequency of failure for the Space Shuttle System is 2 failures out of 113 (or
about 1/52) total flights by the shuttle fleet. To illustrate the difficulty in determining the
correct measure of reliability, note that one could instead look at the historical failure rate
for each individual shuttle, as shown in Table 2.1
Another PRA study, started before the Columbia accident, is in process. Current results
indicate a median failure rate of 1/165 excluding the threat of micrometeorite orbital
damage (MMOD), and 1/123 including MMOD [Vesely, 2003].
1. Unpublished analysis. See, for example, [Vesely, 2003]
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TABLE 2.1 Space Shuttle Historical Failure Rates
First Flight # Flights Historical Failure Rate
Columbia 1981 28 1/28
Challenger 1982 10 1/10
Discovery 1983 30 0/30
Atlantis 1985 26 0/26
Endeavour 1991 19 0/19
Enterprisea
Total 113 2/113
a. Test vehicle not used for space flight
2.3.4 Evaluating Probabilistic Risk Assessment
This section uses the risk analysis criteria to demonstrate the limitations of PRA when
applied to complex socio-technical systems. For convenience, numbers in parentheses are
used to indicate when a particular criterion is being referenced. It may also be useful to
consult the summary table at the end of the chapter when reading these two sections.
Note that there are other approaches to risk assessment, some have been mentioned earlier
in this chapter. This evaluation focusses on PRA because it is a popular technique in the
nuclear and chemical industries and is gaining increasing acceptance in other areas, such
as the space industry.
Problems with Component Reliability Estimates. The system-level failure probability
estimates are dependent on the component reliability estimates. It is difficult for PRAs to
deal with the absence of data. Estimates of system-level failure probabilities require that
all the component failure probabilities be 'filled in'. The quality of the reliability data for
components or subsystems is often questionable, even though numbers may be stated to
several decimal places [e.g. Crawford, 2001]. Tests and experiments used to obtain com-
ponent reliability data do not always reflect the operating conditions of the component.
For example, a component may be operating in a different temperature range to that in
which it was tested. Similarly, extrapolations of historical data may not take changes in the
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operating conditions or component manufacturing processes, which may affect the com-
ponent reliability, into account. Surrogate or generic data, where a component's reliability
is estimated on the basis of a similar component's reliability, can easily be wrong. Expert
judgement can be prone to irrational biases such as organizational pressures and profes-
sional ideologies [Dietz and Rycroft, 1987]. Expert judgments do not always agree. If
more than one expert judgment is obtained, whose opinion is 'best' and how should the
data be combined? Software presents an even greater (and perhaps insurmountable) chal-
lenge. Software 'reliability' is not well-defined and most incorrect outputs have no rela-
tionship to particular hazards. How does one determine the probability of just one or two
particular erroneous outputs or behaviours?
The varying levels of confidence in data are not always explicitly made visible' (8). Spe-
cifically, when Bayesian updating is used, the subjectivity associated with determining
prior distributions is often not made apparent [Bier, 1999]. Worse, where data is unknown,
the tendency is therefore to use guesstimates or expert judgements. Poor data at the com-
ponent level will compromise the system-level results. PRAs thus do not necessarily pro-
vide a true reflection of the available evidence (6). Even apparently small changes in
component probabilities can have dramatic impacts on the top level probability. For exam-
ple, probability assignments that are assumed to be negligible sometimes have a signifi-
cant effect on the final results [Bier, 1999].
Limitations of Fault and Event Trees. Fault and event tree analysis was developed by
reliability theorists for relatively simple and primarily electro-mechanical systems, which
could often be represented completely and directly by trees. For example, assuming that
the component level failure rates were accurate, a fault tree of a system could be used to
determine the top level failure probability. As a result fault and event trees were and often
still are seen as being objective. But when these techniques are used on more complex sys-
1. Simply putting a probability distribution on component failure rates does not adequately address this
problem. Probability distributions are usually selected based on their convenience, or some feeling about
how the data 'ought' to be distributed.
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tems the construction of the trees becomes subjective. Because these systems involve so
much uncertainty, judgement is required to decide what to include in the trees and crucial
elements may be omitted because of ignorance, error, or lack of imagination.
Fault trees are limiting because a complete set of system failures cannot be defined for
even moderately complex systems [NASA, 1995]. For all but the most simple systems,
there will always be another way that something could go wrong, whether it is an addi-
tional branch on a fault tree, or an additional failure that had not been thought of before. It
is often difficult to incorporate additional scenarios or components into a completed fault
tree, and top level probabilities must be recalculated each time. The British nuclear sub-
marine 'Tireless' was forced to abandon exercises in the Mediterranean in 2000 when a
cooling-system pipe cracked. The possibility of this pipe cracking had not been considered
in the probabilistic risk analysis and (perhaps consequently) the pipe was never checked
during maintenance [Redmill, 2002]. Precision is not the same thing as accuracy and does
not imply it.
Similarly, for event trees it is difficult to define a complete set of initiating events that pro-
duce all the important accident sequences. In complex systems, there is no way of guaran-
teeing that all the event sequences that can lead to a particular accident have been
identified. It is also difficult or impossible to determine the order of functions across the
top of the event tree. When these functions interact with each other, as is the case in com-
plex or tightly coupled systems, there is no correct order of events, because any particular
ordering will exclude some interactions. Both event and fault trees can only model linear,
direct relationships between events, specifically, they cannot represent feedback or adapta-
tion [Rasmussen, 1997].
Fault and event trees do not handle common-cause or dependent failures well, and fall
apart if multiple common-cause failures must be considered (5, 6). PRAs tend to consider
only a small subset of common-cause failures. One unfortunate side-effect is that the
impact of redundancy on increasing system reliability can therefore be overestimated.
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High levels of redundancy increase system complexity and can therefore even lead to
accidents [Perrow, 1999a]. Risk mitigation strategies based on increasing redundancy may
perversely decrease system safety (12).
Due to its bottom-up reassembly nature, PRA rapidly becomes intractable (1) for large
systems, both in the sense of performing the PRA and in the sense of communicating and
understanding the results. PRAs have been performed for large systems such as the Inter-
national Space Station, but the fault and event tree models are so large that it is difficult to
conceive of them being free from error. Results of the PRA tend to be communicated at a
very high level, or focus on components or subsystems that the analysis indicates contrib-
ute significantly to the system-level failure probability. It is difficult for the decision mak-
ers to understand where and what the risks really are (7), and hence to make decisions
about dealing with these risks. Similarly it is difficult to include workers (e.g. operators,
supervisors) in the process (15). Developing coping and mitigation strategies and conceiv-
ing of alternative designs is therefore difficult (10, 11, 12). The complexity of the models
makes evaluation of the risk assessment by outsiders (to the risk assessment) difficult (9).
It is not practical to review exhaustively each individual component's reliability data, nor
can the fault and event tree models easily be evaluated without redoing the assessment.
Questionable Rigour. PRA breaks a problem down into smaller problems until a point is
reached where the problems can be solved. The approach is familiar to engineers and sci-
entists, who are trained to solve problems in this manner. As a result, PRA is seen as being
objective and rigorous when in fact it relies on subjective judgement. For complex sys-
tems, the PRA approach offers no guarantee of objectivity or rigour (6). In multiple
assessments of the same system, different assessors come up with different evaluations
[Pate-Cornell and Dillon, 2001]. Two reasons immediately come to mind. First, the quality
of the reliability data for components or subsystems is often questionable. Second, like
any risk assessment technique, PRA does not evaluate the risks of the system itself, but the
risks of a model of the system. A system model is never more than an approximation of
the system and is therefore subjective. System modelers decide, for example, where to
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draw the boundaries of the system and to what level of detail different system aspects are
modelled. PRA models are not excluded from this limitation. Modelers must decide what
types of failures (what goes wrong) to look at, and which failure scenarios (how it goes
wrong) to consider. The construction of fault and event trees is part art, especially in the
case of complex systems. It is thus highly likely that different modelers will not consider
the same set of failures or failure scenarios, and will construct different fault and event
trees, resulting in different assessments of risk. Any other risk assessment methodology
will run into the same problem, but in the case of PRA it can be very difficult to determine
how and why one model differs from another because the models are so large and
involved (8, 9).
Hidden Assumptions. PRA analyses generally do not make their assumptions explicit,
often because the analysts may not even be aware they are making these assumptions (8).
Of course any risk assessment is based on assumptions, but when these assumptions are
not made explicit the limitations of the analysis are not apparent. If the system or its envi-
ronment change and these assumptions become inappropriate, it may not be obvious that
the risk assessment must be adjusted. The focus on random component failures means that
there is an implicit assumption that the system design is correct, that the realised system
matches the design, and that the system is operated as intended. In reality, the design may
be flawed, the realised system almost never matches the design, and systems are never
operated in quite the way the designers intended. The PRA for nuclear power plants like
Chernobyl certainly never included the assumption that the operators would disable the
safety protections because they were under pressure to get a test done that would other-
wise have to wait six months. Under those circumstances, the probability was actually
quite high, certainly higher than in the calculations, which assumed the protections would
be operational (or would only fail due to random events). But if one considers the produc-
tion and other pressures on the operators, their behaviour appears less bizarre and even
'reasonable' (or at least understandable). Such pressures can be predicted, but they are
usually ignored because considering them makes PRA impractical or infeasible.
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Omission of System Accidents. When it comes to modern, complex, socio-technical
systems, PRA is becoming even less applicable. Because it is based on the concept of
component failures and event chains, it does not cover system accidents where no compo-
nents fail (4). It has an inherent bias toward random, mechanical-type errors. In fact, it is
difficult to find examples of accidents that are caused by genuinely random component
failures [Crawford, 2001]. Because it depends on component failure, PRA cannot assess
the contribution of software to system-accidents. Software (4) is often simply ignored, for
example by modelling it as a component with zero probability of failing (5). While it is
true that software does not fail in the sense of physically breaking like hardware does,
software has been blamed for many accidents. For example, the Ariane 5 rocket exploded
shortly after launch due to a bug in its software. Attempts have been made to include soft-
ware in PRA, but these methods all revert to the component failure concept at some level
and do not adequately account for the origin of software-related failures. See, for example,
[Garret and Apostolakis, 1999]. PRA therefore excludes an entire group of accident sce-
narios.
Poor Treatment of Human Factors. Incorporating the effects of cognitively complex
human interaction and organizational and societal influences in PRA is difficult (4).
Attempts to include these factors have focussed on extending the "component failure"
concept. When human interaction is modelled in a PRA, it is usually limited to models of
human error on the level of the individual. That is, the human is viewed as just another
system component that can fail. The best known technique for estimating human reliabil-
ity is the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) developed by Swain et al.,
see for example [Swain, 1990]. This technique includes only physical mistakes and not
mental errors. It handles the things that are most easily automated and therefore usually
are automated. Human error rate estimation techniques tend to have significant shortcom-
ings, especially when combined with each other and with machine component reliabilities
[Wickens and Hollands, 2000, pp.500-502]:
- Lack of Database: Empirical data for performance on simple acts and non-
stressed conditions exists. But data on the frequency of cognitive errors
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related to diagnosis and problem-solving, and the effects of stress are much
more limited and tend to rely heavily on expert opinion, which may be
wrong.
Although most accidents continue to be blamed on human error, there is
growing recognition that human error is in general not random and often
occurs because the design of the system makes it difficult or impossible to
avoid erring [Leveson, 1995].
- Error Monitoring: Humans monitor their own performance and often cor-
rect errors before they can affect system performance. The probability of
human error cannot be directly associated with the probability that the error
will result in a system failure.
- Non-independence of Human Errors: The assumption that human errors
are independent is untenable. The dependence may work in two directions.
Committing one error may result in an increase in frustration and stress and
so increase the probability of committing another error. Alternatively, com-
mitting one error may result in an increase in care and vigilance and so
decrease the probability of committing another error. In either case, one can-
not make the assumption that the probability of committing an error is inde-
pendent of whether an error was made at an earlier time. Similarly, the error
probabilities of two or more people cannot be assumed to be independent.
- Integrating Human and Machine Reliabilities: Human and machine reli-
abilities cannot be assumed to be independent. When a machine component
fails, it is likely to affect the probability of human failure. For example, the
operator may become more cautious and vigilant if a component has failed.
One result of the human error viewpoint is that safety improvement programs have tended
to direct their efforts at reducing human error. But it is now recognized that human error is
often the result of the interaction between the human operators and the rest of the system
and its environment. In particular, people are unlikely to undertake actions that do not
seem reasonable to them at the time, so that the majority of errors of commission (doing
the wrong thing) result from short-cuts, trying to satisfy competing goals and incentives
(e.g. production pressure), or misdiagnoses [Julius et al., 1995]. Similarly, errors of omis-
sion (neglecting to do the right thing) may also be driven at least in part by characteristics
of the system. Efforts to reduce human error by increasing punitive measures, for exam-
ple, may therefore only have limited effect (11, 12). For example, in an aircraft, both the
pilot and co-pilot may make the same mistakes if the aircraft interface is poorly designed.
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It has also been argued that some level of error must be tolerated in order to reduce the risk
of catastrophic accidents [Amalberti, 1996].
Poor Treatment of Organizational and Societal Factors. Likewise, organizational and
societal factors have a significant impact on human performance and safety. Research into
incorporating these factors into PRA has again attempted to extend the component failure
and event chain concepts by quantifying the impact of these factors on component or sub-
system failure probabilities, see, for example SHERPA [Embrey, 1992], SAM [Murphy
and Pat6-Cornell, 1996], and WPAM [Davoudian et al., 1994a]. In these approaches,
organizations are seen as influencing the likelihood of human errors, for example using
influence diagrams [Oliver and Smith, 1990]. While these approaches do provide insights
into organizational behaviours that can influence safety, the insights are so general that
they are not useful for improving the safety of a specific system (4, 11, 12) [Abramovici,
1998]. More important, they still rely on the component failure concept and so retain all
the associated limitations discussed above [cf. Hollnagel, 1998]. For example, they do not
take feedback into account (15).
Negative Impact on Risk Management. As illustrated by the examples of component
redundancy and human error reduction, the type of risk assessment influences the risk
management strategies that an organization uses. The result of the PRA focus on compo-
nent failure (and human error) is that most risk reduction or safety improvement programs
tend to focus on reducing the effects of component failures and reducing human error.
Because PRAs tend to model the physical system in great detail while omitting qualitative
effects such as organizational factors, they can lead to a false sense of accuracy [Murphy,
1994] and to ineffective mitigation measures (12). The focus on managing component
failures means that many safety management programs are in fact reliability improvement
programs: quality control and various forms of redundancy are used to reduce the likeli-
hood of individual component failures and their impacts, respectively. While redundancy
1. See also [Abramovici, 1998] for an overview of these and other techniques.
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can improve system reliability, it is only useful to a point. It does not provide any protec-
tion against common-mode failures. It increases system complexity, making it even harder
to understand the system. As long as the risk assessment techniques focus on component
failure and human error, risk mitigation strategies too will focus on component failure and
human error (12). PRA does not provide a way for understanding the complexities of
modern systems, and cannot aid us in learning how to deal with these systems (16).
PRA does not convincingly meet any of the risk assessment criteria. Because it provides
only a limited view of risk, risk management efforts based on the results of a PRA can
have only limited effectiveness, and may even decrease safety. An alternative approach
that complies with these criteria is needed.
The results of this section are summarised in Table 2.2 at the end of this chapter together
with requirements for an alternative risk analysis methodology that would better satisfy
the criteria.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has described the role of risk assessment in the risk management process and
developed a set of risk assessment criteria based on this view. Current risk analysis tech-
niques and their extensions do not address the requirements for risk assessment of com-
plex socio-technical systems. An alternative approach to risk analysis that addresses some
of these limitations is presented in Chapter 5.
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TABLE 2.2 Summary of PRA with respect to Risk Assessment Criteria
Risk Requirements for a New
Criterion Approach
1 Practical PRAs usually have to be performed Throughout the development of an
2 Compatible by experts. The models cannot be alternative approach, emphasis must
with institu- understood by those unfamiliar with be laid on making the approach
tions PRA techniques such as fault and user-friendly and practical.
event trees and Bayesian updating.
3 Take psycho- Psychological and social attributes Incorporating risk attributes other
logical and of risk are not considered. than likelihood and consequence is
social attributes difficult. Psychological and social
of risk into attributes of risk contribute to our
account. perception of risk, and contribute to
how people define what is accept-
able and what is not. A new
approach must find ways of
acknowledging and dealing with
these factors. This problem is easier
stated than solved, however.
4 Comprehensive Does not include system accidents, Stop using component failures as the
where components/subsystems work building blocks for the risk assess-
as they are supposed to. ment. Component failure is not a
The contribution of software to sys- good model for software or human
tem accidents is often simply behaviour. Techniques based on
ignored. component failure cannot incorpo-
Adequately accounting for the rate system accidents. An alternative
effects of cognitively complex might be to use "constraints" as the
human interaction and organiza- building blocks, as discussed in
tional and societal influences is dif- Chapter 1.
ficult.
5 Logically Does not include system accidents, An approach that is not based on
sound where components/subsystems work component failure may be able to
as they are supposed to. incorporate system accidents.
6 Adherent to Tendency to use guesstimates where Move away from component fail-
evidence data is unavailable. ures and the associated models (fault
trees, event trees, etc.) to open the
way up for models that can accom-
modate gaps in information.
7 Represent Single number descriptions of risk Clearly state assumptions and rea-
results in a way and a focus on components does not soning on which results are based.
that facilitates adequately describe complex risks.
understanding
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8 Explicitly doc- The focus on component failure car- The approach must help in identify-
ument assump- ries with it an underlying assump- ing and laying bare underlying
tions and tion that accidents where all the assumptions. It is never possible to
premises components work as they are sup- operate without assumptions, what
posed to, do not happen, or at least is important is that decision makers
are vanishingly rare. This assump- are aware of them as far as possible.
tion is rarely made visible.
Varying levels of confidence in
underlying data are not always made
visible.
9 Open process The complexity of the models Assumptions and reasoning must be
and results to makes evaluation of the risk assess- clearly documented.
evaluation ment by outsiders (to the risk assess-
ment) difficult.
10 Aid in the Inadequate identification and under- An approach that contributes to a
development standing of risks makes it difficult to system-level understanding of
and assess- devise coping strategies. behaviour and risk will also aid in
ment of "cop- the development of ways of dealing
ing" strategies with risk. A system-level under-
11 Aid in the Risk mitigation strategies and alter- standing will help in escaping the
development native designs that are proposed in problem of unwittingly replacing
and analysis of response to PRA results tend to one risk with another.
mitigation focus on eliminating unreliable
strategies components and increasing redun- What is needed are fundamental
dancy (i.e. reliability engineering solutions to risk-based problems,
techniques). These strategies do not not symptomatic solutions like
necessarily improve safety and may redundancy.
perversely even decrease it.
12 Be convenient Updating component failure rates is Assume that change will occur and
to update to simple, but adding additional com- provide mechanisms to incorporate
reflect chang- ponents necessitates re-analyzing change over the system lifetime.
ing risks fault and event trees.
13 Aid in identify- Because current PRA techniques do Incorporate both technical and non-
ing when the not account well for organizational technical factors. Do not rely solely
boundaries of and psychological factors, they can- on component failure. Provide ways
safe behaviour not identify when the boundaries of of easily incorporating updated
are being safe behaviour are being approached information and identifying new or
approached changed risks.
14 Encourage and It is difficult to involve workers and The approach must be open to and
enable worker to communicate the results. understandable by people other than
involvement the risk assessors. It should encour-
age a system-level understanding of
behaviour and risk.
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TABLE 2.2 Summary of PRA with respect to Risk Assessment Criteria
Facilitate learn-
ing
PRA does not provide a way for
understanding the complexities of
modern systems, and will not aid us
in learning how to deal with these
systems.
The approach must be open to and
understandable by people other than
the risk assessors. It should encour-
age a system-level understanding of
behaviour and risk.
To avoid overwhelming users with
detail, the technique should provide
for some form of "selective detail".
Users should be able to select the
detail with which they view differ-
ent aspects of the system. The aim is
to promote understanding, not
spread confusion.
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Chapter 3
ORGANIZATIONAL RISK THEORIES
"When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?"
John Maynard Keynes'
The importance of organizational factors in accidents has gained increasing acceptance.
Numerous authors have written on the topic. In particular, sociologists have developed
several theories to explain why accidents occur and how they can be prevented. This chap-
ter reviews three of the most popular sociological and organizational approaches to safety:
normal accidents theory, high reliability organizations, and normalization of deviance.
3.1 Normal Accidents Theory
Charles Perrow's initial formulation of Normal Accident Theory 2 (NAT) was developed in
the aftermath of the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979 [Per-
row, 1982]. He introduced the idea that in some technological systems, accidents are inev-
itable or 'normal', and defined two related dimensions-interactive complexity and loose/
tight coupling-which he claimed together determine a system's susceptibility to acci-
dents [Perrow, 1999a].
1. See http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?TERM=KEY-
NES%2C%20JOHN%20MAYNARD
2. The sections on Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Organizations are based on [Marais et al.,
2004].
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Interactive complexity refers to the presence of unfamiliar or unplanned and unexpected
sequences of events in a system that are either not visible or not immediately comprehen-
sible. A tightly coupled system is one that is highly interdependent: Each part of the sys-
tem is tightly linked to many other parts and therefore a change in one part can rapidly
affect the status of other parts. Tightly coupled systems respond quickly to perturbations,
but this response may be disastrous. Loosely coupled or decoupled systems have fewer or
less tight links between parts and therefore are able to absorb failures or unplanned behav-
ior without destabilization. Figure 3.1 provides examples of industries as classified by
Perrow according to coupling and interactive complexity'.
According to the theory, systems with interactive complexity and tight coupling will expe-
rience accidents that cannot be foreseen or prevented. Perrow called these system acci-
dents. When the system is interactively complex, independent failure events can interact
in ways that cannot be predicted by the designers and operators of the system. If the sys-
tem is also tightly coupled, cascading events can quickly spiral out of control before oper-
ators are able to understand the situation and perform appropriate corrective actions. In
such systems, apparently trivial incidents can cascade in unpredictable ways and with pos-
sibly severe consequences.
Perrow made an important contribution in identifying these two risk-increasing system
characteristics. His conclusion that accidents are inevitable in these systems is however
overly pessimistic. The argument advanced is essentially that most efforts to improve
safety in interactively complex, tightly coupled systems all involve increasing complexity
and therefore only make accidents more likely.
The flaw in this argument is that the primary engineering solution he considers is redun-
dancy. He correctly argues that redundancy introduces additional complexity and encour-
1. Note that Perrow's diagram classifies industries, not particular implementations. This level of classifica-
tion ignores the possibility of alternative design approaches to particular functional requirements. For
example, pebble bed nuclear reactors are designed to be less complex and less coupled than traditional
boiling water nuclear reactors.
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Figure 3.1 Interaction/Coupling Charta
a. Adapted from [Perrow, 1999a, Figure 3.1]
ages risk taking. He provides many examples of how redundant safety devices or human
procedures can not only be ineffective in preventing accidents, but can even be the direct
cause of accidents. A near meltdown at the Fermi demonstration reactor in Michigan in
1966, for example, occurred when a piece of zirconium installed inside the reactor as an
additional safety feature broke off and stopped the flow of coolant to the reactor core (see,
e.g., [Nuclearfiles, 2004]). The core was partially melted and the reactor was permanently
disabled.
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While Perrow's basic argument about redundancy is compelling, the use of redundancy is
not the only way to increase safety and many of the alternatives do not involve increasing
complexity. Redundancy and the use of protection systems are among the least effective
and the most costly approaches to designing for safety [Leveson, 1995]. More effective
approaches involve eliminating hazards or reducing their likelihood by means other than
redundancy, for example, substituting non-hazardous materials for hazardous ones, reduc-
ing unnecessary complexity, decoupling, designing for controllability, monitoring, and
interlocks of various kinds. Operations can also be made safer by reducing the potential
for human error, or by making systems more resilient to error or failure. A simple example
is the use of colour coding and male/female adapters to reduce wiring errors.
While it is usually not possible to predict all accident scenarios in complex systems, thor-
ough engineering analyses of system hazards can be used to prevent whole classes of
potential accidents. The consequences of accidents can be effectively mitigated without
completely identifying all potential causes. For example, life boats can be used to evacu-
ate passengers and crews from a sinking ship, regardless of the cause of the sinking.
Safer systems can be designed by limiting the interactive complexity and tight coupling in
designs. Interactively complex and tightly coupled designs are created because they often
allow greater functionality and efficiency to be achieved, but in some cases simpler,
decoupled designs may be able to achieve similar goals. Where systems cannot be decou-
pled or made simpler, an awareness of the risk posed by such systems can aid in develop-
ing positive safety cultures and also in improving the resilience of systems to errors,
failures, and accidents. Interactive complexity is by definition subjective and can therefore
be reduced through training and experience. The better people know and understand a sys-
tem the less likely they are to encounter interactions that they do not expect or understand.
3.2 High Reliability Organizations
High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are defined as the subset of hazardous organiza-
tions that enjoy a record of high safety over long periods of time1 :
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One can identify this subset by answering the question, "How many times could this orga-
nization have failed resulting in catastrophic consequences that it did not?" If the answer
is on the order of tens of thousands of times, the organization is 'high' reliability"' [Rob-
erts, 1990a, p.160].
By this definition, it is difficult to think of any low reliability organizations: Any organiza-
tion that did not have at least this type of safety record would be shut down immediately
except in cultures or countries where frequent catastrophic consequences and death is
acceptable. Such 'failure' can be hypothesized to be possible every second of the day for
most high-hazard activities and therefore an HRO might experience daily accidents and
deaths, certainly something that would not be tolerated in our society. The only way to
define safety or to compare organizations in terms of safety is to calculate accident rates
based on a particular activity over a common operational time period.
Definitional problems aside, HRO researchers seem to counter Perrow's hypothesis by
suggesting that some interactively complex and tightly coupled systems operate with very
few accidents. These conclusions are based on studies of two aircraft carriers, U.S. air
traffic control, utility grid management, the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant, and fire fighting
teams [La Porte and Consolini, 1991]. The key works in HRO include [Clarke, 1998;
Clarke, 1999; Clarke and Short, 1993; La Porte, 1996; La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Rob-
erts, 1990a; Roberts, 1990b; Rochlin, 1991; Weick, 1987; and Weick, 1990].
The critical flaw in the HRO argument is that the systems they studied are neither interac-
tively complex nor tightly coupled according to Perrow's definitions. Air traffic control
(ATC), for example, is as safe as it is precisely because the system design is deliberately
decoupled in order to increase safety. The ATC system is carefully divided into non-inter-
acting sectors and flight phases (en route, arrival, and takeoff and landing) with the inter-
faces between the sectors and phases (for example, hand-off of an aircraft between two air
traffic control sectors) carefully limited and controlled. Loose coupling is also ensured by
maintaining ample separation between aircraft so that mistakes by controllers can be rem-
1. The researchers most often associated with HROs are Todd La Porte, Gene Rochlin, Karlene Roberts,
Karl Weick, and Paula Consolini.
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edied before they impact safety. Different parts of the airspace are reserved for different
types of aircraft or aircraft operation (e.g., visual flight rules vs. instrument flight rules).
Additional warning devices, such as the traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), are
used to further reduce the likelihood of accidents.
The functions of aircraft carrier landing and take-off systems are similar to ATC (although
much simpler) except that carriers operate in more extreme environmental conditions.
Like ATC, the structure of aircraft carrier operations and systems reduce system coupling
and the availability of many different options to delay or divert aircraft, particularly during
peacetime operation (which was when the HRO studies were done), introduces essential
slack into the system. These systems are relatively simple and loosely coupled and safe,
thus seeming to support Perrow's arguments rather than contradict them (see also the
afterword to [Perrow, 1999a]).
The HRO researchers emphasize the low level of complexity in the systems they studied:
HROs struggle with decisions in a context of nearly full knowledge of the technical
aspects of operations in the face of recognized great hazard... The people in these organi-
zations know almost everything technical about what they are doing-and fear being
lulled into supposing they have prepared for every contingency... This drive for technical
predictability has resulted in relatively stable technical processes that have become quite
well understood within each HRO [La Porte and Consolini, 1991, pp.29-30] (emphasis
added).
Systems that allow "nearly full" knowledge are by definition not interactively complex. If
technical knowledge is near complete, as required for HROs, it is relatively easy to lower
risk through standard system safety and industrial safety approaches. Unfortunately, most
complex systems, particularly high-tech systems, do not fall into this category.
The important factor here is uncertainty: technical, organizational, and social. It is uncer-
tainty that makes engineering difficult and challenging and occasionally unsuccessful. The
Space Shuttle is an example of a system at the other extreme from those studied by the
HRO researchers. Technical uncertainty is inherent in any system as complex as the Shut-
tle. For example, although foam shedding from the external tank during liftoff has been
identified as a problem for two decades, it is still not fully understood. All attempts to fix
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the problem have been unsuccessful. In complex systems, particularly those operating at
the edge of technical innovation, there are always many technical uncertainties that cannot
be practically resolved as required for HROs. At any time, the Shuttle has over 3000 waiv-
ers (allowing flight even though potential problems have not been completely resolved)
out of a total of over 4000 Criticality 1 and IR components. Deciding which outstanding
problems should be given priority is a difficult problem in itself. In addition, because
many high-tech systems use new technology, understanding of the physical phenomena
that may cause problems is often limited. NASA (and other organizations) cannot wait for
complete understanding before launching technically complex systems. While the Shuttle
is admittedly an extreme example, most high-tech systems have unresolved technical
uncertainty. If it were necessary to resolve all uncertainty before use or operation, as
required for HROs, most high-tech systems would never come into operation.
Organizational and social uncertainties further exacerbate the problem. The Shuttle, for
example, exists in a highly uncertain political and budgetary environment. Budgets can
change dramatically from year to year and organizational goals, which may be dictated by
politics, can change abruptly.
An important distinguishing characteristic in high-risk systems is the source of the risk. In
aircraft carriers, the risk stems not from technical uncertainty or even organizational struc-
ture or social factors, but primarily from the difficulty of the task being controlled. Land-
ing a plane on an aircraft carrier is the most difficult task required of a naval aviator and
accidents do occur, despite the claims of some HRO proponents that there are no or few
accidents. For the Shuttle, the task itself is not only high risk, but the technical, organiza-
tional, and social structures used to perform the task also involve significant uncertainty.
The risk on aircraft carrier stems primarily from uncertainty about individual operator
behaviour. The equivalent for the Shuttle is uncertainty about the behaviour of those
employees manufacturing the components, preparing the Shuttles for launch, and operat-
1. Criticality 1 means the failure of the component could lead to the loss of the Shuttle. The category IR
indicates there is a redundant function that can potentially mitigate the failure.
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ing in Mission Control. However, much of the risk in high-tech systems like the Shuttle
(and the source of both the Challenger and Columbia accidents) is uncertainty in the engi-
neering and engineering decision-making environment, which does not exist in the sys-
tems that the HRO researchers studied.
Some HRO researchers claim that their example systems operate in an environment that is
constantly changing [La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990b], but there is little evi-
dence of this and the quote above contradicts this assumption of constant change. Air traf-
fic control has essentially remained the same for the past thirty years. On an aircraft
carrier, the environment is actually quite stable, at least insofar as the types of changes in
the problem environment are very limited. Over the nearly seventy-five years of aircraft
carrier existence, only a few major changes have occurred; the greatest changes resulted
from the invention of jet aircraft. The introduction of improvements in carrier aviation,
such as the angled flight deck, the steam catapult, and the introduction of mirror landing
systems, have occurred slowly and over long time periods.
But even if the HRO argument is flawed with respect to claims that the systems studied
are tightly coupled and interactively complex, the suggestions they make for improving
safety may still be useful and should be considered. Unfortunately, these suggestions are
not very helpful for complex socio-technical systems.
The HRO researchers have identified four primary organizational characteristics that they
claim substantially limit accidents and 'failures' and simultaneously result in high levels
of performance [Sagan, 1993]: (1) prioritization of both safety and performance and con-
sensus about the goals across the organization [La Porte and Consolini, 1991]; (2) promo-
tion of a "culture of reliability" in simultaneously decentralized and centralized operations
[Weick, 1987]; (3) use of organizational learning that maximizes learning from accidents,
incidents, and near misses [La Porte and Consolini, 1991]; and (4) extensive use of redun-
dancy [Rochlin et al., 1987]. The next four sections consider the practicality and useful-
ness of each of these for organizations trying to operate high-risk systems.
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3.2.1 Goal Prioritization and Consensus
In HROs, leaders prioritize both performance and safety as organizational goals, and con-
sensus about these goals is unequivocal [La Porte and Consolini, 1991]. While this state of
affairs is clearly desirable, it is almost never possible. Safety goals usually do not coincide
with performance goals (unless the sole or primary purpose of the system is to maintain
safety). In addition, while organizations often verbalize consensus about safety goals (e.g.,
"safety is our number one priority"), performance and decision making often depart from
these public pronouncements. For most of the organizations studied by HRO researchers,
safety is either the only or primary goal of the existence of the organization so prioritizing
it is easy. For example, in peacetime aircraft carrier operations, military exercises are per-
formed to provide training and ensure readiness. There are no goal conflicts with safety:
The primary goal is to get aircraft landed and launched safely or, if that goal is not suc-
cessful, to safely eject and recover the pilots. If conditions are risky, for example, during
bad weather, flight operations can be delayed or canceled without major consequences.
In wartime, the carrier's goals are subordinated to the larger goals of the military opera-
tion. The peacetime primary goal of safely getting aircraft on and off the carrier must now
be combined with additional goals from strategic planners, including speed of operations.
Human safety, aircraft safety, and even carrier safety may no longer be the highest priority.
Further complicating the situation is the stress of being in combat. The grounding of the
USS Enterprise and the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian commercial aircraft by the
USS Vincennes indicate that combat conditions have a strong effect on high reliability per-
formance [Rochlin, 1991].
Safety is not the primary goal of most organizations. Usually, the mission of the organiza-
tion is something other than safety, such as producing and selling products or the pursuit
of scientific knowledge. In addition, it is often the case that the non-safety goals are best
achieved in ways that are not consistent with designing or operating for lowest risk. In that
case, each employee reliably performing their job is not enough to ensure safety-the
employees may behave in a highly reliable manner to satisfy the non-safety goals while
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compromising safety in the process. Management statements that safety is the primary
goal are often belied by pressures on employees to bend safety rules in order to increase
production or to meet tight deadlines. An example was the issuance of "countdown to
Node 2 launch" screensavers to all NASA Shuttle employees before the Columbia acci-
dent [Gehman, 2003, p. 133]. This action reinforced the message that meeting the ISS
construction milestones was more important than other goals, despite management claims
to the contrary.
When safety goals conflict with other goals, the resolution of conflicts will not always
result in putting the safety goals first by everyone in the organization unless there are safe-
guards to require this. The internal and external pressures to focus on the mission goals
rather than safety goals may be extreme. The accelerated Shuttle launch pressures, for
example, arose as NASA was being pushed by agencies such as the Office of Management
and budget to justify its existence:
This need to justify the expenditure [on the Shuttle] and prove the value of manned space
flight has been a major and consistent tension between NASA and other governmental
entities. The more missions the shuttle could fly, the better able the program was to gener-
ate funding. Unfortunately, the accelerated launch schedule also meant that there was less
time to perform required maintenance or do ongoing testing. The results of these tensions
appears to be that budgetary and program survival fears gradually eroded a number of
vital procedures as well as supplanted dedicated NASA staff with contractors who had
dual loyalties [Barrett, 2004].
Consensus on prioritization of conflicting goals may waver when a company is forced to
choose between operational safety goals (i.e., performing activities that lower risk) and
their organization's continued existence. The goal of NASA's manned space flight organi-
zation is to explore outer space and accrue scientific knowledge. Recognition that these
activities involve risk is widely accepted. The problem is not only the simple one of prior-
itizing the safety goals-this would result in never launching any spacecraft-but making
difficult trade-offs and decisions about how much risk is acceptable and even how to mea-
sure the risk. Suggesting that NASA or any large organization should prioritize safety
goals and operate reliably overly simplifies the difficulty in accomplishing these goals and
is not very helpful in resolving the necessary trade-offs and improving the complex deci-
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sion-making involved. The flaw in the HRO argument is that safety is not black or white,
but a matter of trying to determine how much risk exists in particular activities and deci-
sions and how much risk is acceptable.
In a peacetime period, the Navy can afford to slow down carrier operations or keep a
nuclear submarine in port for an extended time when safety goals are not met. But NASA
and most other organizations are subject to financial, political and social pressures from
within and without that limit their responses to goal conflicts. For example, the internal
fight for primacy and survival by individual NASA centers, combined with external Con-
gressional pressures to allocate functions and therefore jobs to centers in their own states,
limits flexibility in designing programs (see Section 4.3.3).
A further complication is that individual employee goals may conflict with one or more of
the organization's goals. Beliefs about the requirements for career advancement, for exam-
ple, may lead employees to behave in ways that run counter to the organization's interests
or to safety goals.
Organizations that contract out part of their functions have additional goal conflicts
because the pressure to maintain supplier relationships is substantial. NASA has a large
number of contractors working with and alongside civil servants. It is more difficult to
come forward with negative information when you are employed by a firm that could lose
its relationship with a prime customer; you also lose the place you have made within that
customer organization. This is a situation full of mixed loyalties in which internal as well
as external pressures come into play to affect actions. Analysis of these often intense pres-
sures can provide insights into why gaps occurred in important functions such as informa-
tion sharing and systems safety [Barrett, 2004].
Organizations can improve conflict resolution and implement safeguards to counteract
pressures to undervalue safety, but some of the HRO arguments do not take into account
the extreme difficulty of achieving this goal in practice.
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3.2.2 Simultaneously Decentralized and Centralized Operations
The second characteristic of HROs is that organization members are socialized and trained
to provide uniform and appropriate responses to crisis situations [Weick, 1987]. This field-
level response to crises is the "decentralized response" that forms such a large part of
HRO philosophy. The other side, "simultaneous centralization", refers to the maintenance
of clear chains of command in crisis situations. For example, while the operation of air-
craft carriers is subject to the Navy's chain of command, even the lowest-level seaman can
abort landings [La Porte and Consolini, 1991]. Clearly, this local authority is necessary in
the case of aborted landings because decisions must be made too quickly to go up a chain
of command. Overtraining of emergency responses is a standard practice in the training of
operational personnel working in potentially dangerous, time-critical conditions. Note
also that low-level personnel on aircraft carriers may only make decisions in one direction,
that is, they may only abort landings. The actions governed by these decisions and the
conditions for making them are relatively simple. This approach works only because the
systems they studied were loosely coupled. In systems that are interactively complex and
tightly coupled, taking individual action and acting alone may lead to accidents when local
decisions are uncoordinated with other local or global decisions. The type of bottom-up
decentralized decision-making advocated for HROs can lead to major accidents in com-
plex socio-technical systems.
3.2.3 Organizational Learning
A third characteristic of HROs claimed by some proponents of this theory is that they use
sophisticated forms of organizational learning. The argument is made that limiting learn-
ing to trial and error is not practical in these organizations. Instead, HROs use "imagina-
tion, vicarious experiences, stories, simulations, and other symbolic representations of
technology and its effects" as substitutes for and supplements to trial-and-error learning
[Weick, 1987]. This process sounds exactly like what engineers do in hazard analysis,
although the approaches engineers use appear to be more rigorous than simply using "sto-
ries and vicarious experiences".
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HROs also try to maximize learning from accidents, incidents, and near misses [La Porte
and Consolini, 1991]. While it is difficult to argue against learning from mistakes, the
costs of implementing effective organizational learning are high and the problem of com-
petition for resources arises again. In addition, the difficulty of implementing effective
organizational learning should not be underestimated.
The organizations studied by HRO researchers are characterized by unchanging or very
slowly changing designs and technology, which increases the effectiveness of learning
from accidents and incidents. Organizations like NASA and the military that operate at the
edges of technological innovation do not always have past experience from which to learn.
Lessons learned on old technologies are also often inapplicable to newer ones. For exam-
ple, digital systems are changing the nature of accidents and the types of errors made by
operators [Sarter and Woods, 1995]. Experience with older, electro-mechanical systems is
only partially applicable to these new system designs and technology.
Organizational learning is important, but the difficulty of achieving effective learning
should not be underestimated. Improved methods of risk and hazard analysis, system
safety engineering, and understanding of the organizational and social factors that allow
accidents to happen can be used to reduce the need to learn from accidents and ad-hoc sce-
nario generation.
3.2.4 Extensive Use of Redundancy
A fourth characteristic often cited about HROs is the extensive use of redundancy. HROs
are "characterized especially by flexibility and redundancy in pursuit of safety and perfor-
mance," [La Porte, 1996] where redundancy is defined as "the ability to provide for the
execution of a task if the primary unit fails or falters" [La Porte and Consolini, 1991].
According to Roberts, HROs use technical redundancy, where parts are duplicated (e.g.,
backup computers) and personnel redundancy, where personnel functions are duplicated
(e.g., more than one person is assigned to perform a given safety check) [Roberts, 1990b].
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On aircraft carriers, for example, control for setting the arresting gear ultimately rests in
the hands of at least three people, with oversight from the carrier's airboss.
The role of redundancy in increasing the safety of socio-technical systems is a major point
of disagreement between Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and HRO. The problem seems
to be that the proponents of each are arguing about completely different types of systems.
Interactive complexity, tight coupling, and working in environments of uncertainty and
imperfect knowledge limit the effectiveness of redundancy. Under these circumstances
redundancy can actually increase the risk of an accident, as Perrow so persuasively
argued.
The systems studied by HRO researchers are interactively not complex, not tightly cou-
pled, and, according to their own accounts, are characterized by low levels of uncertainty.
In these relatively simple, decoupled systems, redundancy can be effective in preventing a
single component failure (or sometimes multiple component failures) from leading to an
accident. Even in these cases, however, there are limitations. For example, common-mode
failures, where supposedly independent redundant components fail due to the same cause,
limit the effectiveness of redundancy in protecting against component failure. An Eastern
Airlines Lockheed L-1011 descending into Nassau in 1983 lost oil pressure in all three
engines simultaneously because both mechanics did not put O-rings on three newly
installed engine oil plugs [NTSB, 1983]. Inadequate preventive maintenance is one type
of common error that affects all components, including backups components. Redundancy
depends on an assumption of random and independent component failure to be effective.
But many causes of accidents in interactively complex and tightly coupled systems do not
involve random or independent component failure.
The use of redundancy can lead to dangerous decision making when it encourages com-
placency and the need for additional safety measures is discounted. As Sagan notes,
"when redundancy makes the system appear more safe, operators often take advantage of
such improvements to move to higher and more dangerous production levels" [Sagan,
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1993, p. 40]. The decision to launch the Challenger Space Shuttle on its fatal flight was
partly based on overreliance on redundant 0-rings. The failure of the primary 0-ring led
to the failure of the secondary 0-ring [Rogers, 1986]. Redundancy does not provide pro-
tection against underlying design errors, only random failures. Worse, the overconfidence
provided by the redundancy convinced the decision makers that the Shuttle would survive
a cold-weather launch even if the primary 0-ring failed.
Redundancy is not useful in software. Most software-related accidents can be traced back
to errors in the software requirements, that is, a misunderstanding about what the software
was supposed to do under some circumstances. In these accidents, the software did exactly
what the programmers intended it to do-it did not 'fail'. Software redundancy manage-
ment systems are so complex that they often introduce errors and can lead to system fail-
ures themselves [Leveson, 1995].
Redundancy is only one limited way to increase reliability (but not necessarily safety) in
some special cases; under other circumstances it can be the cause of or contributor to acci-
dents. Increasing reliability and safety in complex, socio-technical systems requires more
sophisticated approaches that take the non-random, technical, and organizational factors
involved in accidents into account.
Both NAT and HRO research oversimplify the cause of accidents. HRO underestimates
the problems of uncertainty, while NAT recognizes the difficulty of dealing with uncer-
tainty but underestimates and oversimplifies the potential ways to cope with uncertainty.
The contribution of Perrow to understanding accidents in complex systems by identifying
interactive complexity and tight coupling as critical factors should not be discounted. But
HRO leads to more pessimism than required with respect to designing and operating com-
plex high-risk systems. While the HRO researchers do offer more suggestions, most of
them are inapplicable to complex systems or oversimplify the problems involved.
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3.3 Normalization of Deviance
Diane Vaughan developed the theory of normalization of deviance to explain the Chal-
lenger accident, and subsequently applied it to the Columbia accident as well [Vaughan,
1996; Gehman, 2003, Chapter 8]. The theory claims that risk is "normalized" over time,
so that an organization ends up accepting higher levels of risk than initially intended.
While the theory has received great attention from other sociologists, it does not quite
reflect the way that engineers think about risk when designing high-risk systems. The
Challenger accident occurred not because an escalated level of risk was knowingly
accepted, but because some aspects of system behaviour had come to be seen as accept-
able and, further, that this conclusion had been reached without adequate supporting data
[Leveson, 2004b].
This section develops a critique of the theory, which is illustrated by a review of one of the
occasions of 'normalization of deviance'. According to the theory, normalization of devi-
ance occurred when members of NASA and its contractors repeatedly accepted incremen-
tal increases in risk as the following sequence of events repeated:
1. Signals of potential danger
2. Official act acknowledging escalated risk
3. Review of the evidence
4. Official act indicating the normalization of deviance: accepting risk
5. Shuttle launch
Consider the proposed process of normalization by reviewing some of the events sur-
rounding the performance of the solid rocket booster (SRB) joints on the Space Shuttle.
The Space Shuttle Challenger was lost in 1986 when 0-rings on one of the joints failed to
seal, allowing an explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen propellants to escape. The
explosion destroyed the External Tank and exposed the Shuttle to severe aerodynamic
loads that caused complete structural breakup [Rogers, 1986, Chapter 3].
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The O-rings in the SRB joints were not expected to show any erosion, but starting with the
second Space Shuttle flight in 1981, erosion of 0.053" was observed on the primary 0-
ring of the right SRB's aft field joint'. According to Vaughan, this was a "signal of poten-
tial danger" (Step One). Despite the erosion, the primary O-ring sealed the gap, indicating
that under similar conditions it could provide sealing in the presence of erosion of at least
0.053".
Systems are designed with nominal performance in mind. In complex systems it is impos-
sible to predict performance precisely based solely on design parameters. It is therefore
expected that the actual performance will deviate from the nominal performance. That is
why performance requirements are usually not phrased in absolute terms, but rather in
terms of upper and lower bounds of acceptable performance. Remedial action is necessary
only when the actual performance falls outside the specified performance limits. System
developers then have three options: they can redesign the relevant parts of the system to
bring performance closer to the desired performance; they can renegotiate the perfor-
mance requirements; or they can do a combination of redesign and requirements adjust-
ment. Acknowledging a deviation from nominal performance is not the same thing as
acknowledging an "escalation of risk".
Engineers at NASA and Thiokol did not expect to see erosion because none had ever been
observed in tests on Titan rockets, on which the SRBs were based. But erosion was not an
unknown phenomenon in the aerospace industry and it was therefore not seen as conclu-
sive evidence that the sealing ability of the O-rings was compromised. Subsequent investi-
gation (Step 3) of the erosion indicated that it was caused by a localized deficiency in the
zinc chromate putty that lined the space between the booster segments. Engineers at Mor-
ton-Thiokol believed that the reason for the erosion had been determined and they began
testing the method of putty lay-up and the effect of the assembly of the rocket stages on
the integrity of the putty [Rogers, 1986, Chapter. 6]. Contrary to Vaughan's assertion, the
1. The erosion on STS-2 proved to be the worst observed on a primary 0-ring in a field joint in any recov-
ered solid rocket booster [Rogers, 1986, Chapter. 6].
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erosion was not seen as a "signal of potential danger". Rather, it was an unexpected but
not unprecedented deviation in performance that nevertheless still fell within the perfor-
mance requirements of the 0-rings. It is easy to identify events such as deviations from
expected performance as "signals of potential danger" in hindsight by tracing backwards
from an accident. But complex systems will experience countless such deviations. Deter-
mining which ones, if any, could lead to accidents is difficult and often impossible. When
actual performance falls within the limits of specified performance, it is even more diffi-
cult to identify this deviation as a potential contributor to an accident.
Continuing the case of erosion on STS-2, note that the risk that the 0-rings would not seal
did not change because erosion was observed. There was no "escalation of risk"
(Step Two). The 0-rings did not suddenly become less likely to seal, and the conse-
quences of not sealing did not suddenly increase. What changed was the evidence relating
to this risk. Vaughan's use of the terms "construction of risk" and "negotiation of risk" is
unfortunate. The objective features (probability, consequences) of risk are not constructed
or negotiated, they are an inherent feature of a system. How well the assessed risk com-
pares to the actual risk depends on the type of system, how well the technology is under-
stood, the risk analysis methods, and so forth. An improved assessment of risk does not
mean that the level of risk has changed, it simply means that the assessed risk is now
closer to the actual risk. How well the subjectively perceived risk compares to the actual
risk depends on who is doing the perceiving, what their relationship is to the risk analysts
and to the system, how the risk is presented to them, and so forth1 . What is negotiated is
how data about risk should be interpreted, as well as the level of acceptable risk, although
the huge uncertainty associated with systems like the shuttle make it impossible to set a
firm boundary or determine with certainty whether a given risk is above or below this
boundary. In the case of the 0-ring erosion on STS-2, the perceived risk did not increase,
because engineers believed that the worst-case erosion would not compromise sealing of
the joint. There was no perception of "escalated risk". While the deviation from nominal
1. There is a vast literature on risk perception. See [Slovic, 2000] for an extensive discussion.
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performance was accepted (as is standard), there was no acceptance of increased risk
("Step 4") because neither the actual nor the perceived risk increased.
There was one official acknowledgement that risk was higher than previously believed. In
December 1982, the O-rings were reclassified from Criticality 1 R to Criticality 1. The ear-
lier classification indicated that failure of the O-rings could lead to loss of the Shuttle, but
that there was a redundant O-ring. The reclassification was made on the basis of analyses
of joint rotation, which indicated that under certain conditions the primary O-ring would
not be able to provide sealing [Rogers, 1986, Chapter 6]. Despite the reclassification,
many engineers continued to believe that the O-rings did provide redundant sealing. This
belief was partially responsible for the decision to launch Challenger. But the engineers'
continuing belief was not a case of "normalization of deviance" either, it was simply a
case of overreliance on redundancy.
Normalization of deviance argues that by accepting incremental increases in risk, organi-
zations eventually end up accepting higher levels of risk than they would have at the
beginning of system development. The Challenger story does not support this theory how-
ever. In most cases, deviations in performance were examined and found to be within the
limits of acceptable performance as these limits were stretched and reinterpreted. The
problem was that these analyses were not sufficiently extensive and were improperly com-
municated to a management audience that had preconceived notions that the O-rings did
not pose a flight risk. The engineers tasked to investigate the problem encountered admin-
istrative resistance and had difficulty convincing management of the seriousness of the
problem [Winsor, 1988]. By the eve of the Challenger launch they were still unable to
prove unambiguously that the O-rings would not seal'. But these problems had no relation
to "escalation of risk" or "normalization of deviance".
1. Coupled with a deterioration of NASA's safety culture from "prove it's safe" to "prove it's unsafe", the
lack of unambiguous data resulted in the decision to launch.
ORGANIZATIONAL RISK THEORIES
The proposed process of normalization of deviance is an oversimplified and inaccurate
representation of system development. Real systems are developed in an atmosphere of
uncertainty. Understanding the risks posed by deviations from expected performance often
requires extensive technical analyses. Such analyses require management support and may
require extensive resources and time. Engineers and technicians may therefore find them-
selves in a difficult situation where they are unable to obtain the necessary managerial
support because they can only obtain the necessary supporting data indicating the serious-
ness of the problem by doing the analysis. Neither the Challenger nor the Columbia acci-
dents resulted from a knowing acceptance of increased risk. In both cases, the underlying
technical phenomena (0-ring erosion and foam impacts) were poorly understood and
decision makers unknowingly accepted high risks.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has reviewed three popular sociological theories of organizational risk,
namely normal accidents theory, high reliability organizations, and normalization of devi-
ance. HRO and normalization of deviance underestimate the challenges posed by uncer-
tainty, while NAT recognizes the difficulty of dealing with uncertainty but underestimates
and oversimplifies the potential ways to cope with uncertainty. NAT and normalization of
deviance do not offer practical suggestions for dealing with uncertainty and developing
safer systems. While the HRO theorists do offer more suggestions, most of them are inap-
plicable to complex systems or oversimplify the problems involved.
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The machine does not isolate man from the great problems of nature but plunges him more
deeply into them.
Antoine de Saint-Exupdry'
People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they
don't know is what what they do does.
Michel Foucault 2
One of the worst industrial accidents in history occurred in December 1984 at the Union
Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India. The accidental release of methyl isocyanate
(MIC) resulted in at least 2000 fatalities, 10 000 permanent disabilities (including blind-
ness), and 200 000 injuries [Shrivastava, 1992]. The Indian government blamed the acci-
dent on human error in the form of improperly performed maintenance activities.
Numerous additional factors involved in the accident can be identified. But further analy-
sis shows that the plant had been drifting over a period of many years toward a state of
high-risk where almost any change in usual behaviour could lead to an accident [Leveson,
1995]. A better understanding of risk therefore requires understanding how systems
migrate towards states of increasing risk.
This chapter examines the dynamics of risk in organizations. First, a framework is devel-
oped to analyse the strategic trade-off between short and long term goals and understand
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why organizations tend to migrate to states of increasing risk. Next, a set of archetypes of
organizational safety are developed. These archetypes describe specific mechanisms by
which organizations unintentionally or unknowingly increase or fail to decrease risk,
despite their best intentions.
4.1 Organizational Dynamics and Complex Goal
Environments
Organizations that operate complex systems have to make trade-offs between multiple,
interacting, sometimes conflicting, and often changing goals at both the individual and
organizational levels. Resolving the conflict between goals is difficult because the poten-
tial outcomes (e.g., revenues, costs, and risks) of different courses of action are often
poorly understood, uncertain, or ambiguous. Resource pressures (e.g., time, money) limit
the ability to clarify the situation or reduce uncertainty, further complicating the trade-off
process. In some cases, goals may directly oppose one another. For example, operators
may be required to work faster to increase throughput. However, they may also be
required to perform delicate tasks that require high precision, which is enhanced by work-
ing more slowly. If the organization is tightly coupled and interactively complex [Perrow,
1999a], the situation is further complicated because it is difficult to predict the conse-
quences of actions and it is difficult to determine which information is relevant to the situ-
ation. When an organization is in a crisis mode, appropriately resolving conflicting goals
becomes even more difficult because organizational and individual resources are stretched
ever more tightly. This makes it more likely that inappropriate decisions will be made thus
further escalating the crisis situation [Woods and Cook, 1999]. Which goals were most
important and what was the most appropriate way to meet these goals is often visible only
in hindsight.
Maintaining an acceptable level of risk in complex goal environments is difficult for a
number of reasons, one of which is that safety goals are often poorly articulated (i.e., what
is an acceptable level of risk and how should it be achieved) and the long-term effects of
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performance-related decisions on safety are often not obvious. Understanding how goal
conflicts arise and how they can be resolved is the first step towards formulating a robust
strategy to successfully resolve the apparent conflict between performance and safety.
This section discusses some of the inherent tensions between short and long term organi-
zational goals, how this tension can result in inappropriate resolution of performance and
safety goals, and how organizations can develop a strategy that maintains performance
and safety over the long term.
4.1.1 Organizational Efficiency and Thoroughness
The individual approach to coping with complex goal environments can be seen as a
trade-off between efficiency and thoroughness: "On the one hand people genuinely try to
do what they are supposed to do-or at least what they intend to do-and to be as thor-
ough as they believe is necessary. On the other hand they try to do this as efficiently as
possible, which means that they try to do it without spending unnecessary efforts or wast-
ing time" [Hollnagel, 1993]. For example, by omitting apparently unnecessary steps in a
procedure, throughput and thus efficiency can be increased. Because short-term perfor-
mance pressures dominate, people and organizations tend to be more efficient and less
thorough. Rasmussen noted that organizations move toward the boundaries of safety
under pressures to maintain economic performance and reduce workload [Rasmussen,
1997]. This adaptation results in migration to a system state where any small deviation in
behaviour can lead to an accident. While Hollnagel's discussion refers primarily to indi-
vidual activities, it can be applied at the organizational level by replacing individual effi-
ciency and thoroughness with organizational analogues.
Organizational efficiency refers to those aspects of organizational behaviour that promote
meeting performance goals (at least in the short term) such as productivity, defect-elimina-
tion, on-time delivery, quality, cost and rapid product development. Organizations can
improve their efficiency by changing aspects of their organizational design such as organi-
zational structure (e.g., how functions are allocated to departments), processes (e.g., man-
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ufacturing and accounting procedures), and composition (e.g., types of skills). Similarly,
they can change the design of the systems they operate to obtain better performance (e.g.,
faster, more fuel-efficient aircraft). Available resources and market size limit efficiency
because some activities are more efficient when performed in larger volumes (economies
of scale).
Number of different
types of activities
Medium High
High Thoroughness Thoroughness
Low Medium
Low Thoroughness Thoroughness
Activity repeat
Low High frequency
Figure 4.1 Levels of Thoroughness
Organizational thoroughness refers to those aspects of organizational behaviour that pro-
mote meeting long-term goals like safety or sustained growth. In the safety context, orga-
nizational thoroughness therefore refers to performing activities that promote the safety of
the systems the organization manufactures or operates. These activities can take place at
any stage of the system lifecycle. For example, hazard analysis identifies and classifies
hazards during system development. During operation, root cause analysis can promote
learning from accidents and help organizations improve their safety. Some activities, such
as hazard analysis and root cause analysis, are appropriate for all systems. Appropriate
additional safety activities depend on the stage of the lifecycle, the type of organization,
and the type of systems that the organization operates. Additional activities should be
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defined depending on the characteristics of the system (e.g., code inspection in software
companies).
An organization with a high degree of thoroughness is one that performs many relevant
types of safety activities, and performs these activities frequently, as shown in the top right
hand corner of Figure 4.1. Conversely, an organization with a low degree of thoroughness
is one that performs few types of safety activities, and does not perform these activities
frequently, as shown in the bottom left hand corner of the figure. Organizations that per-
form few types of activities frequently, or many types of activities sparingly, are character-
ized as having a medium degree of thoroughness.
Safety
Sperfect
Sdesired ---------------- ---------------------- - -------
System A System B
TA TB Thoroughness
Figure 4.2 The relationship between thoroughness and safety is system dependent
Not all organizations need to exhibit a high degree of thoroughness to achieve a given
level of safety. The degree of thoroughness required in order to achieve the required level
of safety is system dependent, as shown in Figure 4.2. For example, fuel lines on a motor
vehicle need not be checked every day-if the vehicle loses power the occupants will gen-
erally not be harmed. On the other hand, if the engines of an aircraft do not receive fuel,
disaster will likely result. Aircraft fuel lines must be checked frequently. Note though that
continuing to apply one type of safety activity more intensively does not necessarily result
in increased safety, and may even paradoxically result in decreased safety, as discussed in
Section [Amalberti, 1996]. Once a given safety activity has been applied to its maximum
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extent, additional different activities may be necessary to further improve safety. For
example, preventative maintenance on its own cannot guarantee safety, no matter how
well it is performed. Additional activities such as personnel training and root cause analy-
sis are also required.
The Thoroughness-Efficiency Space for Organizational Design
Thoroughness
A
Low risk
Poor performance
Accidents,
regulators
High risk
Poor performance
L
Low risk
Good performance
Performance and
resource pressures
Efficiency
High risk
High performance
Figure 4.3 The Thoroughness-Efficiency Space
In the short term efficiency and thoroughness do not complement each other: they are
orthogonal, as shown in Figure 4.3. In the short term, activities that promote performance
and activities that promote safety tend to work against each other. The diagram illustrates
two aspects of the tension between efficiency and thoroughness. First, it classifies organi-
zations according to the degrees of efficiency and thoroughness that they exhibit. The sus-
tainable organization balances performance and safety goals, as shown in the upper right
hand quadrant of the graph, labelled "low risk, good performance". Such an organization
is realistic about the performance it can achieve given its resources, design, and the neces-
sary level of safety1 . The worst type of organization is neither efficient nor thorough and is
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therefore exposed to high risk and performs poorly, as shown in the lower left quadrant,
labelled "high risk, poor performance". Organizations that focus on short-term perfor-
mance while skimping on thoroughness fall in the lower right hand quadrant, labelled
"high risk, high performance". These organizations perform well in the short-term, but
because they are insufficiently thorough they are exposed to high risk and may eventually
experience a disastrous accident. Conversely, organizations that exhibit a high degree of
thoroughness and low efficiency fall in the upper left quadrant, labelled "low risk, poor
performance". These organizations have a low risk exposure to the detriment of poor per-
formance. Organizations may temporarily operate in this quadrant while they determine
how to increase performance without compromising safety. For example, following the
Challenger and Columbia accidents, shuttle flights were suspended while changes were
made to the organizational and system designs to improve safety.
Organizational Dynamics in the Thoroughness-Efficiency Space
Figure 4.3 also illustrates the pressures that cause organizations to move from one quad-
rant to another. Resource and performance pressures push organizations away from thor-
oughness (e.g., reducing training programs) and towards efficiency (e.g., increased
productivity demands). Resource pressures occur at the organizational level when
resources are limited and the organization does not or cannot scale its goals down com-
mensurately. Organizations are almost always subject to resource pressures. Government
agencies such as NASA have their budgets set by Congress, usually below the amount
requested. Performance pressures include pressure to improve productivity, decrease
development times, and develop better products. Faced with intense public criticism of the
International Space Station, NASA pressured employees to meet ISS deadlines with a
"Countdown to Node 2 Launch" screensaver [Gehman, 2003, p. 133]. The screensaver
reinforced the message that meeting the schedule requirements was paramount. Perfor-
1. Acceptable performance and risk levels must be set by the organization. In the case of regulated indus-
tries, the regulatory agencies determine acceptable risk levels. Note that while performance is usually
unambiguous and easily measured and quantified, risk levels are not so easily measured or quantifiable.
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mance pressures may come from within the organization or from outside. For example,
public companies must maintain a healthy financial scorecard in order to keep satisfying
their shareholders and Wall Street. Organizations must carefully choose how to translate,
propagate, or dampen, external pressures into internal pressures. For example, they may
push back on the external source by requesting additional resources or by limiting what
they had committed to delivering.
Consider now how resource and performance pressure push organizations away from thor-
oughness. Begin with a sustainable organization in the upper right hand quadrant. This
organization is performing well and is sufficiently thorough to maintain risk at an accept-
able level. It is difficult for organizations to move into or remain in this quadrant. Perfor-
mance and resource pressures tend to push organizations away from or out of this
quadrant, towards short-term profitability and high risk, in the lower right hand quadrant.
Next consider an organization in the lower right hand quadrant. This organization is per-
forming well but is exposed to high risk. Organizations operate in this quadrant because
short-term performance goals such as on-time delivery tend to dominate, thus driving the
organization to emphasise performance at the detriment of safety. Resource pressures
(e.g., financial, personnel, time) are experienced most sharply in the present. Because the
value of safety practices or measures is not always clearly visible and is not easily mea-
sured, safety usually has a lower priority compared to other goals such as performance or
efficiency. Benefits from investments in safety tend to emerge only in the long run, and
may only be indirectly observable, as non-accidents or the avoidance of modifications or
retrofits to improve safety [Leveson, 1998]. However, the costs (time, financial, perfor-
mance, etc.) of safety practices or measures can usually be measured. Faced with intangi-
ble long-term benefits but visible short-term costs, it is understandably tempting for
project managers to knowingly or tacitly compromise on safety. Emphasising performance
goals works in the short term because it is usually possible to simplify procedures and
omit safety activities without immediately increasing risk to the point where an accident is
imminent. If the probability of accidents is low then organizations can be both efficient
and safe in the short term. Over time, however, the drive towards greater efficiency
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increases risk, pushing the system closer to the border of safe behaviour [Rasmussen,
1997].
Pressures resulting from accidents and from industry regulators push organizations
towards thoroughness and away from efficiency. Not all pressures result in improved
safety however. Accident investigation recommendations may be inadequate, incomplete,
or even inappropriate. For example, a common finding is that procedures were not fol-
lowed, leading to a recommendation to enforce procedures more strictly. But this type of
finding ignores the systemic factors that led to procedures being violated in the first place.
Recommendations and requirements from regulators may also be inappropriate. Even
when pressures, recommendations and requirements are appropriate they may be short-
lived. In the aftermath of accidents, organizations do try to improve their safety. But this
goal is usually replaced by other goals, such as productivity, when the memory of the acci-
dent fades. Pressures from regulators may also fade away between inspection cycles. If
inspections occur infrequently, there may be substantial periods when the organization is
not subject to any regulatory pressure.
Because short-term pressures dominate, organizations generally move into the top left
hand corner of Figure 4.3 (low risk, poor performance) only under duress. For example,
following a serious accident they may make an effort to improve their safety. Or regula-
tors, as is the case with nuclear energy, may impose safety requirements on the organiza-
tion as a condition of operation. In the long term, investment in safety is economically
justifiable. But it is difficult for organizations to operate in a long-term manner, because of
the immediacy of performance goals and resource pressures.
4.1.2 The Performance-Safety Barrier
An organization's design, the design of the systems it operates, and its available resources
determine how much emphasis it can place on performance while maintaining the neces-
sary level of safety. A conceptual performance-safety barrier is defined, as shown in
Figure 4.4. The shape of the curve is defined by noting that increasing emphasis on safety
101
102 ORGANIZATIONAL RISK DYNAMICS
detracts from short-term performance. Note that there is a maximum possible performance
given a level of available resources. Decreasing emphasis on safety further does not
increase performance, because risk is increased to the point where accidents occur often
enough to detract from short-term performance. The performance-safety barrier can be
moved outward towards greater efficiency by increasing the level of resources or by
changing the system design (e.g., more efficient and safe motor vehicles).
Thoroughness
-- - - -------- 
- - -
Increasing resources
Resource pressure
Efficiency
Change in
system design
-----------
Figure 4.4 The Performance-Safety Barrier
4.1.3 Balancing Safety and Performance
Emphasizing performance goals to the detriment of safety goals may work in the short
term. But in the long term, continuing this emphasis can result in potentially disastrous
accidents, as illustrated by the Bhopal accident. Organizations that wish to survive in the
long term should operate in the upper right hand quadrant of the thoroughness-efficiency
space where both performance and safety goals are met. The performance-safety barrier
limits the maximum efficiency obtainable for the required level of safety and therefore the
Organizational Dynamics and Complex Goal Environments 103
necessary degree of thoroughness, thus creating a sustainable operating space, as shown in
Figure 4.5.
Thoroughness
Sustainable Operating Space
T AE: minimum efficiency penalty in order to
maintain a degree of thoroughness
compatible with the required level of safety
Efficiency
Figure 4.5 The sustainable operating space for an organization operating System A as
shown in Figure 4.2.
The desired, or ideal, operating point, as shown in Figure 4.6, is the point where an organi-
zation maximizes performance while maintaining the required level of safety1 . If an orga-
nization's performance and safety goals place it outside the performance-safety barrier,
either the barrier must be moved outwards (by increasing the level of resources or chang-
ing the system design), or the performance and/or safety goals must be revised. Con-
versely, if the organization is operating inside the performance-safety barrier, higher
performance is possible without decreasing thoroughness. Note that while the desired
operating point optimizes performance and safety, an organization should operate slightly
inside the barrier because of uncertainty in determining the desired and actual operating
1. Note that it may be difficult to measure the level of safety. The operating point is a theoretical construct
that illustrates the trade-off between efficiency and thoroughness.
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points and to provide resilience in the face of short-term variations in the operating point
and performance-safety barrier.
Thoroughness
Desired Operating Point:
T Maximise performance for
the required level of safety
a-'f ciency
Minimum level of
thoroughness required
in order to achieve an
maintain a necessary
safety level
Figure 4.6 Balancing Safety and Performance
In practice, the trade-off between performance and safety goals, resources, and system
design is usually not made explicitly. Organizations are often not conscious of performing
trade-offs [Woods and Cook, 1999], or of the criteria upon which these trade-offs are
made. When the desired performance is not attained, safety goals are often tacitly or
explicitly traded for higher performance. The possibility of obtaining the desired perfor-
mance by increasing the level of resources, or changing the system design, may be
ignored, or discounted because of cost and other considerations. The criteria by which
trade-offs are made are not always visible either. They may be explicit, implicit, or emer-
gent properties at various levels of the organization. They may be susceptible to influence
and change over time, or they may be firmly fixed and inflexible in the face of changing
conditions. By becoming aware that they are making trade-offs, organizations can be pro-
active about identifying trade-offs, formulating strategies to make these trade-offs, and
determining where they want to lie in the efficiency-thoroughness space.
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4.1.4 Migration to Boundaries
Migration toward states of increased risk, as discussed earlier, occurs when performance
and resource pressures cause the organization to emphasize efficiency at the detriment of
thoroughness, thus moving it to the edge of safety. Continuous effort is needed to ensure
that performance and resource pressures do not result in a decrease in thoroughness that
moves the organization away from safety. Changes that occur over time in the system
move the performance-safety barrier and may result in the organization operating below
the minimum thoroughness threshold, as shown in Figure 4.7. The organization is there-
fore faced with two tasks: monitoring where it lies with respect to the barrier, and ensuring
that it remains inside (for safety), and preferably on (for maximum performance), the bar-
rier.
Thoroughness
Performance pressure
pushes system away
from thoroughness
4T
Ef iciency
Resource pressures or
system changes push
barrier inwards
Figure 4.7 Migration from the Desired Operating Point
Determining where an organization lies with respect to the barrier and the thoroughness
threshold requires a combination of risk management and performance monitoring. A
description of performance monitoring is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the literature
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provides numerous references. Chapter 5 describes one approach to assessing and moni-
toring the level of risk.
Ensuring that an organization remains inside the barrier requires a positive safety culture,
as described in Appendix B. A positive safety culture can be seen as "pulling the slippery
slope" up, as shown in Figure 4.8, making it easier for the organization to withstand per-
formance and resource pressures and to resist changes in the system that make it less safe.
Thoroughness
Active and continuous commitment to
safety prevents the slide away from
TA thoroughness towards efficiency and
eventually higher risk.
Efficiency
Active and continuous commitment to
safety resists changes in system that
decrease safety.
Figure 4.8 A positive safety culture prevents sliding away from safety
This discussion has shown how tension arises between safety and performance because
performance is measured in the short term, while safety, or the lack thereof, is only
observed over the long term. When viewed in the short term, safety and performance goals
tend to promote opposing actions. By taking a long-term view the tension can be resolved.
An awareness of the often implicit trade-offs between safety and performance can
empower organizations to avoid decisions that gradually push the system towards the
boundary of safe behaviour.
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4.2 Organizational Safety Archetypes
While individual accidents usually have unique features at the surface, further probing
often reveals common underlying systemic patterns. By identifying these patterns, or
archetypes, organizations can better understand past accidents, monitor risk, and decrease
the likelihood of future accidents.
This section introduces the concept of safety archetypes. General system behavioural
archetypes have been described by various authors in fields such as system dynamics
[Braun, 2002; Wolstenholme, 2003] and organizational behaviour [Masuch, 1985; Miller
and Friesen, 1980]. While the general archetypes apply to all behaviour, the safety arche-
types developed here address specific behaviour related to flaws in an organization's
safety processes and culture.
In risk analysis the archetypes can be used to understand how and why the level of risk
changes over time, as discussed in Chapter 5. They explain how undesired side-effects
arise from apparently good decisions, why organizations become complacent, and why it
is difficult for organizations to successfully implement safety improvement programs. An
awareness of these pitfalls can help organizations avoid them or at least decrease their
negative impact.
In accident analysis, the archetypes can be used to develop dynamic models that describe
the systemic and organizational factors contributing to the accident. The archetypes help
clarify why safety-related decisions do not always result in the desired behaviour, and how
independent decisions in different parts of the organization can combine to impact safety.
The archetypes are explained using elements of the system dynamics modelling language.
A brief review is provided below.
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4.2.1 Brief Overview of System Dynamics
System dynamics is an approach to identifying, explaining, and eliminating problem
behaviours in socio-economic systems, primarily by identifying feedback loops in the sys-
tem. It provides a framework for dealing with dynamic complexity. Whereas the control-
lers used in engineered feedback control systems typically employ negative feedback,
socio-economic and natural systems may exhibit both negative and positive feedback
loops. System dynamics is grounded in the theory of nonlinear dynamics and feedback
control, but also draws on cognitive and social psychology, organization theory, econom-
ics, and other social sciences [Sterman, 2002a].
With its explicit recognition of the time dimension, system dynamics is designed to
address the problem of dynamic complexity. This type of complexity refers to our inability
to predict the often counterintuitive behaviour of complex systems over time.
The archetypes are constructed from three basic building blocks: the reinforcing loop, the
balancing loop, and the delay.
Reinforcing Loop.
A > +
Variable 1 GR Variable 2
1+
Figure 4.9 Reinforcing Loop
A Reinforcing Loop is a structure that feeds on itself to produce growth or decline. It cor-
responds to a positive feedback loop in control theory. An increase in State 1 causes an
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increase in State 2, as indicated by the '+' sign, which in turn causes an increase in State 1,
and so on. In the absence of external influences, both State 1 and State 2 will grow or
decline increasingly rapidly. Because initial growth/decline is often slow, it may be unno-
ticed until it becomes rapid, at which point it may be too late to control the growth/decline.
Reinforcing loops "generate growth, amplify deviations, and reinforce change" [Sterman,
2000].
Balancing Loop
A Balancing Loop is a structure that attempts to move a current state to a desired or refer-
ence state through some action. It corresponds to a negative feedback loop in control the-
ory. The difference between the current state and the desired state is perceived as an error.
An action proportional to the error is taken to decrease the error, so that, over time, the
current state approaches the desired state. While the reinforcing loop tends to display
growth or decline, the balancing loop tends to settle down to the desired state. Because the
size of the remedial action is proportional to the size of the error, the current state initially
rapidly approaches the desired state. As the error decreases, the rate with which the cur-
rent state approaches the desired state decreases.
Desired Value
Error Action
Current Value
Figure 4.10 Balancing Loop
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Delay
Delays are used to model the time that elapses between cause and effect, and are indicated
by a double line, as shown on a balancing loop in Figure 4.11.
Desired Value
++
Error Action
+ Delay marking
Current Value
Figure 4.11 Balancing Loop with Delay
Delays make it difficult to link cause and effect (dynamic complexity) and may result in
unstable system behaviour. Consider, for example, the problem of navigating a ship down
a narrow channel. Suppose that the ship is veering to one side of the channel, and the
helmsman wishes to correct the course. Due to the ship's inertia, adjusting the rudder will
not result in an immediate course change. There is a delay between a change in the rudder
position and the resulting course change. In stressful situations, even experienced helms-
men may interpret a delayed response as a complete lack of response, and accordingly
make a larger change in the rudder position. When the ship's inertia is eventually over-
come, the helmsman finds himself sailing towards the opposite side of the channel. If the
helmsman continues to over-correct in this way, the ship may veer wildly from one side of
the channel to the other, and may run aground.
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The next sections introduce the following sets of archetypes:
1. Cycles of Error
2. Challenges of Maintaining Safety:
e Stagnant Safety Practices in the Face of Technological Advances
- Decreasing Safety Consciousness
- Eroding Safety Goals
- Complacency
3. Side-Effects and Symptomatic Responses:
- Unintended Side Effects of Safety Fixes
- Fixing Symptoms Rather Than Root Causes
- The Vicious Cycle of Bureaucracy
4. Challenges of Successfully Addressing Root Causes:
- The Short-Term Performance Trap
- Employee Commitment
4.2.2 Cycles of Error
This archetype demonstrates why organizations may oscillate between periods of few
accidents and incidents and periods of many or serious accidents.
Decisions about whether to take an action or not can be wrong in two ways: action is taken
when it should not be taken, or action is not taken when it should be taken. By analogy to
hypothesis testing, taking an inappropriate action is a Type I error, while not taking an
appropriate action is a Type II error [Bendor, 1985]. Figure 4.12 illustrates the concept in
the case of deciding whether to launch the Space Shuttle.
Avoiding the possibility of Type I errors necessarily requires accepting some Type II
errors and vice versa. A Type I error such as an unsafe launch decision can have obvious
and tragic consequences. But Type II errors are wasted opportunities and can be costly in
terms of lost revenue, wasted resources, and the impact on other projects. In the frame-
work of the discussion in Section 4.1, Type I errors occur when efficiency is pursued to
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Proper course of action
Launch Abort
Correct
decision
.~ Mision AccidentcMissi
.
successful ocurs
0
p 1CorrectType il Error decision
Missed Accident
opportunity avoided
Figure 4.12 Type I and II errorsa
a. Adapted from [Heimann, 1993]
the detriment of thoroughness, while Type II errors occur when thoroughness is pursued to
the detriment of efficiency. In the case of the Shuttle, repeated launch scrubs delay con-
struction of the International Space Station as well as numerous scientific experiments.
Some scientific opportunities may even be lost. When NASA missed the launch date for
the ASTRO mission, the opportunity to study Halley's comet was lost for at least seventy-
six years. The inability to avoid both Type I and II errors simultaneously is one manifesta-
tion of the tension between performance and safety discussed in Section 4.1.
In complex systems, it is not possible to eliminate the possibility of either Type I or II
errors because there is never complete certainty that an accident will or will not occur.
Organizations tend to cycle between Type I and II errors [Heimann, 1997], as demon-
strated by the Cycles of Error archetype (Figure 4.13).
Consider an organization that begins with a concern to avoid Type I errors. This focus on
avoiding accidents results in an increasing number of missed opportunities over time. As
more and more opportunities are missed, performance and cost-effectiveness pressures
eventually cause the focus to change from avoiding Type I errors to avoiding Type II
errors, thereby increasing the probability of accidents. When an accident does occur, the
focus shifts back to avoiding Type I errors, and the cycle begins again (Reycles of failure).
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+ R-cycles of error
Avoid Type II Errors
Figure 4.13 Cycles of Error
At NASA this behaviour is exemplified by the change from the culture of "prove it's safe"
during the Apollo program and in the early days of the Shuttle program to the culture of
"prove it's not safe" that prevailed before both the Challenger and Columbia accidents.
Both accidents were preceded by an atmosphere in which maintaining launch schedules
had become increasingly important. For example, before the Columbia accidents, employ-
ees were issued with a "Countdown to Node 2" screensaver that reinforced the message
that meeting the ISS construction milestones was more important than other goals, despite
management claims to the contrary. NASA reacted to both accidents by cancelling all
launches while the accidents were investigated, recommendations made, and efforts made
to decrease the likelihood of future accidents. But the increased emphasis on safety fol-
lowing the Challenger accident rapidly faded away and set the stage for the Columbia
accident seventeen years later. Cycles of Error indicates that history is likely to repeat
itself again.
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Type I errors can be tragic and have far-reaching effects. Cycles of Error can be used to
increase awareness of risk and fight against the complacency (see Complacency) that
arises from repeated success.
4.2.3 Challenges of Maintaining Safety
The next four archetypes illustrate the challenges of maintaining safety over long periods
of time.
Stagnant Safety Practices in the Face of Technological Advances
When technological advances are not accompanied by concomitant understanding of the
associated risks, safety may be compromised, as shown in Figure 4.14. This structure con-
sists of a reinforcing loop (Rgrowing performance) and two balancing loops (Bdecreasing safety
and Biagging understanding)-
Figure 4.14 Stagnant Safety Practices in the Face of Technological Advances
The constraint on safety is the understanding of the risk associated with the new technol-
ogy and the resulting risk associated with the systems in which it is embedded. Technolog-
ical advances result in a focus on performance and a corresponding increase in
performance, which in turn motivates more advances (Rgrowing performance). At the same
time, the focus on performance detracts attention from safety (Bdecreasing safety)- As the
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speed of change accelerates, understanding of the safety implications lags further behind
(Biagging understanding).
One particular area of concern is software. Software is becoming an increasingly signifi-
cant part of most systems. Unfortunately, the field of software engineering has not kept
pace with the uses to which software is put. Numerous aerospace accidents have involved
software which behaves in a way that could have been foreseen but was not because the
software, system, and safety engineering functions did not detect the problems [Leveson,
2004b]. For example, the Mars Polar Lander is believed to have crashed when the soft-
ware on the Mars Polar Lander erroneously interpreted a spurious signal from the space-
craft legs as indicating that the spacecraft had landed and shut the engines down
prematurely, causing the spacecraft to crash into the Martian surface [Albee, 2000].
The problem of stagnant safety practices can be ameliorated by applying new technologies
only when their risks are understood, investing more resources in the understanding of
new technologies, and by developing tools for understanding complex systems.
Decreasing Safety Consciousness
The success of a safety program may be limited by the characteristics of the system to
which the program is applied, or by the nature of the program itself. This archetype illus-
trates how a strategy, policy, or process that initially promotes improved safety may even-
tually reach a point where its continued application cause a decline in safety (Figure 4.15).
Incident reduction measures may initially improve system safety (Rreduce incidents). But the
absence of incidents (near-misses, unscheduled downtimes, etc.) renders the system mute,
and situational awareness of the system is decreased. The result is a decrease in system
safety (Bawareness limits safety)-
Consider the case of ultra-safe systems such as commercial air travel. Common sense tells
us that in order to increase safety, errors, incidents and breakdowns must be reduced or
eliminated. This is true for systems where the rate of incidents and accidents is high. In the
case of ultra-safe systems, continued elimination of errors, incidents, and breakdowns may
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Figure 4.15 Decreasing Safety Consciousness
paradoxically decrease safety [Amalberti, 1996]. Amalberti argues that the combination of
a system with a given set of safety measures bears within itself a maximum safety poten-
tial, which cannot be exceeded by continued optimization of those safety measures. Con-
tinued optimization of a particular safety measure mutes some system aspects, thereby
decreasing system awareness and adversely affecting safety. To obtain further increases in
safety beyond this limit, additional, new safety measures are necessary. Therefore, to
maintain safety, safety measures must be aggregated, but no single safety measure should
be overly optimized.
Over-optimization numbs the adaptive capabilities of human and technical systems, while
covering up minor system failures. In the case of error reduction, for example, it has been
found that error plays an ecological role in the control of performance, and that detected
errors are necessary to maintain situational awareness. Similarly, programs to reduce the
number of incidents and breakdowns may also perversely decrease safety. As the per-
ceived level of safety increases, the temptation is strong to redirect investments away from
safety measures and towards improving system performance. Over-stretched system per-
formance leads to new risks, which may materialize in the form of disastrous accidents
[Rasmussen, 1997]. Beyond a certain incident reduction quota, the absence of incidents,
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as opposed to the presence of a minimum number of incidents, does not prevent accidents
from occurring. Information that can only be gained from incidents is lost when all inci-
dents are eliminated. Responding to incidents provides organizations with the motivation
to adapt and increases organizational resilience [Sitkin, 1992]. It may therefore be neces-
sary to tolerate a certain level of errors, incidents, breakdowns, and even accidents to pro-
tect the system against disastrous accidents and prepare the organization for responding to
accidents if they do occur.
Another response to the problem is to gradually lower the incident detection threshold as
the number of incidents is reduced, thus maintaining a certain minimum number of inci-
dents. Investigations into incidents have several uses and benefits [cf. Carroll, 1998b].
First, they can uncover the causes of the particular incident. Second, they can uncover root
causes that may lead to other incidents and even accidents. Third, they encourage mem-
bers of the organization to think about how their role in the organization affects safety.
Fourth, they maintain the organization's ability to investigate incidents. By setting the
incident detection threshold sufficiently low so that incident investigations do not cease
entirely, organizations can continue reaping the benefits of incident investigations.
Consider the strong emphasis on redundancy as a safety and reliability measure in many
systems. Some degree of redundancy is useful in increasing reliability, and possibly safety.
But more redundancy is not necessarily better, and may be worse [e.g., Sagan, 2004].
While redundancy may increase reliability, it does not necessarily increase, and may even
decrease, safety. First, a reliance on redundancy may lead to decreased emphasis on other
safety engineering techniques. If system designers believe that redundancy will limit the
effect of design errors they may be less motivated to find and eliminate these errors. In
practice, redundancy may 'cover up', or mute, design errors and prevent them from
becoming visible until something catastrophic occurs. Second, increasing redundancy
increases system complexity. More complex systems are less amenable to testing and
maintenance, and their properties and behaviour are difficult to predict accurately [Gra-
ham, 1971].
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The use of redundancy can lead to dangerous decision making when it encourages com-
placency and the need for additional safety measures is discounted [Marais et al., 2004].
The decision to launch the Challenger Space Shuttle on its fatal flight was partly based on
overreliance on redundant 0-rings. The failure of the primary 0-ring led to the failure of
the secondary 0-ring [Rogers, 1986]. The overconfidence inspired by the redundancy
convinced decision makers that the Shuttle would survive a cold-weather launch even if
the primary 0-ring failed. Redundancy led to decreased safety consciousness at the exact
time when concern for safety was most needed because redundancy on its own was not
enough to improve system safety.
Eroding Safety Goals
This archetype illustrates how safety goals may erode or become subverted over time.
Eroding Safety Goals behaviour often precedes accidents, but is generally only observed
in hindsight. Eroding Safety Goals is difficult to observe while it is occurring because
change tends to happen gradually. At short time scales, changes may be imperceptible. It
is only after an accident has occurred that the extent of change is noticed, if at all.
Safety goal improvenent
efforts
Safety gap
B_drifting goals -
B_safety
Pressure to Actual safetyadjust goals
Figure 4.16 Eroding Safety
Figure 4.16 illustrates the basic structure. A safety gap between the safety goal and actual
safety inspires safety improvement efforts, which improve actual safety, but usually not
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immediately (Bsafety). The safety gap can also be decreased by adjusting the safety goal
downwards. The greater the gap, the greater the pressure to adjust goals (Bdrifting goals).
Because Bdrifting goals makes the safety gap smaller, Bsafety becomes less effective at main-
taining safety at the required level.
Culture of lax'
Beroding goals
B
B-lagging safety
Extemal Pressure
Performance + S
pressure Safely
B-safety emphasis
Perceived Safety
+ Ability to .
withstand pressure
Figure 4.17 Disappointing Safety Programs
Disappointing Safety Programs. Eroding Safety Goals illustrates one reason why safety
programs do not always live up to expectations (Figure 4.17). Safety improvement pro-
grams can be expensive and often do not show immediate results (Blagging safety). While the
eventual costs of not improving safety can be high, the immediate cost of a safety program
is subject to external pressures (e.g., budget and performance pressure). The combination
of seeming ineffectiveness and external pressures makes it tempting to place less emphasis
on safety and adjust the goals of the safety program (Bsafety emphasis and Beroding goals). This
adjustment is not necessarily seen as a failure, and may even be viewed as an improve-
ment. These balancing loops interact to repeatedly lower the safety goal. Repeated lower-
ing of safety goals results in a reinforcing dynamic (Riax goal setting) that encourages lax
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goal setting in the future. The problem can be addressed by setting absolute safety goals,
perhaps based on some external standard. Such external safety goals will only be effective
however if organizations adhere to these standards, either of their own accord, or because
regular inspections, audits, and/or punitive measures force them to do so.
For example, a common response to failed programs is to restructure parts of, or the entire
organization in question. After the Challenger accident NASA responded by reorganizing
the safety and quality programs at NASA Headquarters and the field centers. A new office
of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) was established
and overall management of the safety function was elevated to the level of associate
administrator, in an attempt to increase awareness of significant safety and quality issues
at the highest levels of NASA management. This reorganization was presented as one of
the most significant improvements following the Challenger accident [NASA, 1988]. This
reorganization failed to achieve its goal over the long term, and many of the same "silent
safety program" characteristics were made evident by the Columbia accident. While
restructuring and reorganization is sometimes necessary, it does not always address the
underlying problem.
Another, more subtle form of downward goal adjustment is the eternally receding dead-
line. In this case, the goals remain the same, but the deadline for meeting the goals is con-
tinually shifted back, effectively lowering the goals.
Pressure for increased performance (e.g., shorter delivery times, increased profit) can
make it difficult to remain focussed on safety goals. Eroding Safety illustrates how these
pressures can contribute to safety improvement goals not being met. The challenge is to
resist external pressures that work against safety improvement programs, whether overtly
or in a less obvious manner. Anchoring the safety goals to externally generated and
enforced standards or deadlines can make adjustments in goals more visible or more diffi-
cult to make. For example, government regulators impose certain minimum safety stan-
dards on some industries, such as the nuclear power industry.
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To be successful a safety program must provide a clear plan and a realistic time frame for
improving safety. It must provide concrete steps towards achieving the safety goal, as well
as interim measures of progress. If a safety program is seen as working against perfor-
mance (e.g. preventing on-time delivery of goods) there will be a reciprocal tendency to
work against the program, thereby decreasing its effectiveness. Managers who pay lip ser-
vice to safety programs but simultaneously demand increased performance encourage a
lax attitude to safety at lower organizational levels. Only when there is buy-in at all levels
of the organization can a safety program succeed.
Complacency
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B accidents
Safety Fixes R_safety fixed
Perceived Safety
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Figure 4.18 Complacency
A history of operations without incidents often leads to growing complacency as shown in
Figure 4.18. Consider a system that initially operates with a high accident rate. In order to
bring the accident rate down, the system is closely monitored, possibly both internally
(company rules and procedures) and externally (government regulation). Close oversight
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may eventually contribute to a decreased accident rate, and may bring it to the point
where people do not believe that accidents can or will occur. In the apparent absence of a
threat to safety, extensive oversight may seem draconian and unnecessarily costly. Cou-
pled with budgetary pressures, this anti-regulation sentiment creates pressure to decrease
oversight (Boversight). Decreased oversight is manifested on the one hand by less training
and fewer or less strict certification requirements, and on the other hand by decreased
inspection and monitoring. A decrease in these activities eventually leads to an increase in
the risk of accidents, and so the accident rate increases (Baccidents). Safety fixes imple-
mented in response to accidents increase perceived safety and thus encourage the relax-
ation of oversight (Rsafety fixed). One way to avoid the complacency trap is to continuously
monitor risk (thus maintaining awareness that risk is not negligible) and set the level of
oversight accordingly (Bmonitor risk).
Following the Apollo launch pad fire in 1967, NASA established one of the best system
safety programs of the time [CETS, 1993]. But nearly two decades later the Rogers Com-
mission report on the Challenger accident referred to a "Silent Safety Program" that had
lost some of its effectiveness since Apollo. In particular, the report cited growing compla-
cency at the agency, as the perception grew that Shuttle operations were routine [Rogers,
1986]:
Following successful completion of the orbital flight test phase of the Shuttle program, the
system was declared to be operational. Subsequently, several safety, reliability and quality
assurance organizations found themselves with reduced and/or reorganized functional
capability... The apparent reason for such actions was a perception that less safety, reli-
ability and quality assurance activity would be required during 'routine" Shuttle opera-
tions. This reasoning was faulty. The machinery is highly complex, and the requirements
are exacting... As the system matures and the experience changes, careful tracking will be
required to prevent premature failures... Complacency and failures in supervision and
reporting seriously aggravate these risks.
Improved safety consciousness at NASA in response to the Challenger accident rapidly
deteriorated as a series of successful missions helped the memory of the accident fade.
Many engineers were highly conscious of the risks and even tried warning NASA and the
government. But neither NASA management nor the government appear to have taken
these concerns seriously. When Columbia was launched in January 2003, managers were
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much more concerned about maintaining the launch schedule than about safety. Although
a team was assembled to investigate the foam strike that occurred during the launch, they
received little support from management, who appeared to have already decided that the
foam strike did not pose a flight risk.
The problem with complacency is twofold. First, it is difficult not to become complacent
when success follows upon success. Second, it is difficult for an organization to realise
that it is becoming complacent, and often a serious accident is required to shake the com-
placency.
Complacency arises because the accident rate usually does not immediately increase fol-
lowing a decrease in oversight. Inertia in the system temporarily keeps the accident risk at
a low level, creating the impression that oversight is set at the appropriate level. All the
while, the system is migrating toward the boundary of safe behaviour [Rasmussen, 1997].
When accidents start occurring, the link to decreased oversight is not immediately obvi-
ous. When making the connection between risk and the level of oversight, the long-term
trend in the risk level must be considered, rather than short-term fluctuations.
4.2.4 Side-Effects and Symptomatic Responses
The next set of archetypes addresses the problem of poorly designed (safety) improvement
efforts. The first archetype illustrates how the unforeseen side-effects of safety improve-
ment efforts may worsen the problems these efforts are intended to address. The second
archetypes shows how addressing symptoms and not root causes not only does not solve
the underlying problem, but may actually make it worse. The third archetype illustrates
how inappropriate responses to organizational challenges can lead to stifling rules and
apathy.
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Unintended Side Effects of Safety Fixes
The unintended consequences of poorly designed responses to safety problems, whether
they are symptomatic treatments or supposed fundamental solutions, can worsen the prob-
lem.
This structure consists of a balancing loop (Bfix) and a reinforcing loop (Rside-effects). The
loops interact so that the desired result initially produced by the safety fix in the balancing
loop is, after some delay, offset by the undesired side effects in the reinforcing loop. Ini-
tially, the safetyfix ameliorates the safety problem (Bfix). After a delay, the unintended sys-
tem reaction becomes visible, worsening the problem and accordingly the safety fix is
applied more strongly (Rside-effects). The safety fix ironically contributes to the worsening
of the problem.
RAside effects
Control Action Problem System Reaction
i I B-fix I
Figure 4.19 Unintended side-effects of safety fixes
Well-intentioned, commonplace solutions to safety problems often fail to help, have unin-
tended side effects, or exacerbate problems. The example below illustrates how disciplin-
ing workers and writing more detailed procedures may fail to reduce the number of
equipment breakdowns.
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Figure 4.20 Unsuccessful Problem Resolutiona
a. Adapted from [Carroll, 1998b]
Consider a plant that is experiencing increasing equipment breakdowns, which are attrib-
uted to poor maintenance (Figure 4.20) [cf. Carroll et al., 1998]. A typical 'fix' for mainte-
nance-related problems is to write more detailed maintenance procedures and to monitor
compliance with these procedures more closely (Bdiscipline fix and Bprocedure fix). But these
fixes often result in reinforcing loops (Rdistrust and Rcomplexity) that eventually make the
problems worse. More detailed procedures can translate to fewer errors in a particular
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task. Workers tend to view more detailed procedures and closer supervision as mistrust
and regimentation, causing them to lose motivation, or comply blindly or maliciously with
procedures that may be incomplete or incorrect. Skilled workers may find the new regime
intrusive and look for more interesting work elsewhere. Excessive restrictions on behav-
iour discourages problem-solving and encourages blind adherence to procedures, even
when such compliance is not optimal in terms of safety or productivity. Blaming or disci-
plining individual workers, designed to create an atmosphere of accountability, encour-
ages all workers to hide problems. For example, when the Federal Aviation
Administration provided immunity from prosecution to pilots who reported near-colli-
sions, the number of reports tripled; when immunity was later retracted, the number of
reports decreased six-fold [Tamuz, 1994]. When incidents are deliberately concealed, the
underlying problems do not become visible, often worsen, and may lead to more prob-
lems.
Unintended Side Effects behaviour occurs when the fundamental problem is not under-
stood, or when the solutions to the fundamental problem are not appropriate or are
improperly implemented. This behaviour can be avoided by correctly identifying the fun-
damental problem and designing appropriate solution strategies. Identifying the funda-
mental problem is often difficult, and designing and implementing solution strategies can
be challenging. An awareness of the long-term negative implications that fixes often have
can provide the impetus to search for fundamental solutions instead.
Fixing Symptoms Rather Than Root Causes
This archetype is a special case of Unintended Side Effects that shows how symptomatic
solutions, or fixes, can undermine the ability to determine and address root causes
(Figure 4.21). Afix is implemented in response to a problem (Bfix), temporarily decreasing
the problem symptoms. The fix may also make it more difficult to identify the fundamen-
tal problem and/or implement a fundamental solution: If the fundamental solution is
known, side effects of the fix may either decrease the desire to implement the fundamental
solution, or act to decrease the effectiveness of the fundamental solution (Rside effects). If
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the fundamental problem or solution is not known, the symptomatic solutions may
decrease the ability to find the fundamental solution, for example by masking the problem
symptoms.
Side Effects
S olutio n LinkSy 
t m af y
Rside effectsSafety
Problem Attack root causes
B-fix -B-root causes
Figure 4.21 Fixing symptoms rather than root causes
Instead of applying reactive fixes when problems arise, organizations should perform root
cause analysis and use the resulting insights to formulate fundamental solutions that
address the underlying systemic causal factors (Broot causes).
Fixing Symptoms illustrates the tension between the appeal of short-term, symptomatic
solutions, and the long-term impact of fundamental solutions. Symptomatic solutions are
usually easier, faster, and cheaper to implement than long-term fundamental solutions. Ini-
tially, positive results to symptomatic solutions are seen immediately, as the visible symp-
toms are eliminated. Once a symptomatic solution has been successfully applied, the
pressure to find and implement a fundamental solution tends to decrease. Over time, the
symptomatic solutions may become less effective, or different symptoms of the underly-
ing problem may arise-in response new symptomatic solutions are devised. The underly-
ing problem remains. If the fundamental problem is not dealt with, symptoms can be
ORGANIZATIONAL RISK DYNAMICS
expected to continue surfacing in various forms. Long-term, fundamental solutions, on the
other hand, may be more difficult to devise, more difficult to implement, take longer to
show results, and are often initially more costly. At the same time, external pressures often
demand a 'quick-fix' to the problem.
The reactive focus of many safety programs results in placing primary emphasis on inves-
tigating previous incidents and accidents in an attempt to prevent future accidents. These
efforts are not always fruitful. Excessive focus is placed on preventing recurrence of
exactly the same accident, without taking sufficient account of the underlying systemic
factors that allowed safety to deteriorate [Leveson, 2004a]. Attempts to identify the deeper
factors or conditions that allowed the accident to occur (i.e., root cause analysis) are often
insufficient.
For example, Carroll has identified instances of inadequate root cause analysis at nuclear
plants [Carroll, 1998b]. In the nuclear and chemical industries, problem investigation
teams are assigned to examine serious incidents and troubling trends. These investigations
are part of corrective action programs to improve safety and performance. Although con-
siderable resources are devoted to these programs, the investigations do not always result
in effective learning. The authors found that the investigations tended to focus on only a
few proximal causes. These causes were typically technical or involved human error, and
their solutions were obvious, easily implemented, and acceptable to powerful stakehold-
ers. Little effort was made to uncover root causes or devise fundamental solutions.
Symptomatic solutions to accidents often only decrease the likelihood of that particular
accident recurring. They do not eliminate the deeper structural deficiencies that led to the
accident in the first place and may lead to other accidents in the future. Once a symptom-
atic solution has been successfully applied, the perceived need to solve the underlying
structural problem may disappear, reducing the pressure to find a fundamental solution. To
improve safety in the long term the fundamental problem or structural deficiency that is
causing the symptoms must be identified.
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For example, if an aircraft rudder failure is shown to be the result of insufficient or poor
maintenance, the recommended action may be to improve the rudder maintenance proce-
dures. But deeper problems, such as subtle management pressure to increase maintenance
throughput, may have caused the maintenance to be poorly performed in the first place.
Identifying the root causes of incidents and accidents is not always easy to do. Symptom-
atic solutions may be suppressing the symptoms, creating the illusion that no problem
exists. These solutions may be consciously or unconsciously formulated and applied.
Unconsciously applied solutions (e.g. unconsciously correcting for misaligned steering on
a motor vehicle) may so successfully mask the underlying problem that operators are not
aware of the problem symptoms, let alone the fundamental problem. Because any individ-
ual only has a limited view of the system, obtaining different viewpoints of the symptoms,
the problem, and the system can help in identifying the fundamental problem.
Eliminating root causes is likely to be more difficult, time-consuming, and costly to imple-
ment than implementing symptomatic solutions. It is essential to obtain commitment from
all parties involved with the implementation of the proposed solution. Without such com-
mitment, the solution is unlikely to be successfully applied. Side effects of the solution
must be identified as far as possible. Of course it may not be possible to foresee all the side
effects. Awareness of the potential for side effects makes it easier to identify and deal with
them if they do occur. Where side effects of symptomatic solutions may undermine the
fundamental solution, it is necessary to stop applying these solutions before applying the
fundamental solution.
Consider now two examples illustrating symptomatic responses. The first example illus-
trates the application of the Fixing Symptoms structure in the health care industry. The
second example illustrates how incident reporting schemes may decrease safety by
encouraging workers to hide incidents.
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Not Learning from Failure. In a study of hospital nursing staff, Tucker et al. investi-
gated why hospitals often do not learn from failures [Tucker et al., 2002; Tucker and
Edmondson, 2003]. They found that the organizational structure encouraged 'first-order'
problem-solving (fixing symptoms), which addresses only the particular problem, to the
detriment of 'second-order' problem-solving, which addresses the underlying (or root)
causes of the problem. As a result the hospitals repeatedly had to deal with the same types
of problems, despite, and to some extent because of, their best intentions. They developed
a causal loop model to explain this behaviour, as shown in Figure 4.22.
This failure to learn and its systemic causes are not unique to the health care industry.
Graphical manipulation of the model reveals the underlying Fixing Symptoms structure, as
shown in Figure 4.23.
Systemic (or fundamental) problems become visible as problem symptoms (e.g. accidents,
incidents, and other barriers to task completion such as unavailability of equipment),
which trigger first-order (or symptomatic) problem-solving efforts. These efforts may be
quite effective at reducing problem symptoms. But first-order problem-solving decreases
the chances that the underlying systemic problems will be addressed. First, effective first-
order problem-solving results in immediate gratification and reduces the need to do sec-
ond-order problem-solving. Second, because first-order problem-solving does not resolve
the underlying causes, problems tend to recur. The result is that employees have to keep
on 'fighting fires', which leads to employee burnout. Frustrated, stressed, and tired
employees are both less willing and less able to identify and solve underlying problems
and more prone to make decisions leading to accidents.
Organizations that engage only in first-order problem-solving do not address the underly-
ing systemic issues. At best, such organizations can maintain the status quo of safety, but
they are more likely to experience deteriorating safety as problems continue to arise and
employees continue to be overworked. Clearly no organization wishes to contribute to its
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Figure 4.22 First- and Second-Order problem-solving in Hospitalsa
a. Adapted from [Tucker and Edmondson, 2003]
own deterioration. Why, then, would an organization engage in this behaviour? The
dynamics described above explain why, once begun, this behaviour tends to persist.
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Figure 4.23 Not Learning from Failure
Now consider the factors that encourage first-order problem-solving in the first place. The
hospital study identified several psychological factors and organizational features, some
of which are positive, that encourage nurses to address problems on their own and as
quickly as possible. Nurses' low status relative to doctors and constant time pressure
encouraged them to address problems on their own and as quickly as possible. Nurses
were often aware that a problem was recurring and serious and might require more senior
intervention. But they generally preferred not to inform more senior personnel or suggest
remedial action, both because of problems associated with the status gap between doctors
and nurses and because doing so would require time that they did not have. The psycho-
logical gratification that nurses derived from dealing with problems on their own encour-
aged future first-order problem solving. Ironically, some positive human resource
attributes encourage first-order problem-solving and so discourage learning [Tucker and
Edmondson, 2003]: First, norms of individual vigilance encourage individuals to be inde-
pendent and solve problems independently without considering the impact on the system.
The Safety Fixes archetype shows how such behaviour not only does not solve the under-
lying problem, but can even give rise to new problems. Second, concerns about unit or
subdivision efficiency mean that workers do not have time or incentives to consider fac-
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tors beyond their subdivision. Third, individual empowerment is intended to help organi-
zations address problems such as quality and productivity. But a focus on empowerment
often leads to the removal of managers and other non-direct support from day-to-day
activities. Workers have to deal on their own with problems that may stem from other
parts of the organization. Managers, who have the status and ability to implement second-
order solutions, are left unaware of problem symptoms and so cannot gain the broad per-
spective necessary to properly identify and solve systemic problems.
Organizations can avoid the nearly inevitable deterioration associated with first-order
problem solving by working to actively encourage second-order problem-solving. Appen-
dices A and B discuss how organizations can provide management support, create a cli-
mate of psychological safety, and become more responsive to second-order problem
identification and solving.
Reporting Schemes. Reporting Schemes is a special case of Fixing Symptoms that illus-
trates how improperly designed incident reporting schemes and other regulatory require-
ments can work against safety. Consider what often happens when incident reporting
schemes are implemented (Figure 4.24). The primary purpose of these schemes is to
encourage workers to be more careful on a day-to-day basis, thus reducing the number of
incidents. As an incentive to reduce the number of incidents, workers with the best safety
records (as measured by fewest reported incidents) are rewarded (Binappropriate incentives)-
Rewarding workers who report the fewest number of incidents is an incentive to withhold
information about small accidents and near misses. Under-reporting of incidents creates
the illusion that the system is becoming safer, when, in fact, it has merely been muted.
Management becomes less aware of the behaviour of the system, and safety may therefore
decrease (B safety). At the worker level, the original goal of increasing safety is subverted
into one of reporting the fewest incidents. Ironically, the introduction of an incident
reporting scheme can decrease safety, as found in a study of the California construction
industry [Levitt and Parker, 1976].
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Figure 4.24 Incident Reporting Schemes
The Reporting Schemes archetype illustrates how the goal of improving safety can be dis-
placed by goals that subvert safety improvement. Regulatory requirements can have a sim-
ilar negative effect on safety when they are more focussed on bureaucratic requirements
than on improving safety. The investigation into the Three Mile Island accident criticised
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for displacing the objective of operational safety
with a demand that the nuclear industry comply with ineffective rules:
"The existence of a vast body of regulations by NRC tends to focus industry attention nar-
rowly on the meeting of regulations rather than on a systematic concern for safety. Fur-
thermore, the nature of some of the regulations, in combination with the way rate bases are
established for utilities, may in some instances have served as a deterrent for utilities or
their suppliers to take the initiative in proposing measures for improved safety" [Kemeny,
1979, pp. 52-53].
In implementing safety programs it is essential to consider carefully what incentives or
rewards will be used to ensure compliance. One way of avoiding this type of behaviour is
to encourage employees to report safety incidents, rather than rewarding employees with
the best safety records (Rappropriate incentives). If symptomatic behaviour is rewarded (e.g.
fewest reported incidents), it is likely that workers will find other ways to generate the
same symptoms (e.g., under-reporting incidents) (see also [Repenning and Sterman,
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2001]). If incentives are inappropriately formulated, compliance with the intent of the pro-
gram may be lower than if no incentives were offered. This behaviour can also be
observed in organizations that operate according to process certification standards. In this
case the purported rewards are often not visible and employees view the requirements as
impeding their normal working processes. Employees therefore obey the letter of the pro-
cess and documentation standards, but do not comply with the underlying intentions.
In order to maximize the likelihood that safety programs will be successful, the intent of
these programs should be communicated at all levels of the organization and employees
must be provided with the necessary resources to perform their part in the programs. They
must be empowered to make safety-based choices in cases where such decisions might
adversely affect productivity (e.g., see the discussion of worker initiated procedure
changes at the North Anna nuclear plant in Section 5.3.2). If employees understand the
intent of the program, and are therefore committed to it, they are more likely to comply
with its intent than with the letter of the law.
Organizations can further increase the likelihood of success of improvement programs by
including employees in the development of these programs. When employees are included
they not only understand the intent and mechanisms of the program better, but are likely to
be more committed to it.
The Vicious Cycle of Bureaucracy
This archetype demonstrates another aspect of inappropriate responses to problems. It
explains the tendency of organizations to become caught up in bureaucratic rules and apa-
thy' [e.g., Merton, 1968]. The vicious cycle arises as follows. Pressure on the system, due
to poor performance (in this case, lack of safety), creates a desire for change. When man-
agement tries to bring this change about through increasing formalization and bureaucracy
(e.g. rule making and closer supervision), employees may react dysfunctionally, becoming
1. Bureaucracy is not necessarily bad. See []Adler and Borys, 1996] for a discussion of 'good', or enabling,
bureaucracies, and 'bad', or coercive, bureaucracies.
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apathetic, alienated or even subversive. The quality offeedback about system behaviour
may therefore decrease. Despite management's best efforts, safety does not improve.
Management, unaware of the real problem, institute further formalization, thus completing
the vicious circle (Rbureaucracy). Eventually, management exhausts the supply of control
devices (Rcontrol devices), but by this point the organization is so caught up in bureaucracy
and apathy that implementing even well-considered changes is difficult.
Desre for
SafetychangeSafety
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Quality of Feedback R-bureaucracy B control devices Availability of
about System Formalization control devicesBehaviour
Dysfunctional +
reactions by
employees
B_make them feel better
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treatment
Figure 4.25 Vicious Cycle of Bureaucracy
One way of counteracting apathy and other dysfunctional reactions in organizations is to
apply human relations treatments, such as employee recognition programs and social
events [Argyris and Sch6n, 1978]. While such devices can lower apathy to some degree,
they are not as effective as lowering the level of bureaucracy (Bmake them feel better).
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Bureaucracy can have a detrimental effect on safety when it decreases the ability to sur-
face and resolve issues. Formal methods of operation and strict hierarchies limit commu-
nication, as discussed in Appendix A. When information is passed up hierarchies it is
often distorted, depending on the interests of managers and the way they interpret the
information. Information (e.g., concerns about safety) may even be completely silenced as
it passes up the chain of command. Employees may not feel comfortable going around a
superior who does not listen to their concerns. Managers may find it difficult to build trust
with their subordinates. Employees or organizational units may also promote bureaucratic
barriers to communication [Adler and Borys, 1996; Carroll et al., 2002] for a variety of
reasons such as to decrease information overload or to assert their independence (see also
Section 4.3.3).
Bureaucratic requirements may limit the time available for 'real' technical work, frustrat-
ing efforts to make progress or improve understanding of the system. When Morton
Thiokol set up a team to investigate the problem of 0-ring erosion before the Challenger
disaster, the team's progress was impeded by bureaucratic obstacles in the form of admin-
istrative delays and lack of cooperation from managers at Thiokol [Winsor, 1988]. See
also Section 4.3.1 for a discussion of bureaucracy at NASA.
4.2.5 Challenges of Successfully Addressing Root Causes
The next two archetypes illustrate the problems associated with improving safety even
when the appropriate solutions have been identified.
The Short-Term Performance Trap
Section 4.1 discussed how taking a short-term view leads to an apparent trade-off between
performance and safety. The short-term performance trap shows how this short-term ori-
entation can result in a situation where both safety and performance decline (Figure 4.26).
It is based on a model developed by Repenning and Sterman to explain why organizations
are often unable to reap the benefits of process improvement programs [Repenning and
Sterman, 2001]. They suggested that this inability had little to do with the specific
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improvement tools, but was rather a systemic problem arising from the interaction
between the organization's structure, management and employees, and the process
improvement programs.
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Figure 4.26 The Short-Term Performance Trapa
a. Adapted from [Repenning and Sterman, 2001]
The trap works as follows: The safety of an organization and the systems it operates
decreases as infrastructure wears down, designs and processes become obsolete, or skilled
employees leave the organization. Safety can be increased by investing in infrastructure
upgrades, process improvement, employee training, and so forth.
The actual performance of the organization can be increased in two ways: by focussing on
short-term solutions such as cutting corners and fixing symptoms, or by focussing on
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long-term solutions, such as improving safety'. Safety improvements improve perfor-
mance in the long run because they make accidents less likely. Catastrophic accidents
often result in a suspension or cancellation of operations. Both Shuttle accidents resulted
in immediate suspension of all launches pending investigation of the accident and reme-
dial steps. In the case of Challenger this suspension lasted two years; the suspension fol-
lowing Columbia had not been lifted at the time of writing.
Consider first the option of focussing on short-term performance. Performance pressure
arises as a result of a performance gap between actual and desired performance. The
greater the gap, the greater the pressure. As a result of this pressure, reliance on short-term
solutions increases, leading to an improvement in short-term actual performance (Bshort-
term).
Now consider the option of focussing on long-term performance and improving safety. In
this case the performance gap creates pressure to improve safety. This pressure results in
increased time spent on safety improvement, which eventually results in increased safety
and hence improved long-term actual performance (Bwork smarter).
Short-term solutions and improving (or even maintaining) safety compete for employees'
time and company resources. By placing an emphasis on short-term performance and by
tacitly accepting short cuts, managers send an implicit message that safety is less impor-
tant, making it difficult for employees to focus on safety. The reinvestment loop (Rreinvest-
ment) is a reinforcing loop that amplifies whichever loop (Bshort-term or Bsafety) is dominant,
further strengthening its dominance. For example, if more emphasis is placed on short-
term solutions, less effort is expended on safety improvement, increasing the likelihood of
accidents and incidents. A common response is to place even more emphasis on short-
term solutions in order to narrow the performance gap quickly. Conversely, if more
emphasis is placed on safety improvement, accidents and incidents are less likely. Fewer
1. Of course safety improvement is not the only way to that long-term performance can, or should, be
improved. Other techniques, such as process improvement, should also be used where appropriate.
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accidents and incidents means fewer interruptions to normal work and therefore frees up
more time to work on safety improvement. For example, by making an effort to identify
and solve the root causes of a problem, the need for symptomatic fixes is eliminated.
The reinvestment loop typically works to reinforce the short-term loop and not the safety
improvement loop because focussing on short-term solutions and decreasing emphasis on
safety usually yield increased performance in the short term. Spending less time on safety
means more time is available to work. Short cuts like avoiding maintenance and cutting
training frees up time to do work, thus increasing performance. Symptomatic fixes mask
underlying problems and allow continued operation of the system despite underlying
problems. Short cuts and fixes are tempting because they show immediate improvements
in productivity but their negative effect on safety usually only becomes apparent after
some time. Because short-term solutions yield immediate benefits, managers may be
blinded to alternative considerations. The shortcuts loop (B shortcuts) is a balancing loop that
allows increased performance at the cost of cutting corners.
It is difficult for organizations to avoid falling into the short-term performance trap for two
main reasons. First, short-term solutions usually show immediate results and activate the
reinvestment loop in the negative sense, making investments in improving safety less
likely. Second, it is far easier to take short cuts and fix symptoms than it is to understand
the root causes of problems.
Employee Commitment
Unintended Side Effects and Fixing Symptoms have shown that identifying root causes and
devising and implementing appropriate solutions is difficult. One of the problems with
implementing safety improvement programs is obtaining and maintaining employee com-
mitment. The Employee Commitment archetype' illustrates the potential pitfalls associated
with obtaining and maintaining employee commitment (Figure 4.27).
1. This archetype is based on concepts in [Keating et al., 1999].
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Figure 4.27 Employee Commitment
There are two sources of employee commitment to improvement programs, managerial
push and employee pull [Shiba et al., 1993]. Managerial push refers to efforts to promote
improvement efforts or force employee participation. Examples of managerial push
include inspirational speeches and literature, mandatory participation in training and
workshops, financial incentives, and performance review criteria based on observed
improvement. Thus, increased Managerial Push drives increased Employee Perception of
Program Value.
Employee pull occurs when employees understand the benefits of improvement and com-
mit themselves to improvement efforts independent of, and occasionally in spite of, mana-
gerial attitudes [Keating et al., 1999]. Employee perception of program value increases in
response to visible improvement results. This perception sets off increased commitment to
improvement program, resulting in increased effort allocated to improvement program. If
the program is appropriately designed, the result is an eventual increase in improvement
results and in visible improvement results, leading once again to increased employee per-
ception of program value (Brise to the challenge). Employee pull can therefore create a valu-
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able reinforcing loop of increasing commitment and increasing improvement results
(Remployee pull). Note that removing managerial push leaves the employee pull loop intact,
while removing employee commitment destroys the loop. Managerial push can adjust
employee perception of program value, but a program cannot succeed without employee
commitment.
Safety improvement programs do not always have highly or immediately visible results
(see Eroding Safety). In particular, the organizational and technical complexity of a sys-
tem make it more difficult to devise, implement, and observe the results of improvement
programs. In cases where results have low visibility, are ambiguous, or take a long time to
become apparent, employees may be less committed than the program's 'goodness' war-
rants. Furthermore, many improvement programs show a 'worse-before-better' pattern,
whereby performance deteriorates before it improves. For example, safety measures such
as increased inspection or stricter design verification procedures directly impinge on
short-term productivity (see Short-term Performance Trap). In such cases, extra effort
should be put into educating employees about the benefits of the program, including
emphasising the long-term nature of the expected pay-offs.
4.2.6 Tailoring and Expanding the Archetypes
The safety archetypes represent the basic characteristics of some of the most common risk
dynamics. Organizations can obtain the most value from the archetypes by tailoring them
to their specific problems, as shown in the example applications (e.g. Disappointing Safety
Programs). Organizations can also construct additional archetypes to understand their spe-
cific problems.
The archetypes have emphasised the importance of identifying the fundamental solution
and obtaining employee commitment. One way to facilitate both finding and implement-
ing the solution is to involve employees in the generation of the dynamic models as much
as possible. Employees may have specific knowledge of the problem and insights into
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solutions. In addition, by involving employees in the process, they are more likely to be
committed to subsequent solutions.
The next section presents some examples of archetypal behaviour at NASA, illustrating
the process of tailoring and generating additional archetypes.
4.3 Organizational Risk Dynamics at NASA
This section illustrates the construction of archetypes to improve understanding of safety
problems at NASA, specifically in the Space Shuttle Program. The archetypes are exam-
ples of problem behaviours at NASA and focus on situations where feedback makes the
situation worse. They are not intended to be a complete explanation of problems at NASA.
The archetypes are based on a history of NASA [McCurdy, 1993] and on the Challenger
[Rogers, 1986] and Columbia accident reports [Gehman, 2003].
On a complex program such as the Space Shuttle problems are inevitable. For example, it
is impossible to foresee all the possible interactions between shuttle components, and
which of those will cause problems. The trick is to surface and resolve issues before they
turn into catastrophes. The following examples identify some mechanisms that decrease
NASA's ability to surface and resolve issues.
The first example shows how Vicious Circles of Bureaucracy can be tailored to understand
the problems of bureaucracy at NASA. The next three examples illustrate specific prob-
lem behaviours on the shuttle program.
4.3.1 Growing Bureaucracy
Figure 4.28, based on Vicious Circles of Bureaucracy, illustrates how NASA's bureau-
cracy grew and changed in a way that decreased the ability to surface and resolve issues
[McCurdy, 1993, pp. 111-118].
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Figure 4.28 Growing Bureaucracy
The agency bureaucracy, as indicated by the relative number of administrative staff,
expanded significantly over the years since NASA was founded. In 1961, approximately
six per cent of NASA staff was classified as professional administrators. By 1991, this
percentage had grown to approximately eighteen per cent [McCurdy, 1993, p. 116, Fig. 7].
This increase in administrative staff was accompanied by a growing perception within
NASA that bureaucracy made it more difficult to accomplish technical tasks [McCurdy,
1993, p. 117].
There are three main sources of bureaucratic growth [McCurdy, 1993, pp. 111-118]. First,
organizations tend to become more bureaucratic over time because initially informal or ad
hoc methods of operation are formalized. Such formalization can be useful because it
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decreases uncertainty about how to act and results in increased predictability. Second, as
programs become more complex, informal management and planning is no longer suffi-
cient. In NASA's case, decreasing resources further increased the management and coor-
dination required for program success. Increasing reliance on contractors, parcelling of
projects and resources between centers, and diversification and overlap between centers
all worked to increase the management burden. Opportunities for poor interfacing
increased, decreasing the ability to surface and resolve issues. Third, as political oversight
increases, organizations are forced to deploy more administrative staff to handle the bur-
den. In NASA's case, political oversight grew as government grew bigger and committee
structures became more democratic [McCurdy, 1993] and in response to the Apollo and
Shuttle accidents.
Increased public oversight and internal changes in response to accidents increases the
bureaucratic burden and may therefore perversely make accidents more likely (Bbureau-
cracy)-
It is interesting to note that there are no negative arrows going into bureaucracy. As many
organizations, and especially governments, have found, growing bureaucracies is far eas-
ier than shrinking them.
4.3.2 Contracting the Culture Away
Ever increasing levels of contracting out had a profound negative effect on the technical
culture (see Appendix B) at NASA [McCurdy, 1993], as illustrated by Figure 4.29.
Increasing reliance on contractors meant that the in-house technical capability declined,
requiring further reliance on contractors (Rlosing the culture). The result is a continuing
decrease in in-house technical capability, which weakens the technical culture, and
decreases the ability to surface and resolve issues.
Any agency that attempts challenges like the moon landings and the Space Shuttle has to
rely on contractors to some extent [McCurdy, 1993]. It is possible to use contractors with-
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Figure 4.29 Contracting the Culture Away
out compromising safety, but the nature and extent of the contracting relationships must be
carefully managed. NASA has used contractors since the days of Apollo but the relation-
ship between NASA and its contractors changed significantly over time. In the 1960s,
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NASA took great pride in its in-house technical capability, from technicians to scientists
and engineers. They developed a tradition of contractor penetration, double-checking all
contractor work, and retaining control of functions like spacecraft control and mission
planning.
Following the moon landings NASA was forced to make severe retrenchments, which
focussed disproportionately on clerical and technical staff [McCurdy, 1993]. While NASA
retained its scientists and engineers, the retrenchments curtailed the agency's ability to
perform in-house technical work. NASA came to rely more and more on contractors and
NASA engineers spent more of their time managing contractors and less time doing actual
engineering, such as testing.
When NASA first embarked on space exploration, industry space expertise was limited
[McCurdy, 1993]. NASA was therefore able to both exert authority over contractors, and
resist government pressure to use contractors. Over time, space industry expertise
increased, partially as a result of doing contract work for NASA and the DoD (Rindus try
experience). By the 1980s the space industry was big enough to exert strong political influ-
ence and preclude a return to in-house capability.
In 1984 the work of preparing and flying the space shuttle was assigned to a consortium of
aerospace companies organized under the United Space Alliance. The agency that had
insisted on knowing everything about its spacecraft during the Apollo days relinquished
control of the most complex spacecraft ever built to contractors. This step placed NASA
engineers and technicians one step further from the shuttle and further decreased their
ability to surface and resolve issues.
While contractors are of course concerned for the safety of the crew and shuttle, they are
ultimately driven by financial concerns. Many contractors rely on NASA for a large por-
tion of their business and must therefore maintain good relations with NASA. Causing fre-
quent launch delays creates friction and may place future contracts in jeopardy. NASA
emphasised the importance of avoiding delays by providing contractors with on-time
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launch incentives. Contractors therefore have less incentive to look for problems or be
aggressive about delaying launches when they are not absolutely sure that there is a prob-
lem.
The fatal launch decision on the eve of the Challenger disaster can be partly attributed to
Morton Thiokol's reluctance to cause further launch delays. There had already been sev-
eral launch delays when Marshall and Morton Thiokol teams met to decide whether to
launch. Thiokol engineers expressed concerns about launching in cold weather but when
Thiokol suggested delaying the launch, the Marshall manager famously asked, "My god,
Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?" [Rogers, 1986]. Subsequently
Thiokol management reversed its position and recommended the launch at the urging of
NASA and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major cus-
tomer [Rogers, 1986]. Pressure to launch coupled with contractors' concerns about future
contracts can have an adverse effect on safety.
4.3.3 Ineffective Leadership Structure
Lead centers were intended to be a way of decreasing the management load at NASA
headquarters while simultaneously retaining centralized control of programs. McCurdy
suggests that the prevailing conditions of increasing program complexity (shuttle and
space station development) and decreasing resources made this approach inappropriate. It
weakened program management and exacerbated rivalry and mistrust between centers
[McCurdy, 1993, p. 127], as shown in Figure 4.30.
As industry space expertise increased, there were more questions about whether all the
NASA centers were necessary. Centers had to look after their own survival. Some centers
diversified, moving into different parts of the space program or developing clients outside
NASA. The Marshall Center took charge of the development of Skylab while the Lewis
Center moved into non-space related research, developing expertise in diverse areas like
air quality monitoring and power generation. In some cases centers developed overlapping
areas of expertise, resulting in direct competition. For example, Marshall and Goddard
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Figure 4.30 Ineffective Leadership Structure
competed to develop the Hubble Space Telescope. Competition can be good but it must be
carefully managed so that it encourages rather than suppresses progress. For example,
when more than one center works on the same project, lines of responsibility must be
clearly drawn. In the case of Hubble, in May 1972 both centers were granted an equal
share of responsibility, which created permanent management problems. Work on the
space station Freedom was parcelled among four centers, with Johnson taking overall
responsibility for managing itself and the three other centers. Lines of responsibility were
unclear leading to bitter conflict between centers and the collapse of the scheme after only
two years [McCurdy, 1993]. James C. Welch, who became NASA's Hubble program man-
ager in 1983 noted that, "No one really felt like they had the authority to go in and direct
all other parts of the program to conform" [Capers and Lipton, 1993]. Parcelling of
resources and responsibilities between the centers meant they were effectively competing
against each other and therefore had little reason to be supportive or cooperative.
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Greater program complexity and parcelling of programs and resources means that greater
coordination is required between centers for programs to succeed. But parcelling and
overlap places centers in competition with each other (to maximize its likelihood of sur-
vival each center needs to obtain as much of each project as it can handle), which
increases mistrust between centers and so decreases communication and coordination.
As trust between centers declines, technical criteria become less important than bureau-
cratic and political criteria, centers hold problems back, and the lead center is unable to
exert its authority. The result is a decreased ability to surface and resolve issues, increas-
ing the likelihood of accidents and incidents. The finger pointing that invariably results
when something goes wrong decreases trust further, resulting in a vicious circle of grow-
ing mistrust and decreasing transparency and cooperation (Rgrowing mistrust). Expecting cen-
ters to follow the lead of a lead center that they do not trust is naive and places unfair
expectations on the lead center.
4.3.4 Going Operational
The decision to declare the shuttle "fully operational" after only four flights helped to set
the stage for the Challenger accident. Figure 4.31 illustrates why this decision was made
so early and what the effects on safety were.
As organizations age, they become less comfortable with uncertainty and start preferring
routine operations to risky ventures [McCurdy, 1993]. In the early 1980s NASA was fac-
ing a future of highly uncertain funding. By shifting from an emphasis on research and
development to an emphasis on space operations, NASA hoped to decrease this uncer-
tainty. The space station was one potential source of guaranteed, long-term, funding but its
construction (and approval) depended on a fully operational and reliable shuttle. At the
same time, launch competition had suddenly arrived in the form of the European Space
Agency's Ariane rocket. NASA was in danger of losing its status as the primary means of
accessing space. By declaring the shuttle operational, NASA cleared the way for space
station approval and increased the predictability of its funding. Decreased appetite for
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Figure 4.31 Going operational
uncertainty as the agency aged, coupled with the pressure of decreasing resources and
increasing competition, pushed NASA away from research and toward space operations
(Breduce uncertainty)-
The shift towards space operations instigated a number of feedback loops that worked to
decrease safety. First, the emphasis on the continuous and routine nature of shuttle mis-
sions decreased public interest in the space program. Shuttle missions were not as exciting
as lunar landings. As public interest decreased, the political priority of the space program
decreased, leading to reduced funding and greater uncertainty. The strategy that was sup-
posed to secure funding ironically decreased politicians' willingness to fund the agency
(Bdecreasing interest). Decreasing resources decreased the ability to surface and resolve issues
and therefore made accidents more likely.
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Second, by shifting to space operations, NASA decreased the ability to see spaceflight as
inherently risky. The perception that the shuttle was safe and operational made it more dif-
ficult to obtain funding for safety and testing (Rsafe enough)-
Third, the shift to operations made it difficult for many NASA and contractor employees
to continue seeing the shuttle as essentially an experimental vehicle. While it appears that
many lower level employees were well aware of the risks, the investigations of both the
Challenger and Columbia accidents suggest that management did not share this view (Bac-
cidents will happen).
4.3.5 Short-Term Cost Savings
The space shuttle is an example of how design and management choices made to save
money in the short term incurred severe cost and safety penalties in the long term, as
shown in Figure 4.32.
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Compromises on the shuttle design began almost as soon as the shuttle concept was put
forward. Initially, NASA proposed the shuttle as a fully reusable vehicle that would pro-
vide "routine and low cost manned access to space" [Gehman, 2003, p. 22]. But there was
little support from government, which had questions about the value of manned space
flight, especially given the high cost of shuttle development. NASA was therefore forced
to justify the shuttle on economic grounds. NASA argued that if the shuttle launched all
commercial and government payloads, and that if it were fully reusable, the total cost of
launching and maintaining satellites would be dramatically reduced. The proposed savings
would only be realized if the Shuttle made approximately fifty flights a year, including
launching all Department of Defense (DoD) satellites.
Attempting to satisfy the DoD and commercial customers simultaneously created complex
requirements. Commercial customers required low cost launches, while the DoD required
a large payload bay and the ability to perform large "cross-range" manoeuvres. Satisfying
these complex requirements, while keeping costs low, required "a revolution in space
technology" [Gehman, 2003, p. 22]. But revolutions do not come cheaply, and numerous
compromises were made to keep development costs low and decrease the resource gap
between required and available resources. Compromises tend to increase design complex-
ity (especially when they come later in development process), thus increasing the required
development resources. The result is that the compromises intended to decrease develop-
ment or operational costs may perversely contribute to the resource gap (Rcomplexity)-
Some design compromises directly detract from safety, while the effect of other types of
compromises is more subtle. Compromises that affect safety can be grouped into three
types:
Compromises that directly decrease safety. In some cases compromises were made
that directly decreased safety. NASA had to choose between solid and liquid rocket
engines and boosters for the shuttle. Liquid rocket engines are safer because unlike solid
rocket engines they can be shut down after ignition. Solid rocket engines, on the other
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hand, are cheaper to develop. Administrator James F. Fletcher openly acknowledged that
the choice of solid rocket engines was based on a "trade-off between future benefits and
earlier savings in the immediate years ahead: liquid boosters have lower development
costs" [Logsdon, 1986]. NASA therefore decided to design the shuttle with liquid rocket
engines and solid rocket boosters.
Conflicting requirements mean that it is not always possible to select the design that max-
imises safety. The silver lining in this type of compromise is that the effect on safety is
obvious and can be more easily assessed than the effect of less direct compromises. When
this type of compromise cannot be avoided, its impact on risk should be considered and
communicated to the relevant decision makers. In the above example, solid fuel was used
only on the boosters, which are jettisoned shortly after launch. By avoiding using solid
fuel on the shuttle engines, the risk of an accident involving solid rocket malfunctions was
reduced. The design of the boosters themselves, however, left much to be desired, as was
tragically revealed by the Challenger accident.
A decision was made to section the solid rocket boosters for easier transportation from the
solid rocket contractor's facilities in Utah. This decision was not one that necessitated a
decrease in safety, if the joints between sections were properly designed. Unfortunately
the design of the joints, coupled with incomplete characterization of 0-ring performancel,
was such that a joint failure was almost inevitable, given low enough temperatures. Subse-
quent redesign of the joints showed that a safer design was indeed possible.
Compromises that increase coupling. By making designs more tightly coupled (see
Chapter 3), designers can extract more performance for similar cost. Separating compo-
nents reduces the likelihood of accidents, but a performance penalty is extracted. As one
engineer noted:
"You're letting some opportunities for increasing your performance get away when you
[separate components]... The trend is to greater complexity in order to get more bang for
1. For example, there were no launch criteria that specified safe launch temperatures for 0-rings.
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the buck... In a case like the shuttle, if you don't take advantage of some of the opportuni-
ties to improve performance, you'll never get off the ground." [McCurdy, 1993, p. 152]
For example, a less coupled and safer design would consist of an orbiter and a separate
launch vehicle. But recovering and refurbishing the engines would be difficult. A decision
was therefore made to incorporate the engines into the shuttle and make the rocket boost-
ers reusable.
Compromises that increase complexity. Some compromises do not directly involve
safety, but have a cumulative negative effect on safety because they increase the complex-
ity of the system. As systems become more complex, they become more expensive to
operate, more difficult to understand, and the potential for unforeseen dysfunctional inter-
actions increases. Increasing operational cost can have an insidious effect on safety.
Despite all protestations to the contrary, spending on safety is often seen as a luxury, espe-
cially when funding is restricted and there is a history of successful missions. For exam-
ple, the Kraft Report infamously characterised the shuttle as "mature" and dismissed
concerns from credible sources as being part of an unnecessary "safety shield conspiracy"
[Kraft, 1995]. Another side-effect of increasing complexity is that preparing shuttles for
launch becomes more difficult and it is more likely that problems will arise that delay
launches. Frequent launch delays increase the pressure to launch on any given occasion,
thereby decreasing the ability to surface and resolve issues.
NASA made one other big compromise, that rivals the design compromises for its impact
on safety. When they marketed the shuttle as "safe" and "routine", they created a percep-
tion that the shuttle was safe. This perception was at odds with reality, creating a safety
perception gap that compromised NASA's ability to obtain safety funding (Bnot enough
safety). This perception has been so enduring that NASA has never obtained the necessary
funds to ensure shuttle safety. The CAIB notes:
"In the end, the greatest compromise NASA made was not so much with any particular
element of the technical design, but rather with the premise of the vehicle itself. NASA
promised it could develop a Shuttle that would be launched almost on demand and would
fly many missions each year. Throughout the history of the program, a gap has persisted
between the rhetoric NASA has used to market the Space Shuttle and operational reality,
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leading to an enduring image of the Shuttle as capable of safely and routinely carrying out
missions with little risk." [Gehman, 2003, p. 23]
The preceding sections have presented examples of behavioural dynamics at NASA that
contributed to deteriorating safety. Similar dynamics can be developed for other indus-
tries.
4.4 Summary
Understanding risk requires an appreciation of how and why risk changes over time. This
chapter has discussed the dynamics of risk in organizations, with particular emphasis on
the impact of organizational factors.
The apparent conflict between performance and safety was shown to result from the dif-
ferent time horizons applying to performance and safety. Performance is measured in the
short term, while safety is indirectly observed over the long term. A short-term view cre-
ates the impression that safety and performance necessarily conflict. Expanding the time
horizon attenuates the tension. By increasing awareness of the often implicit trade-offs
between safety and performance, organizations can avoid decisions that increase risk.
Accidents in diverse industries, while unique in their technical aspects, often exhibit com-
mon patterns of organizational behaviour. This chapter identified several such patterns, or
archetypes, and demonstrated their application in diverse industries. In addition, NASA
specific archetypes were developed based on investigations into the Challenger and
Columbia accidents.
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Chapter 5
A NEW APPROACH TO RISK
ANALYSIS
I am a devoted admirer of theory, hypothesis, formula, and every other emanation of pure
intellect which keeps erring man straight among the stumbling blocks and quagmires of
matter-of-fact observations.
G. B. Airy, Director of the Royal Observatory, 1949
"The main benefit of estimating risk lies in the achievement of a detailed understanding of
the engineered system."
Royal Society Report, 1992
This chapter introduces an approach to risk analysis that is applicable to modern, complex
socio-technical systems. The proposed approach goes beyond event-based models to
include risks that do not solely arise from component or subsystem failures and incorpo-
rates the impact of technical, human and organizational factors on risk. By taking an
explicit lifecycle view of systems, the approach (1) enables the early identification of risks
and risk mitigation strategies; (2) aids in the allocation of resources to best manage risk;
and (3) provides for the continuous monitoring of risk throughout the system lifecycle. In
addition, the approach emphasizes and enables the participation of members at all levels
of the organization as well as other stakeholders in order to best identify, assess, and man-
age risks.
5.1 Continuous Participative Risk Management
Risk management consists, on the one hand, of proving that an initial system design satis-
fies safety requirements, and, on the other hand, of best allocating limited resources to
157
A NEW APPROACH TO RISK ANALYSIS
maintain risk at an acceptable level' throughout the system's lifecycle2 . Managing risk
effectively over the entire lifecycle requires first that risks be properly identified and
assessed, and second that impacts of decisions in the present on the future behaviour of the
system be considered and understood. This section discusses one way of effectively
addressing risk management throughout a system's lifecycle: Continuous Participative
Risk Management (CPRM). It is 'continuous' because the process of risk identification,
assessment, and mitigation should continue throughout the system lifecycle and not be a
one-time effort; and it is 'participative' because inputs from members at all levels of the
organization are needed for an appropriate and extensive risk management effort.
Figure 5.1 summarizes the motivation for CPRM.
5.1.1 The Importance of Continuous Risk Management
There are two aspects to continuous risk management. First, initiating risk management
when a new system is first considered allows the early identification and assessment of
risks. The earlier risks are understood the easier it is to develop effective and cost-effec-
tive strategies to eliminate or mitigate the risks. When risks are identified late in system
development, significant changes in the system design may no longer be feasible. 'Band-
aid' and after-the-fact fixes for risks tend to be less effective and more expensive. Risk
assessment tools like probabilistic risk assessment that require a near-complete system
design are not a good basis for continuous risk management of novel systems.
Second, continuing risk management throughout a system's lifecycle until its retirement
allows operators to actively manage risk and maintain it at an acceptable level throughout
the system's lifecycle. Risk is not constant: new risks may arise, and old risks may change.
1. The question of acceptability depends on various factors such as public opinion and regulatory standards.
The acceptability of risk is context dependent: Risks that are deemed acceptable in one context may be
unacceptable in another context. For example, society accepts much higher risks for military aviation
than for civil aviation. The interested reader is referred to the extensive literature, for example [Fischhoff
et al., 1983].
2. Here system lifecycle is considered in the widest sense and extends as far as the consequences of realized
system risks may persist.
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Description Motivation Objective
Continuous 1. Risk analysis begins when 1. Earlier identification and 1. Select best design options
system concept is first assessment of risks allows to minimise risk within
considered. greater freedom of design resource, performance
choices and mitigation and schedule constraints.
options.
2. Risk analysis continues 2. Risk evolves over system 2. Ensure that risk is
throughout system lifecycle. Continuous managed over entire
lifecycle updating is necessary to system lifecycle.
ensure risk analysis is
accurate over lifecycle.
1. Involvement of members
of organization (and
external stakeholders) in
risk analysis.
2. Involvement of members
of organization (and
external stakeholders) in
development of risk
management (e.g.,
mitigation options)
strategies.
1. Wide involvement in risk
analysis maximises quality
and extent of risk
information.
2. Wide involvement in
development of risk
management strategy
encourages employee
commitment and buy-in.
1. Obtain better quality
information on which to
base decisions.
2. Encourage employee
commitment to risk
management process and
maintaining/improving
safety.
Figure 5.1 Continuous Participative Risk Management
In addition, because people tend to overemphasize near-term risks over long-term risks,
dysfunctionality often creeps into decision making (for example, saving money or time in
development while dramatically increasing maintenance costs). Continuous risk manage-
ment allows operators to not merely to minimize risk at a particular stage, but rather to
minimize the total risk across the entire system lifecycle. Hence the case for a continuous
participative risk management approach.
5.1.2 The Importance of Participative Risk Management
Consider now the importance of wide participation in risk management in general, and
risk analysis in particular. Figure 5.2 shows the different groups involved in system design
and risk analysis. Each person has a unique background, interacts with different aspects of
the system to different extents, and therefore develops a unique understanding, or mental
model, of the system. For example, electrical engineers and structural engineers will have
different perspectives on a system.
Participative
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Model C Makers
Figure 5.2 Views on a System: The Standard Approach to Risk Analysis
When risk is analyzed in an isolated process that does not involve members at all levels of
the organization, risk analysts are likely to be exposed only to limited viewpoints on what
the risks are and how important they are. They are therefore more likely to form an inaccu-
rate representation of risks. In addition, such an isolated process of risk analysis misses a
valuable opportunity for developing stakeholder commitment to the risk management
approach.
Different perspectives on a system are useful for risk analysis because they allow different
aspects of system behaviour to be identified. However, while different perspectives on a
system are useful, it is necessary to develop a shared understanding of the risk associated
with a system. Without such a shared understanding of risk it can be impossible to reach
consensus on risk-related decisions or to obtain commitment to risk management strate-
gies (e.g., use of safety procedures).
Figure 5.3 shows an alternative approach, which draws designers, decision-makers, and
other stakeholders (e.g., operators) into the process from the outset. Whereas the standard
approach (Figure 5.2) keeps stakeholders, risk analysts, system designers, and decision
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makers separate, this approach emphasizes the shared development of models of the sys-
tem by encouraging the different groups to work together. In this approach, information is
shared between all the groups, thus maximizing the shared knowledge of the system, facil-
itating the development of a shared understanding of risk and how it should be managed,
and encouraging commitment to the risk management strategy.
System: - No Risk
Analysis
Figure 5.3 Participative risk management
Figure 5.4 shows four conceptual phases in CPRM: pre-analysis, risk analysis, risk-
informed decision making, and post-analysis. The phases are separated here for conve-
nience; in practice they overlap and inform each other. The first (pre-analysis) and last
(post-analysis) phases are high-level and are to do with how the organization views, anal-
yses, and responds to risk. The pre-analysis phase includes the selection of risk analysis
methods, determination of system boundaries, and stakeholder analysis. The post-analysis
phase reviews the results of risk management and adjusts the approach where necessary.
The middle two phases look at particular systems, the risk associated with these systems,
and how the risk can be mitigated. The risk analysis phase identifies and assesses risks for
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a particular system. The results of this phase are used to inform design and operating deci-
sions in the decision making phase. Note that the items in each phase may already be per-
formed as part of existing risk analysis techniques. They are presented here for
completeness and to illustrate the concept of continuous participative risk management.
Update methods and
approaches... ...based on post-
analysis findings
Looking Forward:
e Select methods
e Set system boundaries for risk
analysis
- Stakeholder analysis
System Development:
- Do risk analysis
" Make risk-informed decisions
e Continuously review and
update risk analysis
Status Check and Looking Back:
a Evaluate methods and system
boundaries
" Evaluate stakeholder
involvement
- Determine whether risk
decisions should be
reconsidered
Risk analysis is iterative,
occurring together with system
development and operation
Figure 5.4 Phases in Continuous Participative Risk Management
This section developed and advocated the concept of continuous participative risk man-
agement (CPRM), which takes an explicit lifecycle view of systems and incorporates
information from all members of an organization. Risk analysis is one part of risk manage-
ment. Section 5.4 introduces an approach to risk analysis that enables and encourages con-
tinuous participative risk management. First, though, it is necessary to review the process
that underlies the proposes risk analysis approach, STAMP-Based Hazard Analysis [Leve-
son, 2003].
Pre-Analysis
Phase
Post-Analysis
Phase
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5.2 Review of STAMP-Based Hazard Analysis
This section provides a brief overview of STPA [Leveson, 2003; Dulac and Leveson,
2004; Daouk et al., 2004]. The purpose of hazard analysis is (1) to identify system hazards
and the related safety constraints required to maintain risk at an acceptable level; and (2)
to determine how these constraints could be violated and use this information to eliminate,
reduce, or control the hazards. The hazard analysis process is illustrated in Figure 5.5. An
example of a hazard analysis is presented in Section 5.11.
Engineering Process Hazard Analysis Process
Begin
Step 1
Identify high-level hazards
Step 2
Identify safety-related
requirements and constraints
Step 3
Identify possible inadequate
control actions for each safety-
related requirement/constraint
Iterate as the
design is refined
Step 4
Examine control structure and
process models to identify
control flaws associated with
each inadequate control action
Figure 5.5 STAMP-Based Hazard Analysisa
a. Adapted from [Daouk et al., 2004]. See Chapter 1 for a description of STAMP.
Identify high-level goals,
assumptions and mission
concept
Identify functional
requirements
--
Define system control
structure
Design process model for
system components
I
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The four steps in the hazard analysis process (right-hand side of Figure 5.5) are briefly
discussed below.
Step 1: Identify and Characterize High-Level Hazards
The first step in hazard analysis is to identify and characterize the high-level system haz-
ards. Hazard identification is part art, part science. Analysts base identification of hazards
on personal past experience, hazard identification lists that codify past organizational or
industry experience, and technical expertise. Engaging employees at different levels of the
organization in the process of hazard identification can be useful because they are likely to
have different perspectives and may identify hazards that are not apparent to the risk ana-
lysts. The literature on hazard identification is extensive, see for example [Rasmussen and
Whetton, 1997] for an approach to hazard identification in socio-technical systems.
Step 2: Identify System-Level Safety Requirements and Constraints
The second step identifies a preliminary set of system-level safety requirements and con-
straints that addresses the high-level hazards identified in Step 1. Safety requirements and
constraints are identified by analyzing the ways that the hazard could occur. These
requirements and constraints must be augmented and refined as the engineering design
and hazard analysis processes proceed and more information becomes available. In the
next steps, the constraints identified here are used to identify possible inadequate control
actions and control flaws that could lead to the hazard and associated accident. Additional
safety constraints may be identified as the system design and risk analysis proceed.
Step 3: Identify Possible Inadequate Control Actions
The third step identifies how the safety requirements and constraints identified in step two
could be violated. In the STAMP model, safety requirements and constraints are violated
when the control actions intended to enforce them are inadequate. There are four general
ways in which a controller action may be inadequate [Leveson, 2003]:
1. A required control action is not provided;
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2. An incorrect or unsafe control action is provided;
3. A potentially correct or adequate control action is provided at the wrong
time (e.g., too late); or
4. A potentially correct or adequate control action is stopped too early or too
late.
Inadequate control actions can arise at all levels of the system and supporting organiza-
tional structure. In some cases inadequate control actions may already be addressed by
existing constraints. The next step identifies the control flaws that could lead to the inade-
quate control actions.
Step 4: Identify Possible Control Flaws and Design Options
The fourth step uses both the system control structure and process models developed in
the engineering process (left-hand side of Figure 5.5) to identify scenarios (control flaws)
in which the inadequate control actions could arise. Figure 5.6 shows a classification of
control flaws developed by [Leveson, 2004a]. Control flaws that could lead to inadequate
control actions can be identified using the hierarchical control structure and process con-
trol models together with inputs from the underlying engineering and social science disci-
plines. For example, a structural analysis may be used to identify parts of an aircraft that
are prone to metal fatigue.
1. Inadequate Control Actions
1.1. Design of control algorithm does not enforce process
1.2. Process models inconsistent, incomplete, or incorrect
1.2.1. Flaws in creation or updating processes
1.2.2. Inadequate or missing feedback
- Not provided in system design
- Communication flaw
- Inadequate sensor operation (incorrect or no information provided)
1.2.3. Time lags and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for
1.3. Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision makers
2. Inadequate Execution of Control Action
2.1. Communication flaw
2.2. Inadequate actuator operation
2.3. Time lag
Figure 5.6 Classification of Control Flaws [Leveson, 2004a]
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The control flaws are used to generate new safety requirements and constraints, and also
to inform design decisions based on an assessment of the risk associated with each hazard
(see Step 1). Each identified control flaw is examined to identify whether (1) an existing
safety requirement or constraint already addresses the control flaw; (2) whether additional
safety requirements and constraints are required; and (3) to identify and inform design
options that could eliminate, mitigate, or control the associated hazard.
The hazard analysis approach discussed here is used in a new approach to risk analysis, as
described in the Section 5.4.
5.3 Quantitative and Qualitative Risk Assessments
Quantitative assessments of risks provide a convenient basis for decision making, pro-
vided they are accurate and are trusted by decision makers. Unfortunately, as discussed in
Chapter 2, obtaining accurate numerical estimates of probability is difficult and often
impossible. Even proponents of Probabilistic Risk Assessment note that PRA estimates
should not be used in an absolute sense but only to rank risks and identify the most impor-
tant contributors to these risks [Apostolakis, 2004].
In addition, research has shown that decision makers are often uncomfortable with numer-
ical probabilities. For example, studies of the chemical industry following the Bhopal
accident indicate that when organizations are really concerned about safety they discard
probability estimates and focus instead on worst-case consequences [Bowman and Kun-
reuther, 1988; Kunreuther and Bowman, 1997]. Prior to the Bhopal accident the organiza-
tions in the above-mentioned studies used standard risk assessment techniques such as
fault trees. At least one of the organizations used a strategy by which events with probabil-
ities below a certain threshold were assumed to effectively have zero probability of occur-
rence. After the accident the organizations turned to worst-case scenario analyses and
attempted to reduce the chances of such events as much as possible. Even when risk
assessments included probability estimates these were discarded. For example, one man-
ager noted [Kunreuther and Meszaros, 1997]:
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"We can't deal with probabilities. We don't know what an acceptable probability is. If it's
one in 28,000 years but the next year is the yeat; you are in big trouble."
This general insensitivity, and sometimes antipathy, to probability estimates may also be
partly due to the difficulties of making decisions in real contexts [March and Shapira,
1987]. Real decision-making situations are complex and ambiguous. Accurately estimat-
ing the probabilities of outcomes in the case of complex socio-technical systems is diffi-
cult and often impossible, and more importantly, many managers know this. It therefore
makes sense for them to place less faith in probability estimates and focus on outcomes
instead. One way of increasing decision makers' confidence in quantitative estimates is to
document assumptions, methods, and data sources and present these together with numer-
ical estimates.
In some cases, it may be possible to calculate probabilities quantitatively based on techni-
cal analyses or historical data. For example, structural analyses may be used to estimate
the time to failure of mechanical structures.
In cases where it is not possible to unambiguously and accurately calculate probabilities, it
may be better to rely on coarse quantitative estimates, such as those used in risk matrices
(see Chapter 2). Quantitative estimates can be used both in an absolute sense, to indicate
an analyst's sense of the probability of a particular hazard/accident, and in a relative sense,
to indicate which risks are considered more or less likely than others. Thus, for example,
hazards and risks might be characterized as very unlikely, somewhat likely, or very likely.
When there is no information about the probability of the hazard or risk, classifying them
as unknown avoids assigning arbitrary qualitative or quantitative estimates.
5.4 A New Approach to Risk Analysis
This section introduces a new approach to risk analysis that enables concurrent and inte-
grated development of safety constraints on the one hand, and system and organizational
design on the other hand. In this approach, consideration of hazards, together with other
project requirements (e.g., performance, cost, schedule), drives the development of the
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system design as well as the definition of the supporting organizational structure. The
approach allows the incorporation of risk considerations into decision making from the
beginning of system development, and is inherently integrative: technical, human, and
organizational factors affecting risk are included. The hazard and risk analyses occur in
parallel with the system engineering process (see Figure 5.7).
The risk analysis approach here presented builds on Leveson's hazard analysis technique
[Leveson, 2003] and extends it to include the risk implications of different design options
and inform trade-off decisions. Figure 5.7 shows how the risk analysis adds to and com-
plements STPA.
The risk analysis consists of the following steps as briefly described below: initial risk
assessment, evaluation of design options, and residual risk assessment. The next three sec-
tions discuss each step in detail.
Step 1: Initial Estimate of High-Level Risks. In this step, initial estimates of risks are
formed to facilitate ranking and to determine whether the risk level falls within acceptable
limits. As in traditional system safety engineering, hazards are characterized by their prob-
ability and the range of possible severity or damage associated with the hazard, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 1 (and shown in Figure 5.8). The probability of the associated accident
is a function of the probability of the hazard, the hazard duration or exposure, and the
probability of the hazard leading to an accident.
Step 2: Evaluate Design Options. In this step, different design options are evaluated
with regards to their impact on risk, as discussed in detail Section 5.6. Different design
options may be available to implement the constraints and mitigate the control flaws asso-
ciated with a particular hazard. For the purpose of highlighting trade-offs and informing
decision making (see Step 3), the design options are characterized according to scope,
type, effectiveness, stability, and observability. These evaluations should be updated and
refined as the design is developed and more detailed information becomes available. Note
also that design options may give rise to new control flaws.
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Step 3: Residual Risk Assessment. In this step, the residual risks that remain once par-
ticular design options are selected are assessed, as discussed in detail in Section 5.7.
Design options modify the risk profile formed in Step 1, by eliminating or reducing the
probabilities of hazards and/or accidents, or by limiting the consequences of accidents.
The residual risk assessment can be used to (1) estimate the residual risks for individual
hazards given particular sets of design options; (2) estimate the overall risk of the system;
and (3) make the safety case by presenting the approaches taken/not taken to mitigate haz-
ards.
The initial risk analysis is complete when the detailed design of the all system components
is complete. The analysis must be updated whenever changes in the system are consid-
ered, or whenever changes in the operating environment occur. Changes in the system or
its environment may give rise to new hazards. Finally, the possibility that all hazards have
not been identified must be considered. Continued vigilance is necessary to ensure an
exhaustive identification of hazards.
This section has presented a high-level overview of the proposed risk analysis approach.
The next three sections discuss the steps in the risk analysis in detail. Section 5.5 discusses
the initial assessment of risks. Section 5.6 focusses on the evaluation of design options.
Section 5.7 discusses the assessment of residual risk in detail. Section 5.8 develops a more
elaborate example, based on the Space Shuttle Columbia accident.
5.5 Initial Risk Assessment (Step 1)
In Step 1 of the risk analysis, initial estimates of the risks are formed (1) to facilitate rank-
ing of these risks and (2) to determine whether the initial estimate of risk falls within an
acceptable range to continue system development.
This section first presents the parameters that will be used to represent risk. These param-
eters are common to most risk analysis methodologies and are presented here for com-
pleteness. Next, an example is used to illustrate the process of initial risk assessment.
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Hazards are characterized by the probability, p(H)), of their occurrence and by the range
of possible consequences, C, of accidents associated with the hazard, as shown in
Figure 5.8 [Leveson, 1995]. The probability of an accident is a function of the probability
of the hazard, the hazard duration or exposure, and the probability of the hazard leading to
an accident, p (A I H). The hazard duration or exposure may affect the probability of an
accident. In general, the longer a hazard persists, the more likely it is to lead to an acci-
dent.
Figure 5.8 Components of Risk. Adapted from [Leveson, 1995]
Based on these definitions of hazard and risk, each risk is characterized here by three com-
ponents: (1) the probability, p(H), of the hazard; (2) the conditional probability, p(A I H),
of an accident given the hazard (which is defined here to include the effect of hazard expo-
sure); and (3) the consequence vector C . This characterization is captured in Eq. (5.1):
R = [p(H), p(AIH), C] (5.1)
This characterization of risk can also be represented graphically using risk matrices, as
discussed in Chapter 2.
The initial estimate of the probability of a hazard H takes the form:
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p,(H) E { Quantitative Estimate, Qualitative Estimate, Unknown } (5.2)
For a completely new system design, the probabilities of all hazards and accidents are ini-
tially classified as unknown, to indicate that nothing is yet known about the design or the
risks. As the design is developed and more information becomes available probabilities
can be estimated and updated based on the hazard analysis and the design options selected
to address the hazard, as discussed later.
The proposed process of risk analysis in general, and initial risk assessment in particular,
are best demonstrated by means of a simple example, as shown next. The hazard analysis
for this example is presented in Section 5.11 for reference. Section 5.8 presents a more
complex example.
Initial Risk Assessment: Gas Leak. Consider the following hypothetical scenario. An
office building is being designed, and one concern is that gas leaks in offices could be set
off by ignition sources such as matches or electric sparks. For the sake of this example, it
is assumed that ignition sources are beyond the control of the building developers. In this
case, the hazard, risk, and accident are, respectively:
e H: Gas leak in the office.
- R: Probability and consequences of gas-leak induced fire in the office.
- A: Fire in the office and possibly the rest of the building.
The hazard has been narrowly defined to keep the example relatively simple. In a real risk
analysis, the hazard would be more broadly defined to include any areas where ignition
sources may occur, such as storage rooms and restrooms.
The probability of the hazard is the probability that a leak arises in the gas distribution sys-
tem. Note that this probability depends on various factors, such as the quality of materials
used to construct the gas distribution system, the quality of the installation, the frequency
of inspections, and so forth. The damage associated with the hazard is the damage caused
by the fire to the building, and the possible injuries and loss of life. The hazard exposure is
172
Initial Risk Assessment (Step 1) 173
the time for which a gas leak coincides with an ignition source such as a flame from a
match. Because a spark need only coincide with a gas leak for an instant, the probability of
an accident given a gas leak is the same as the probability of a spark during a gas leak.
Finally, the immediate consequences of the accident are the damage to the building and
injury and/or loss of life. Other consequences include the impact of the damage to the
building on the organization that uses the building (e.g., productive time lost due to reloca-
tion efforts). Figure 5.9 shows how the gas leak hazard is related to the risk of a fire in the
office and building.
Risk: Gas Explosion and Fire in Office
Hazard: Gas Leak in Office
Hazard Level
Risk Likelihood
bi in office or entire T = Exposure to ignition source
bidn.Loss of
prpryand life. deinproert an lie.Ph= f(design) P,, = P(firelgas leak and spark)]
Risk Consequences and Costs
C = Loss of property and life.
Unforeseen = ?
Figure 5.9 Gas Leak Hazard and Fire Risk
The risk of an accident associated with a gas leak fire can be summarized as:
p(H) = f(gas distribution system)
R(gas leak fire) = p(AIH) = p(spark) (5.3)
C(fire)
where
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damage to property 1
C(gas leak fire) = injury and loss of life (5.4)
_etc.
In each case, quantitative or qualitative estimates are obtained by consulting the applicable
domain experts, performing tests and analyses, and so forth.
5.6 Evaluation of Design Options (Step 2)
Design options are used to reduce risk by controlling hazards. Design options to control
hazards may be developed in Step 1 of the hazard analysis. Additional design options to
address control flaws may also be developed in Step 4 of the hazard analysis. Several
design options may be available to address a hazard and/or the associated control flaws.
This section discusses the evaluation of these design options from a risk perspective
(Step 2 of the risk analysis). These evaluations are used to assess the residual risk for dif-
ferent design options, or sets of design options (Step 3 of the risk analysis). The residual
risk assessment can be used, together with other considerations such as the performance
and cost implications of the design options, to inform design decisions.
For the purpose of risk assessment, the design options are characterized according to the
following attributes: scope, type, effectiveness, stability, and observability. These
attributes are briefly discussed in the following subsections. Note that these characteriza-
tions are not necessarily a new way of looking at systems, but are presented here because
of their implications for risk.
5.6.1 Scope
The scope of a design option indicates the extent of the mitigation potentially achieved by
the design option. A design option can address the hazard, one or more inadequate control
actions, or one or more control flaws. Design options that address the hazard will in gen-
eral tend to have a greater risk reduction effect than those that address inadequate control
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actions, which in turn have a greater risk reduction effect than those that address control
flaws. For example, a design option that eliminates a hazard has a greater risk reduction
effect than one that eliminates a control flaw that could lead to that hazard.
The design options suggested in the gas leak example all directly address the hazard
(listed below by decreasing impact on risk reduction):
- D1. 1: Remove gas line from offices/do not install gas lines in offices-haz-
ard eliminated.
- D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints-probability of hazard reduced.
- D1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks-
probability of hazard reduced.
- D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut off gas in event of gas leaks-hazard con-
trolled.
- D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building-damage minimized.
- D1.6: Detect explosions/ fires and activate building sprinkler system-dam-
age minimized.
The scope parameter is used for convenience in the risk assessment, where it guides the
assessment of probabilities and/or consequences.
5.6.2 Type
The type of the design option indicates the type of mitigation potentially achieved by the
design option. There are four complementary approaches to mitigating hazards, the inade-
quate control actions (ICAs) that could lead to the hazards, or the underlying control flaws
(CFs), listed here in order of preference [Leveson, 1995, Ch. 16]:
1. Eliminate Hazard, Inadequate Control Action, or Control Flaw. It may be possible
to eliminate the hazard, inadequate control actions or control flaws by making certain
design decisions. It will not always be practical to eliminate a hazard, inadequate control
action, or control flaw. For example, some elimination options may be judged to be infea-
sible because they are too expensive, too difficult to implement, conflict with essential
performance goals, or contribute to existing or additional hazards. For the gas leak exam-
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ple, D1.1 (remove gas line from offices/do not install gas lines in offices) eliminates the
hazard.
If a hazard is eliminated from the design, immediate further action in the risk analysis is
not necessary. Monitoring the system as it evolves over time can reveal if the hazard arises
again. If the hazard cannot be eliminated (because no options are available or because the
available options are judged to be infeasible), the next three approaches can be used singly
or in combination to decrease the probability of the hazard, control the hazard, or mini-
mize the damage resulting from the hazard.
2. Reduce Probability. It may be possible to reduce the likelihood of the hazard, inade-
quate control action, or control flaw. For the gas leak example, D1.2 (use leak-resistant
tubing and joints) and D1.3 (periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or
leaks) reduce the probability of the hazard.
3. Control Hazard. It may be possible to control the hazard if it does occur. For the gas
leak example, D1.4 (use leak sensors and shut down gas in event of gas leaks) controls the
hazard.
4. Minimize Damage. It may be possible to minimize the damage resulting from the haz-
ard. For the gas leak example, D1.5 (detect gas leaks and evacuate building) and D1.6
(detect explosions/ fires and activate building sprinkler system) minimize the damage
associated with the hazard.
Design options that eliminate hazards have the highest risk reduction potential (see also
Figure 5.14). In contrast, design options that reduce the probability of a control flaw or
minimize damage have lower risk reduction potential. The notion of design option effec-
tiveness, discussed next, further expands on the risk reduction potential of a design option.
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5.6.3 Effectiveness
The effectiveness parameter indicates how effective the design option is expected to be at
a particular scope and type of mitigation effort. The characterization of effectiveness
depends on the type of design option, as shown in italics in Figure 5.10. Thus, a design
option that eliminates a hazard, inadequate control action, or control flaw, is by definition
fully effective. The effectiveness of a design option that reduces the probability of a haz-
ard, inadequate control action, or control flaw is the reduction in probability obtained with
the design option. In the gas leak example, different types of gas lines may have different
probabilities of leaking. The effectiveness of a design option that controls a hazard is the
expected reduction in damage or the expected reduction in the probability of an accident,
given the hazard. For example, the reduction in accident probability obtained by shutting
gas leaks off depends on how quickly leaks are shut off. Finally, the effectiveness of a
design option that minimizes damage is the expected reduction in damage. For example,
the expected reduction in injuries resulting from a gas leak fire depends on how quickly
the evacuation alarm is sounded, and on how well the building occupants are trained in
evacuation procedures.
Type of
Design Option
A
Minimize Damage
Control Hazard
Reduce Probability
Eliminate
Expected reduction N/A N/Ain damage
Expected reduction N/A N/Ain damage, p(A|H)
Expected reduction Expected reduction Expected reduction
in p(H) in p(H), p(A|H) in p(H), p(A|H)
Complete Complete Complete
Hazard Inadequate Control Flaw Scope Of
Control Action Design Option
Figure 5.10 Effectiveness of Design Options
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The effectiveness of each design option can be estimated by risk analysts in concert with
domain experts. For example, traditional risk analysis techniques such as fault and event
trees may be used once the design is complete to help determine the ideal residual proba-
bilities (see Section 5.7) of hazards or accidents where the systems are simple and do not
involve software. When it is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness quantitatively, qual-
itative assessments can be used instead.
For the gas leak example introduced on page 172 (H: Gas leak in the office), the effective-
ness of the proposed design options can be evaluated as follows, using the inadequate con-
trol actions and control flaws identified in Steps 2 and 3 of the hazard analysis (see
Section 5.11) as a guide:
e D1.1: Remove gas line from offices/do not install gas lines in offices.
Scope: Hazard; Type: Eliminate
Effectiveness: Complete-Removing gas lines from offices eliminates the
hazard. Although several inadequate control actions were identified that
could limit the how well this option is implemented, they can be mitigated
quite easily by means of inspections.
e D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints;
Scope: Hazard; Type: Reduce probability
Effectiveness: Reduced probability of hazard-Reduction can be estimated
based on technical specifications of tubing and joints.
- D 1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks;
Scope: Hazard; Type: Reduce probability
Effectiveness: Reduced probability of hazard-Reduction can be estimated
based of technical specifications of tubing and joints, maintenance schedule,
and human factors analyses.
- D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut off gas in event of gas leaks;
Scope: Hazard; Type: Control hazard
Effectiveness: Reduced damage-The reduction in damage depends on how
rapidly the gas is shut off.
- D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building;
Scope: Hazard; Type: Minimize damage
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Effectiveness: Reduced damage-The reduction in damage depends on how
rapidly the gas leak is detected and how effective the evacuation procedures
are.
- D1.6: Detect explosions/ fires and activate building sprinkler system.
Scope: Hazard; Type: Minimize damage
Effectiveness: Reduced damage-The reduction in damage depends on how
rapidly the gas leak is detected and how effective the building sprinkler sys-
tem is.
Subsequent iterations of the risk analysis may yield information that changes the design
option evaluation. For example, they may reveal that a design option creates additional
inadequate control actions that could contribute to the present or other hazards.
The first three design option parameters, scope, type, and effectiveness, are used to evalu-
ate the risk reduction potential of a design option. Design options may however be
improperly implemented, or decline in effectiveness over time, thus leading to an increase
in risk.
The next two design option parameters, stability and observability, are used to identify
potential reasons for a decline in effectiveness, and to assess how difficult it is to deter-
mine whether a design option is properly implemented and whether it continues to be
effective. Determining the ability of design options to enforce constraints over the lifetime
of the system (stability) can help decision makers to make decisions that address risk over
the lifetime of the system. In addition, un-noted declining constraints can result in
increased risk. Considering the ease with which declining constraints can be observed
(observability) further aids in informed decision making about risk over the system life-
time. These two parameters also provide a guide as to which aspects of the system should
be monitored for signs of increasing risk over time.
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5.6.4 Stability
The stability of the design option indicates, where applicable, how rapidly the design
option effectiveness may decline over the system's lifetime. The stability of design
options indicates the degree of continued vigilance that is required to ensure the design
option remains effective. The stability parameter is used in the risk assessment to identify
potential areas of concern where risk may increase over time.
Design options that do not require any further attention such as inspections or preventative
maintenance and are not subject to physical decline over time have maximum stability.
Thus, a design option that eliminates a hazard, inadequate control action, or control flaw
has maximum stability.
For other design options, the stability is the expected time for which the design option is
expected to remain effective. Where the design option consists of physical elements, the
stability is captured by the overall mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) of these elements. For
example, brake pads with a higher MTTF have higher stability than those with lower
MTTF. Low MTTF brake pads will require more frequent inspections and replacements to
ensure that they continue functioning as desired. Design options that require continued
attention may become less effective over time if the quality of maintenance and inspection
declines.
The effectiveness of procedures in mitigating hazards is likely to decline over time unless
active efforts are made to ensure continued compliance. For example, safety procedures
often include steps that are intended to address potential problems. Under normal condi-
tions, it may be possible to omit these steps without serious consequences [Leveson,
1995]. Employees may become complacent when they note that ignoring steps or per-
forming them sloppily usually does not have immediately observable effects on safety.
In practice it will usually be impossible to determine a specific time at which procedure
compliance is expected to decline. Noting in the risk analysis documentation that proce-
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dure compliance may decline over time if active measures are not taken to counteract this
decline serves two purposes. First, it provides designers with another factor that affects the
continued risk-reduction potential of design options. Second, it indicates to risk managers
areas where a decline in effectiveness, and hence and increase in risk, is possible.
For the gas leak example, the stability of the design options is as follows:
e D1. 1: Remove gas line from offices/do not install gas lines in offices.
Stability: Maximum-Hazard is eliminated. Gas lines will remain where
placed unless active effort is made to move them (e.g., building refurbish-
ment).
e D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints.
Stability: Subject to Organizational Factors-Gas lines and joints may be
replaced with lower quality items during periodic maintenance.
- D 1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks.
- Stability: Subject to Organizational Factors-Inspections may become less
frequent/thorough over time.
e D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut down gas in event of gas leaks.
Stability: MTTF of leak sensors. Periodic inspection and maintenance neces-
sary to prevent deterioration of sensors.
- D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building.
Stability: MTTF of leak sensors. Periodic inspection and maintenance neces-
sary to prevent deterioration of sensors.
Evacuation procedure must be practised at periodic intervals to ensure it is
effective.
- D1.6: Detect explosions/ fires and activate building sprinkler system.
Stability: MTTF of fire sensors and sprinkler systems. Periodic inspection
and maintenance necessary to prevent deterioration of sensors and sprinkler
system.
5.6.5 Observability
The observability parameter indicates how easy it is to determine (1) whether a design
option is implemented properly and (2) how effective it is in practice at mitigating the haz-
ard. The observability parameter is used in the risk assessment to identify potential areas
of concern where it may be difficult to observe an increase in risk over time. When it is
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difficult to determine whether a design option is ineffective, the risk level may be higher
than initially assessed.
Monitoring design options generally consists of both technical and organizational aspects.
For example, special equipment may be needed to examine an aircraft for cracks in the
fuselage, but inspection procedures must be followed to ensure that inspection is carried
out properly and at the required time intervals. The observability parameter therefore
includes both the technical and organizational challenges of evaluating the actual effec-
tiveness of design options. Technical challenges depend on the technical features of the
design option and can be identified and evaluated by domain experts.
The ease with which procedures can be monitored and non-compliance detected, depends
on various factors. For example, more complicated procedures are in general more diffi-
cult to monitor than simple procedures because there are more ways for them to be vio-
lated, either intentionally or unintentionally. Also, procedures that require specialized
skills cannot be effectively monitored by personnel who do not have the same specialized
skills. Such procedures therefore have lower observability than procedures that require
less specialized skills.
For the gas leak example, the observability of the design options is as follows:
- D 1.1: Remove gas line from offices/do not install gas lines in offices.
Observability: Simple inspections can determine placement of gas lines.
- D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints.
Observability: Simple inspections can ensure designs specify appropriate
equipment. However, continued vigilance necessary to ensure any replace-
ment meet requirements.
- D 1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks.
Observability: May be difficult to determine whether inspectors perform
inspections properly.
- D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut down gas in event of gas leaks;
Observability: Inspection and analysis of the design can be used to deter-
mine whether it is correct. Testing of the installed leak sensors and shut
182
Residual Risk Assessment (Step 3) 183
down valves can determine whether this option is effective. Inspections
required to detect deterioration of gas sensors. May be difficult to determine
if inspectors perform inspections properly.
- D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building;
Observability: Inspections required to detect deterioration of gas sensors.
May be difficult to determine if inspectors perform inspections properly.
Evacuation procedures must be tested in dry-runs to determine whether they
are effective.
- D1.6: Detect explosions/ fires and activate building sprinkler system.
Observability: Inspections required to detect deterioration of sensors or
emergency response systems. May be difficult to determine if inspectors per-
form inspections properly.
5.7 Residual Risk Assessment (Step 3)
This section shows how the initial risk estimates made in Step lb can be updated to reflect
the impact of design options. The purpose of this stage of the risk assessment is threefold:
1. To aid in the selection of design options;
2. To estimate the residual risk for the selected design; and
3. To show the extent to which hazards have been addressed in the design.
This section addresses these goals by developing an analytical framework to estimate the
probabilities of hazards and accidents in the presence of one or more design options.
Assumptions and caveats that govern the use of the equations are presented. Then, the
determination of the individual probabilities used in the equations is discussed. Next, a
method for incorporating the effects of organizational factors into the assessment is pre-
sented. Finally, the gas leak example is continued to illustrate the application of the con-
cepts presented here. Section 5.8 presents a more complex example, based on the Space
Shuttle.
5.7.1 An Analytical Framework for Residual Risk Assessment
This section develops an analytical framework for residual risk assessment that allows risk
analysts to form quantitative (when quantitative data are available) or qualitative (when
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quantitative data are not available) assessments of the probabilities of hazards and acci-
dents. These assessments can be used to select design options to address risks, and to
determine whether risks have been adequately addressed.
In the STAMP model of accidents, hazards occur when constraints are violated as a result
of a control flaw [Leveson, 2004a]. Accidents occur when the hazard persists, the appro-
priate environmental conditions exist, and the constraints intended to prevent hazards
from leading to accidents are not effective1 . Figure 5.11 illustrates the concept.
Constraints are violated
through inadequate Set of hazard constraints
control actions stemming
from control flaws
leading to a
hazardous
state ~ ~ ~
Hazardous state
Set of accident Constraints2
Accident Containment/
Damage Minimization
Accident
1. For preventing systems from migrating towards hazardous states
2. For preventing hazards from becoming accidents
Figure 5.11 Preventing Hazards and Accidents
The probability that a constraint is violated is a function of the probabilities that the asso-
ciated control flaws occur. The probabilities of hazards and accidents can therefore be
determined by first determining the probabilities that the relevant constraints are violated,
1. For convenience and readability, constraints, inadequate control actions, and control flaws are here
referred to by subscripts and not the hierarchical numbering system used elsewhere in the risk analysis.
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and then determining the probabilities of hazards and accidents given the violation of con-
straints, as discussed next.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, the probability that a con-
straint is violated as a result of control flaws is determined. Second, the impact of design
options on the probabilities of constraint violation is determined. Third, the probability
that a hazard occurs as a result of constraint violations is determined. Finally, the probabil-
ity that a hazard develops into an accident is determined. Figure 5.12 illustrates the devel-
opment of the framework.
1. Violation of Constraints
Constraints may be violated when one or more control flaws occur. For example, in air
traffic control, the constraint that two aircraft must maintain minimum separation (in order
to avoid mid-air collisions) may be violated as a result of several control flaws, such as
incorrect instructions to one or both of the aircraft from air traffic controllers [Leveson,
1995]. However, control flaws do not guarantee that constraints will be violated. In the
aircraft example, the pilots may notice that the air traffic control instructions are incorrect
and perform evasive manoeuvres. The probability that the aircraft violate minimum sepa-
ration can be determined by determining the probabilities of that the control flaws occur,
as well as the probabilities that these control flaws lead to constraint violations.
In general, the overall probability of a constraint violation is a function of (1) the probabil-
ities of the associated control flaws and (2) the probabilities that individual control flaws
will result in constraint violations. Consider now how the individual control flaw probabil-
ities can be combined to obtain the overall probability of constraint violation. Begin with
the simplest case where there is only one control flaw under the constraint. C is defined as
the event where the constraint is effective, and C is the event where the constraint is vio-
lated.
The probability of the constraint being violated, p(C) is given by:
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p(C) = p(CCF) -p(CF) (5.5)
where p(CI CF) is the conditional probability of constraint violation given a control flaw,
and p(CF) is the probability of the control flaw occurring.
When there are several control flaws, the probability of the constraint being violated is
determined by noting that the constraint will be satisfied if none of the control flaws
occurs:
CF
p(C) = 1 - (( 1 -p(C|CFi) -p(CFi)) (5.6)
i=l1
where nCF is the number of control flaws associated with the constraint and it is assumed
that control flaws are independent. The development of techniques to address dependen-
cies between control flaws is left as a subject for future work.
The probabilities of individual control flaws in Eq. (5.6) can be estimated by domain
experts together with risk analysts. Quantitative estimates of control flaw probabilities
should be used where possible. Qualitative estimates can be used where quantitative esti-
mates are not possible. Some control flaws, such as those due to technical design flaws,
are guaranteed to occur, and therefore in such cases:
p(CFtechnical design flaw) = 1 (5.7)
Similarly, determining the probability of constraint violation given a control flaw is also
domain specific. Some control flaws will guarantee that the constraint is violated, that is,
p(OC CF) = 1 . For example, in the gas leak case, CF1.2.1.3 (the designers erroneously
select the wrong type of gas lines and joints) guarantees that the incorrect equipment will
be installed.
When the occurrence of any of the control flaws guarantees that the constraint is violated:
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p(CICFj) = 1 Vi (5.8)
In this case, Eq. (5.6) therefore simplifies to:
nCF
p(C) = 1 - H (1 -p(CFj)) (5.9)
i = 1
Other control flaws may not guarantee that the constraint is violated, but do make it more
likely that it is violated. For example, in the gas leak case, CF1.1.1.1 (The requirement
that gas lines not be placed in offices is not communicated to the designers and the place-
ment of gas lines is not monitored by safety personnel) does not guarantee that designers
will place gas lines in offices.
Eq. (5.6) shows how the probabilities of individual control flaws relate to the probability
that the associated constraint is violated. This expression can be used both to determine
the overall probability of constraint violation, and also to determine the relative impor-
tance of control flaws, as discussed below.
Relative Significance of Control Flaws. The contributions of control flaws to Eq. (5.6)
defines their relative significance to the probability of constraint violation and therefore
indicates to designers which control flaws should be addressed to minimize the probability
of constraint violation. Control flaws that are highly probable and whose occurrence
makes it highly probable that the constraint will be violated have the largest effect on the
overall probability of constraint violation. Thus, where quantitative probabilities are avail-
able, the terms p(CI CFj) -p(CFj) can be used to rank the control flaws and determine
where to focus the risk mitigation effort in order to maximize the probability that a partic-
ular constraint is not violated.
Where only qualitative probabilities are available, a graphical approach such as that
shown in Figure 5.13 can be used. When the probability of a control flaw is low, and the
probability of a constraint violation given the control flaw is also low, the control flaw has
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relatively low impact on the overall probability of constraint violation (e.g., CF in the
figure). Conversely, when the probability of a control flaw is high, and the probability of a
constraint violation given the control flaw is also high, the control flaw has relatively high
impact on the overall probability of constraint violation (e.g., CF9 in the figure). Identify-
ing the control flaws that have the largest impact on the probability of constraint violation
allows designers to focus their risk mitigation efforts on those flaws and therefore develop
the most effective risk mitigation strategies.
p(!CICF) Most significant
control flaw
High CF7 C
Medium CF4 CF5
Low CF1 CF2 CF3
Low Medium High p(CF)
Least significant
control flaw
Figure 5.13 Relative Impact of Control Flaws
2. Impact of Design Options
Design options can be used to reduce (or eliminate) the probability that constraints will be
violated by reducing (or eliminating) the probability of control flaws or constraint viola-
tions. For example, the probability that air traffic controllers give incorrect instructions
that cause pilots to violate minimum separation might be reduced by setting appropriate
operator workloads so that operator fatigue is avoided. The impact on risk of design
options can be assessed by determining the effect of the design option on the control flaw
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probability. The updated control flaw probability is then used to update the probability of
constraint violation, as discussed below, and hence the probability of the hazard and acci-
dent, as discussed later. Design options may also directly address the hazard. In this case
the impact on risk is determined directly, as shown in the example at the end of this sec-
tion.
Consider now how the effect of design options on the probability of constraint violation
can be assessed. In the simple case where there is only one control flaw, CFk, under the
constraint, and this control flaw is addressed by a single design option, Dk, the probability
of constraint violation is obtained by modifying Eq. (5.5):
p(C Dk) = p(C|CFk) -p(CFk|D) (5.10)
where p(CFk|Dk) is the probability of the control flaw given the design option. When a
design option eliminates a control flaw, p(CFk|Dk) = 0.
In the case where one control flaw is addressed by a single design option, while the proba-
bilities of the other control flaws are unchanged and no new control flaws are introduced,
the updated probability of the constraint being violated is obtained by similarly modifying
Eq (5.6):
nCF
p(C|Dk) = 1 -(1 - p(C |CFk) - p(CFk|Dk)) - (1 - p(C |CFj) -p(CFi)) (5.11)
i= 1
In the general case where each control flaw is addressed by one or more design options,
the updated probability for the constraint being violated is:
n CF
p(CE{Dj}) = 1 - fJ (1 -p(CICFi) -p(CFjj{Dj})) (5.12)
i= 1
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where {Di} is the set of design options for CFj. For control flaws that are not addressed
by design options the term p(CFj I{Di}) is set to p(CF) 1.
The most effective (from a risk reduction viewpoint) design options are those that have the
largest effect on the probabilities of hazards and accidents. Therefore the effectiveness of a
design option is mediated by the relationship between the control flaw being addressed
and the hazard. In order to assess the effectiveness of design options, it is therefore neces-
sary first to characterize this relationship, as described below.
Probabilities of Control Flaws given Design Options. The design option evaluations
made in Step 2 (see Section 5.6) of the risk analysis can be used to inform the calculation
of the conditional probabilities of the control flaws. The conditional probability is calcu-
lated by first noting the type and scope of the design option. As shown in Figure 5.14, the
type and the scope of the design option determine the potential risk reduction achievable.
Design options that eliminate or reduce the probability of hazards, ICAs or CFs, reduce
the probability of the hazard. Design options that control the hazard can reduce the proba-
bility of the accident given the hazard and/or the resulting damage. Design options that
result in the elimination of hazards have the highest risk reduction potential. In contrast,
design options that minimize damage have the lowest risk reduction potential.
In cases where the design option reduces a probability (i.e., reduces p(H) or p(A I H)), the
effectiveness parameter can be used to determine the conditional probability. In cases
where the design option controls a hazard or minimizes damage, the effectiveness parame-
ter can be used to determine the reduced consequences and costs.
1. Design options may have side-effects that increase or decrease the probabilities of existing control flaws
or introduce additional control flaws. The incorporation of these effects is discussed in Addendum 3 at
the end of this chapter.
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Type of
Design Option
Minimize Damage
Control Hazard
Reduce Probability
Eliminate
Minimize Damage N/A N/A
Control Hazard, N/A N/A
Reduce p(A)H) N/AN/A
Reduce p(H) Reduce p(H) or p(AIH) Reduce p(H) or p(AjH)
Hazard Eliminated
p(H)=p(A)=O
Hazard
ICA Eliminated CF Eliminated
Reduce p(H) or p(AIH) Reduce p(H) or p(AIH
Inadequate
Control Action
Control Flaw Scope Of
Design Option
Figure 5.14 Risk Reduction Potential According to Design Option Type and Scope
3. Hazard Occurrence
Hazards occur when the constraints intended to prevent the hazards are violated. In the
simple case where there is only one constraint for the hazard, the probability of the hazard
is given by:
p(H) = p(HIC) -p(C) (5.13)
When the violation of the constraint guarantees that the hazard will occur, p(H I C) = 1.
When there are nc constraints under the hazard, the probability of the hazard is deter-
mined by first noting that the hazard will not occur if all of the constraints are effective:
nC
(5.14)p(TZ) = Hp(Cd)
i = 1
Therefore, in the special case where p(H I C1) = 1 (i.e., the violation of any one of the
constraints guarantees that the hazard will occur), the probability of the hazard is:
increasing Risk Reduction Potential
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nc
p(H) = 1 - (1 -p(c1 )) (5.15)
i = 1
In the general case where p(HI C) # 1, that is, the violation of constraints does not guar-
antee that the hazard will occur, combining Eq. (5.13) and Eq. (5.15) gives:
p(H) = 1 - [J (1 - p(HI C) -p(C)) (5.16)
i = 1
Relative Effectiveness of Constraints. The contributions of constraints to Eq. (5.16)
defines their effectiveness in constraining the hazard. Constraints that are highly likely to
be violated and whose occurrence makes it highly probable that the hazard will occur are
the least effective. The calculation of the probability of a hazard given a constraint viola-
tion is domain specific (e.g., see space shuttle example in Section 5.8). Where quantitative
probabilities are available, the terms p(H I Cj) -p(C1 ) can be used to rank the constraints.
Where only qualitative probabilities are available, a graphical approach as shown in
Figure 5.15 can be used to compare constraints. When the probability of a constraint being
violated is low, and the probability of a hazard given the constraint violation is also low,
the constraint is defined to be highly effective (e.g., C1 in the figure). Conversely, when
the probability of a constraint being violated is high, and the probability of a hazard given
the constraint violation is also high, the constraint is defined to be highly effective (e.g.,
C9 in the figure). Identifying the constraints that have the largest impact on the probabil-
ity of a hazard allows designers to focus their risk mitigation efforts on these constraints
therefore develop the most effective risk mitigation strategies.
4. Transition to Accident
As discussed previously, the occurrence of a hazard does not guarantee that an accident
will occur. Accidents occur when a hazardous state persists and coincides with the appro-
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Figure 5.15 Relative Effectiveness of Constraints w.r.t. Hazards
priate environmental conditions. Therefore the overall probability of an accident related to
a specific hazard is given by:
p(A) = p(A|JH) -p(H) (5.17)
where p(A|H) is the probability of an accident occurring given the hazard. p(A|H) is
determined by context specific factors and should be assessed by domain experts together
with risk analysts. For example, the probability that two aircraft will collide if they have
violated the minimum separation distance depends on several factors, such as visibility
conditions, pilot experience, and whether the on-board collision alert system is function-
ing [Leveson, 1995].
Design options can be used to implement constraints to reduce p(A H). For example, in
the gas leak case, the more quickly a gas leak is shut off the lower the probability that it
will coincide in time or space with an ignition source and lead to a fire. An analysis of the
control flaws and evaluation of the design option can be used to identify ways that the
design option design could be ineffective, could be implemented incorrectly, or become
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ineffective over time. Eq. (5.6) can be used to determine the probability that constraints/
design options are violated.
This section has developed an analytical framework to determine the probabilities of haz-
ards and accidents, by using control flaws as the basic element. A similar derivation can
be made for consequences and costs of accidents. The next section discusses how this
framework can be applied in risk management.
5.7.2 Application of the Analytical Framework
This section began by noting that the purpose of this step of the risk assessment is three-
fold:
1. To aid in the selection of design options;
2. To estimate the residual risk for the selected design; and
3. To make the safety case, that is, show the extent to which hazards have been
addressed in the selected design.
The analytical framework derived here can be used to aid in achieving these objectives as
follows:
Selection of Design Options. The selection of design options is informed by the risk
assessment as well as other factors such as cost and performance implications. The overall
effectiveness of design options in reducing risk can be determined by propagating the
adjusted probabilities from control flaws through constraints to hazards and accidents.
Design options that eliminate hazards are preferred from a risk viewpoint. Next in the
ranking are design options that reduce the probability of hazards, followed by design
options that reduce the probability of accidents given hazards. When none of these design
options is available, design options that minimize damage are the last resort. Of course,
design options can also be used in combination, as illustrated in the examples.
Estimation of Residual Risk. The residual risk is estimated by applying the expressions
developed here to the selected set of design options. The overall risk level for the entire
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system can be estimated based on the risk assessments for each hazard/accident. A quanti-
tative estimate (probabilities and/or consequences) is only possible when the estimates for
all the hazards are also quantitative. In other cases, a general estimate of the overall risk
level can still be made. Graphical techniques may be useful in these cases.
While an overall risk estimate may be a useful public relations tool (when the estimate is
low), it does not have much value as a decision aid. Accidents are caused by individual
hazards and it is therefore more important to decision makers to know whether particular
hazards have been sufficiently mitigated.
Making the Safety Case. The safety case is made by using the selected design options
and the estimates of residual risk to show how hazards were addressed and that the risks
associated with individual hazards have been brought to an acceptable level. In addition,
the residual risk of designs that were not selected can be used to show that the approach
selected does indeed address risks in the most effective way, given cost, performance, and
other constraints.
As noted in the development of the analytical framework, it may not always be possible to
assign quantitative values to risk probabilities or consequences. However, as shown in
both the gas leak example and space shuttle example (Section 5.8), a detailed presentation
of the sources of risk, the strategies to mitigate risk, and potential reasons for an increase
in risk is provided by this approach. Such a detailed presentation may provide decision
makers with an improved understanding of risk that leads to better decisions than single
numbers, especially when the accuracy of these numbers is doubtful. Further work should
address the topic of how best to present the results of the risk analysis to decision makers.
5.7.3 Organizational Risk Factors
This section discusses how the impact of organizational factors on risk can be qualitatively
incorporated into the analysis. First, two approaches to incorporating organizational fac-
tors into probabilistic risk assessment are reviewed. Both approaches claim to allow the
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quantitative assessment of organizational factors. Next, the incorporation of organiza-
tional factors into the suggested risk assessment approach is discussed.
Approaches to Organizational Risk Factors in PRA
A number of other researchers have suggested approaches to accounting for organizational
factors in risk assessment, primarily in the area of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
These approaches include the SAM (System-Action-Management) framework [Murphy
and Pat6-Cornell, 1996], and WPAM (Work Process Analysis Model) [Davoudian et al.,
1994a; Davoudian et al., 1994b], both of which build on the probabilistic risk/safety
assessment (PRA/PSA) framework.
In the SAM framework management (or organizational) factors are viewed as affecting
component failure probabilities through human decision and actions. The effect of man-
agement factors on component failure probabilities is modelled using different models of
decision making and execution. The SAM approach claims to be quantitative because
quantitative values are assigned to the model parameters. However, because little empiri-
cal or analytical data exists for the required parameter values, the example SAM applica-
tions rely on expert opinion. Such estimates run the risk of being qualitative guesses
masquerading as quantitative values. Nevertheless, the core idea of SAM, that manage-
ment factors affect the probabilities of component failures, is useful. A similar view is
taken in this approach to risk assessment: here organizational factors are seen as affecting
the probabilities of control flaws, but this influence is judged in a qualitative way only.
WPAM takes a similar approach to SAM. In this case, organizational factors are seen as
introducing dependencies among probabilistic safety assessment parameters. Expert opin-
ion is used to assign relative quantitative weights to the pertinent organizational factors,
which are then incorporated into the PSA. WPAM explicitly takes a formal approach to
ensuring the consistency of expert opinion, but the problems discussed above with quanti-
tative expert opinion apply here too.
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Organizational Risk Factors in the New Approach
While a quantitative assessment of the impact of organizational factors could be useful,
the current state of knowledge does not allow believable quantification of these factors. It
is preferable to use qualitative estimates that make the lack of quantitative information
evident, than to use quantitative estimates that give a false impression of accuracy and pre-
cision. This approach to risk assessment focusses on identifying areas where organiza-
tional risk factors have a significant impact on risk.
The effect of organizational factors on risk is incorporated into the risk assessment by first
determining the residual hazard and accident probabilities assuming ideal organizational
conditions and then estimating the increase in probabilities due to organizational risk fac-
tors. Under ideal organizational conditions, organizational control flaws do not occur and
design option effectiveness is limited only by technical factors.
Organizational risk factors are identified in two ways. First, control flaws may be explic-
itly organizational. For example, in the gas leak scenario several organizational control
flaws were identified (e.g., CFl.3.1.1: Sensors to detect leaks were not installed). Organi-
zational control flaws will increase the probability of hazards and accidents. Second, orga-
nizational factors may limit the effectiveness of design option implementation and detract
from the continued effectiveness of design options. In the presence of organizational risk
factors, the updated probabilities of the control flaws will therefore be larger than the
residual values estimated under ideal organizational conditions.
As discussed above, in general it will not be possible to assign a quantitative value to the
increase in risk due to organizational factors. The impact of organizational factors on risk
should be qualitatively estimated by the relevant domain experts and risk analysts. An
analysis of the organization, including its structure and safety culture, can qualitatively
identify how likely control flaws are, and how likely it is that design options are ineffec-
tive. For example, an organization with a poor safety culture is likely to exhibit poor com-
pliance to maintenance procedures. In such an organization design options that do not
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involve maintenance may therefore be preferable. In addition, system models such as
those proposed by [Murphy and Pat6-Comell, 1996], and in particular system dynamics
models, can aid in evaluating the relative impact of organizational factors. For example,
Chapter 4 provides a set of organizational safety archetypes based on system dynamics
that can be used to estimate the impact of certain specific organizational policies.
Chapter 4 also illustrated how the often implicit trade-off between safety and performance
can increase risk.
The gas leak and shuttle examples illustrate how organizational factors can be incorpo-
rated into risk assessments.
5.7.4 Gas Leak Example Continued: Residual Risk Assessment
Step 2 of the hazard analysis identified the following constraints (see Section 5.11):
- C1.1: Gas lines must not be placed in offices.
- C 1.2: Gas lines and joints must be leak-resistant.
- C 1.3: The gas supply must be shut off in the event of a gas leak.
- C 1.4: The building must be evacuated in the event of a gas leak.
- C 1.5: The building sprinkler system must be activated in the event of a fire.
The constraints indicate the possibility of different design architectures. In this case, each
constraint can also be restated as a design option, as discussed in the next section. Cl.1.
suggests a design where the gas lines are not placed in offices (i.e., hazard is eliminated).
The remaining constraints assume a design where the gas lines are placed in offices, but
steps are taken to prevent leaks and minimize the damage if a leak does occur. If C1.1 is
not implemented, or done so unsuccessfully, the remaining constraints are necessary.
The hazard can therefore be directly addressed by the following design options, obtained
by rephrasing the high-level constraints identified in Step 2:
- Dl.1: Remove gas line from offices/do not install gas lines in offices.
- D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints.
A NEW APPROACH TO RISK ANALYSIS
- D1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks.
e D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut down gas in event of gas leaks.
- D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building.
- D1.6: Detect fires and activate building sprinkler system.
These design options can be used to develop two main design scenarios. In the first sce-
nario the hazard is eliminated by implementing D1.1. In the second scenario the hazard
and accident probabilities are reduced, and the potential damage is minimized, by imple-
menting design options D1.2 through D1.6.
Design Scenario One: Gas lines routed outside offices
This scenario uses Dl.1 on its own. D1.1 eliminates the hazard, provided it is imple-
mented correctly. The probability of the hazard given D1.1 and assuming ideal organiza-
tional conditions is zero:
Pidealorg(HID1.1) = 0 (5.18)
There are several organizational control flaws that could lead to D1. 1 not being imple-
mented, identified under C1.1 (see Section 5.11):
- CF1.1.1.1: Requirement that gas lines not be placed in offices is not commu-
nicated to designers and placement of gas lines is not monitored by safety
personnel.
- CF1.1.1.2: Designers disregard the requirement that gas lines not be placed
in offices and placement of gas lines is not monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.1.2.1: The building plans are unclear about the gas line restriction and
the placement of gas lines is not monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.1.2.2: The builders disregard the building plans and placement of gas
lines is not monitored by safety personnel.
The probability, p(D1.1), that the design option is not implemented is the probability that
constraint C1.1 is violated, p(C1.1), and is given by Eq. (5.6):
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4
p(D1.1) = p(C1.1) = 1 - 17(1 -p(CI CF ) -p(CF1 )) (5.19)
i = 1
where the CFi are the control flaws listed above. Because all the identified control flaws
operate at the organizational level, it is difficult to assign a quantitative value for the prob-
abilities of the control flaws. An analysis of the organization may indicate qualitatively
how likely these control flaws are. In addition, the existence of control flaws indicates that
the design option could be implemented incorrectly, and the specific control flaws identi-
fied point out the areas that should be monitored during design and development.
Determining whether D1.1 is implemented correctly can be easily done by inspection
(easy observability). Once the design option is implemented correctly, it is likely to
remain in place because rerouting gas lines is unlikely to occur unless the building is
altered for some reason (high stability).
D1. 1 eliminates the hazard and therefore provides an ideal solution from a risk viewpoint.
However, other considerations may make this option impractical. A second scenario that
reduces the probability of the hazard and the accident, and minimizes the damage associ-
ated with an accident is therefore considered, as illustrated in Figure 5.11.
Design Scenario Two: Gas lines routed inside offices
In this scenario, gas lines are routed through offices, and additional design options are
selected to reduce the hazard and accident probabilities and minimize damage should an
accident occur. The following design options are used:
- DO: Gas lines are routed through offices.
- D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints.
- D 1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks.
- D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut down gas in event of gas leaks.
- D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building.
- D1.6: Detect fires and activate building sprinkler system.
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The possible consequences of a gas leak have already been estimated in Step lb. Here, the
probability of a gas leak given that gas lines are installed in offices is updated to reflect the
above design options.
- D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints.
D.1.2 directly reduces the probability of the hazard, provided it is implemented correctly.
Under ideal organizational conditions the probability of the hazard given D1.2 is a func-
tion of the technical properties of the equipment used:
pl(HlID1.2) = f(technical properties) (5.20)
There are several organizational control flaws that could lead to an ineffective initial
implementation of D1.2, or to a decline in effectiveness over time (see Section 5.11):
- C 1.2: Gas lines and joints must be leak-resistant.
e CF1.2.1.1: The requirement for leak-resistant gas lines and joints is not com-
municated to the designers and specification of gas lines and joints is not
monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.2.1.2: The designers disregard the requirement for leak resistant gas
lines and joints and specification of gas lines and joints is not monitored by
safety personnel.
- CF1.2.1.3: Designers erroneously select wrong type of gas lines and joints
and specification of gas lines and joints is not monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.2.2.1: The specification for the gas lines and joints is not properly com-
municated to the builders.
- CF1.2.2.2: The builders disregard the specification and installation is not
monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.2.2.3: Installation is not monitored by safety personnel and installation
is not monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.2.3.1: The builders do not have the proper installation skills and instal-
lation is not monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.2.3.2: The builders disregard the installation rules and installation is not
monitored by safety personnel.
- CF1.2.4.1: Defects are not detected.
- CF1.2.4.2: Gas lines and joints are installed despite detected defects.
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CF1.2.5.1: Deterioration is not detected or corrected.
The probability that the design option is improperly implemented is the probability that
constraint C1.2 is violated, and is determined by applying Eq. (5.6):
4
p(D1.2) = p(C1.2) = 1 - [1(1 -p(C1.2|CFi) -p(CFg)) (5.21)
i = 1
where the CFi are the control flaws listed above. As with the first design scenario, all the
identified control flaws are 'soft' in nature and operate at the organizational level. It is dif-
ficult to determine a quantitative value for the probability. The specific control flaws iden-
tified point out the areas that should be monitored during design (e.g., C1.2.1.1),
installation (e.g., CF1.2.2.1), and operation (e.g., CF1.2.5.1).
Determining whether D1.2 is implemented correctly can be done by simple inspections
(observability). Continued vigilance is necessary to ensure that gas lines and joints are not
replaced with lower quality items during periodic maintenance (stability).
D1.2 provides an initial line of defense against gas leaks. High-quality components and
installation can significantly reduce the probability of a gas leak. Continued vigilance is
necessary to ensure that deteriorating equipment is detected and replaced with the correct
equipment. The next design option addresses the issue of detecting and correcting damage
or leaks.
- D1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks.
D1.3 is the first design option in this example that is mainly organizational in nature. D1.3
reduces the probability of the hazard, provided inspections are performed correctly and
over the lifetime of the building. In this case the probability of the hazard depends on the
technical properties of the equipment, as well as the effectiveness of inspections in
promptly detecting and repairing damage or leaks:
p(H1 ID1.3) = f(inspection quality and frequency, technical properties) (5.22)
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The more frequent inspections are, the more likely they are to detect damage before it
becomes serious. The required frequency depends on the technical properties of the equip-
ment-some types of equipment may deteriorate more rapidly. Combining D1.2 and D1.3
therefore reduces the risk more than using either option on its own.
Eq. (5.22) can be used by designers to motivate either installing or not installing gas lines
in offices. If the probability of a leak is deemed to be sufficiently low (as defined by stake-
holders), and there are other reasons why gas lines should be routed through offices, a
decision may be made to install gas lines in offices. On the other hand, if the probability is
high, decision-makers have a rational motivation for routing gas lines differently (and pos-
sibly incurring cost and other penalties).
Eq. (5.22) assumes that the inspection quality is limited only by technical factors (e.g.,
what level of deterioration is detectable) and that the frequency of inspections is deter-
mined solely by the technical properties of the equipment (e.g, how rapidly is deteriora-
tion expected to occur). However, in the long term the quality and frequency of
inspections may be limited by organizational factors, as indicated by the evaluation of
D1.3 (see Section 5.6.3):
- Effectiveness: Inspections performed improperly.
- Stability: Inspections deteriorate in frequency and thoroughness.
- Observability: May be difficult to determine whether inspectors are shirking
their duties
D1.3 may be effective in reducing the probability of leaks, but it should not be relied upon
as the only hazard mitigation measure. D1.2 should therefore be used together with D1.3,
as well as additional design options that address the consequences of a gas leak. The next
design option controls the hazard if it does occur.
- D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut down gas in event of gas leaks.
D1.4 controls the hazard by limiting the extent of any gas leaks. This option reduces the
probability of an accident given the hazard, and may also reduce the damage resulting
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from an accident. The accident probability is a function of how rapidly a gas leak is
detected and shut down (i.e., limiting hazard exposure) and the probability of an ignition
source being present:
i time to gas leak shut down,p((AIH)|D1.4) = ft(5.23)
probability of ignition source
The time to detection and gas shut-down depend on the technical properties of the system
installed.
There are several control flaws that could lead to an ineffective initial implementation of
D1.4, or to a decline in effectiveness over time. The control flaws indicated in bold result
point to possible flaws in the design.
C1.3: The gas supply must be shut off immediately in the event of a gas leak.
CF1.3.1.1: Sensors to detect leaks were not installed.
CF1.3.1.2: Defective sensors were installed.
CF1.3.1.3: Sensors were incorrectly installed.
CF1.3.1.4: Sensors stopped working and were not replaced.
CF1.3.2.1: Sensors not connected to gas shut-off system.
CF1.3.2.2: Sensor signal corrupted.
CF1.3.2.3: Gas shut-off system incorrectly interpret sensor signals.
CF1.3.2.4: Gas shut-off system does not issue shut-off signal.
CF1.3.2.5: Shut-off signal corrupted.
CF1.3.2.6: Shut-off signal incorrectly interpreted.
CF1.3.2.7: Shut-off actuator fails.
CF1.3.2.8: Shut-off signal sent too late.
The design should be inspected and analyzed to ensure that these control flaws are elimi-
nated. For example, CF1.3.2.2 indicates the possibility of signal corruption. This control
flaw can be eliminated by shielding wires against interference. Determining whether D1.4
is implemented correctly can be done by analyzing the design for the technical control
flaws, and by inspecting the physical system (observability).
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The remaining control flaws are organizational in nature. These control flaws indicate the
ways in which D1.4 can be poorly implemented despite a good design, and how the effec-
tiveness of D1.4 can decline over time (stability). The effectiveness of this option depends
primarily on the technical design, but organizational control flaws may affect the quality
of the design, installation, or maintenance, thereby increasing the probability of a leak
above that given by Eq. (5.23).
The next two design options address the consequences of a gas leak and/or accident.
. D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building.
- D1.6: Detect fires and activate building sprinkler system.
D1.5 and D1.6 reduce the damage resulting from an accident. The reduction in damage
depends on (1) how rapidly gas leaks and/or fires are detected, (2) how rapidly the appro-
priate alarms are sounded, (3) how effectively the building can be evacuated, and (4) how
effective the sprinkler system is. As in the previous cases, the control flaws identified in
Step 4 can be used to eliminate design flaws, inform the calculation of expected damage,
and identify organizational factors that may limit the effectiveness of these options.
5.8 Partial Risk Analysis of the Space Shuttle
This section applies the proposed risk analysis approach to one aspect of a more complex
system, the space shuttle. The focus is on the factors that led to the Space Shuttle Colum-
bia accident. Note that this analysis is occurring in hindsight and may therefore be based
on information that was not necessarily available at the time of the Columbia mission. The
purpose of this example is to show the application of the proposed risk analysis technique
to a more complex system. There is no intent to judge or criticize any of the people or
organizations involved in the accident. For an extensive report on the accident, see [Geh-
man, 2003].
The hazard analysis underlying the risk analysis is presented in Addendum 2 at the end of
this chapter.
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5.8.1 Initial Risk Assessment
The Space Shuttle Columbia accident occurred when a hole in the leading edge of the
wing allowed hot air to enter the internal wing structure during re-entry [Gehman, 2003].
The overheating of the internal wing structure led to structural failure of the wing and sub-
sequently the disintegration of the shuttle. Consider now one approach to assessing the
risk of a re-entry accident resulting from overheating of the internal wing structure and to
developing strategies to reduce this risk.
In Step 1 of the risk analysis, initial estimates of the risks are formed to facilitate ranking
of these risks and to determine whether the initial estimate of risk falls within an accept-
able range to continue system development.
The hazard of interest is "overheating of the wing internal structure". This hazard will
occur if there is a hole in the wing exterior during re-entry. The associated risk is an acci-
dent involving structural failure during re-entry.
- H: Overheating of the wing internal structure.
o R: Disintegration of the shuttle during re-entry.
The probability of the hazard is a function of the ability of the wing structure to prevent
hot gases from coming into contact with the internal structure of the wing during all
phases of the shuttle flight:
p(H) = f(ability of wing structure to prevent hot gases from entering) (5.24)
Note that before the Columbia accident this probability was estimated to be low, because
proper analyses and tests were not performed to determine the actual vulnerability of the
structure, and because there was a tacit assumption that a foam impact could not damage
the reinforced carbon-carbon of which the wing leading edge is comprised. The damage
associated with the hazard is the loss of the space shuttle and crew. The shuttle is exposed
to hot air during re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. Thus, the duration of exposure to the
hazard is the time taken for re-entry:
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Exposure = Re-entry duration (5.25)
Assuming that the structural problem (i.e., a hole in the wing) is not corrected, the proba-
bility of the hazard leading to an accident is near unity in this case, as the (current design
of the) wing internal structure is not resistant to hot gases and structural failure of the wing
is therefore inevitable:
p(AIH) ~ 1 (5.26)
Finally, the immediate consequences of the accident are the loss of the shuttle and crew.
Other consequences include the impact of grounding of the shuttle fleet on scientific
research and construction of the International Space Station, the loss of reputation for
NASA, and the loss of public confidence in the space program:
loss of shuttle and crew
C(re-entry accident) = political and research impact (5.27)
shuttle fleet grounding
Based on this hazard, it is possible to identify a number of initial design options. For
example, the hazard can be controlled by redesigning the internal wing structure to make it
resistant to the hot gases to which the shuttle is exposed during re-entry (D1.1). The haz-
ard damage can be minimized by equipping the shuttle with a crew escape pod to protect
and evacuate the crew in the event of a shuttle disintegration (D1.2). Additional design
options are developed in step 4 of the hazard analysis based on the inadequate control
actions and control flaws.
5.8.2 Design Option Evaluation
In Step 2 of the risk analysis, different design options are evaluated to determine their
impact on risk.
The following design options were identified to directly address the hazard and reduce the
consequences of an accident, respectively (see Section 5.12):
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- Dl. 1: Redesign the internal wing structure to make it resistant to the hot
gases to which the shuttle is exposed during re-entry.
e D1.2: Equip the shuttle with a crew escape pod to protect and evacuate the
crew in the event of a shuttle disintegration.
In addition, the following design options can be used to address the identified control
flaws under ICA1.2.1:
- C1.2: The fuselage and wing structure must be examined for possible dam-
age before re-entry.
- ICA1.2.1: The fuselage and wing structure is not examined before re-entry.
- CF1.2.1.1: The possibility of damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not
considered.
D1.2.1.1.1: Change assumptions about the risk associated with foam impacts
(e.g., by showing employees a video of test demonstrating destructive
impact).
D1.2.1.1.2: Make a pre re-entry inspection of the external structure part of
the formal re-entry preparation process.
These two options are complementary. The first option addresses the under-
lying incorrect assumptions, while the second option forces consideration of
possible damage.
- CF1.2.1.2: Engineering analyses incorrectly indicate that damage is negligi-
ble.
D1.2.1.2.1: Encourage and enforce application of sound engineering prac-
tice, such as using models only within the range for which they are validated
and calibrated.
- CF1.2.1.3: It is not possible to perform a pre-entry examination of the fuse-
lage and wing structure.
D1.2.1.3.1: Ensure that NASA has access to satellite resources to view the
shuttle on orbit.
D1.2.1.3.2: Ensure that astronauts are equipped and trained to perform a
space walk to examine and repair the wing structure.
D1.2.1.3.3: Ensure that on-board imaging devices are available to the astro-
nauts and that they are trained to use these devices.
In a complete hazard and risk analysis design options would be developed to address all
the identified control flaws.
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The design option evaluations are presented in the next section on step 3 (residual risk
assessment) for the sake of readability.
5.8.3 Residual Risk Assessment
In step 3 of the risk analysis, the residual risks that remain once particular design options
are selected are assessed. Design options modify the risk profile formed in Step 1, by
eliminating or reducing the probabilities of hazards and/or accidents, or by limiting the
consequences of accidents. The residual risk assessment can be used to (1) estimate the
residual risks for individual hazards given particular sets of design options; (2) estimate
the overall risk of the system; and (3) make the safety case by presenting the approaches
taken/not taken to mitigate hazards.
In a complete risk analysis, one or more design scenarios would be developed and ana-
lyzed. For the purpose of illustrating the approach, only the individual impacts on risk of
selected design options are considered here.
D1.1: Redesign the internal wing structure to make it resistant to the hot gases to
which the shuttle is exposed during re-entry.
TABLE 5.1 Design Option Characterization for D1. 1
Design Option D1.1: Redesign the internal wing structure to make it resistant to the hot gases
to which the shuttle is exposed during re-entry.
Scope Hazard.
Type Control hazard.
Effectiveness Depends on redesign. Consult structural engineers and others involved with wing
structure (e.g., electrical engineers w.r.t. wiring in wings).
Stability This design option should remain effective, assuming material comprising wing
does not deteriorate (e.g., metal fatigue) over time. Update this parameter when
more information on possible material deterioration available.
Observability New structure can be analyzed and tested to ascertain heat resistance.
This design option reduces the probability of the hazard given a damaging foam strike and
therefore reduces the probability of an accident given damage from near certainty with the
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present structure. The probability of the hazard depends on the structural characteristics of
the redesigned wing:
p(H) = f(structural characteristics) < 1 (5.28)
The evaluation of this design option indicated that it can remain effective over time, bar-
ring structural deterioration (stability). The actual effectiveness of this option can be
ascertained by means of analyses and testing (observability). While this option may signif-
icantly reduce the probability of an accident, it may have impacts on performance that
make it infeasible, be exorbitantly expensive, or be impossible to manufacture and assem-
ble.
The next two options are complementary. The first option addresses the underlying incor-
rect assumptions, while the second option forces consideration of possible damage.
D1.2.1.1.1: Change assumptions about the risk associated with foam impacts (e.g., by
showing employees a video of test demonstrating destructive impact).
This design option was identified in the hazard analysis to address control flaw CF1.2.1.1
(the possibility of damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not considered), as shown
below:
- C1.2: The fuselage and wing structure must be examined for possible dam-
age before re-entry.
- ICA1.2.1: The fuselage and wing structure is not examined before re-entry.
- CF1.2.1.1: The possibility of damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not
considered.
- D 1.2.1.1.1: Change assumptions about the risk associated with foam impacts
(e.g., by showing employees a video of test demonstrating destructive
impact).
The design option evaluation is shown below.
This option addresses two aspects of the hazard. First, the probability of damage to the
wing exterior leading to an accident is reduced because engineers and technicians are
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TABLE 5.2 Design Option Characterization for D1.2.1.1.1
Design Option D1.2.1.1.1: Change assumptions about the risk associated with foam impacts.
Scope Control Flaw. CF1.2.1.1
Type Reduce probability.
Effectiveness Physically demonstrating the possible foam impact damage to the wing structure to
employees can help change employee beliefs about foam impact. If employees at
all levels, especially decision makers, believe that foam impacts are a serious prob-
lem, they are more likely to consider such impacts and ensure that the necessary
damage is carried out. This option therefore has the potential to be highly effective.
Stability Effectiveness can be expected to decline over time as employees forget about the
possibility of impact damage and become complacent. It may therefore be neces-
sary to periodically repeat training in order to maintain awareness of the problem.
Observability Observing underlying beliefs and assumptions is difficult. Therefore D1.2.1.1.1 has
low observability and should not be solely relied upon to ensure that damage
inspections occur.
more likely to be on the look-out for foam strikes, and they are more likely to treat any
foam strikes that do occur with extreme seriousness:
p(CF1.2.1.1|D1.2.1.1.1) = very low (5.29)
where the probability that the possibility of damage is considered depends on how well
assumptions are changed.
If foam strikes are identified and properly analyzed before re-entry, strategies to avoid a
re-entry accident can be developed. For example, the crew might be transferred to the
International Space Station, or another shuttle could be launched to rescue the crew or
repair the foam impact damage [Gehman, 2003]. Therefore the probability of damage to
the wing exterior leading to the hazard and a re-entry accident is immediately reduced
from the near certainty in the original design:
p(HI(damage,D1.2.1.1.1)) <p(Hldamage) ~1 (5.30)
Second, this option also has a longer term effect: Greater awareness about the potential
damage caused by foam strikes may spur advances in foam and its application or encour-
age designers to consider strengthening the wing exterior and interior structures (see
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D1. 1). Therefore the probability of damage to the wing exterior may also be reduced in the
long term:
p(H ID1.2.1.1.1) = p(damage to NEW wing covering) <p(H) (5.31)
While this design option can significantly reduce the probability that damage is not
detected, there are two factors that can limit its immediate and long-term effectiveness.
The evaluation of this design option indicated that the effectiveness may decline over time
unless active efforts are made to continue reinforcing the possibility and severe conse-
quences of foam impact damage (stability). In addition, it is difficult to determine whether
underlying beliefs and assumptions have been changed in the desired way (observability).
Note also that even when assumptions are corrected, schedule and other pressures may
make it difficult for employees to properly perform the tasks necessary to prove that dam-
age did not occur.
D1.2.1.1.2: Make a pre re-entry inspection of the external structure part of the
formal re-entry preparation process.
This design option was identified in the hazard analysis to address control flaw CF1.2.1.1
(the possibility of damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not considered.), as shown
below:
- C1.2: The fuselage and wing structure must be examined for possible dam-
age before re-entry.
- ICA1.2.1: The fuselage and wing structures are not examined before re-
entry.
e CF1.2.1.1: The possibility of damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not
considered.
- D1.2.1.1.2: Make a pre re-entry inspection of the external structure part of
the formal re-entry preparation process.
The design option evaluation is shown below.
The probability that damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not considered can be
reduced to near zero by making the inspection part of the formal process:
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TABLE 5.3 Design Option Characterization for D1.2.1.1.2
Design Option D1.2.1.1.2: Make a pre re-entry inspection of the external structure part of theformal re-entry preparation process.
Scope Control Flaw. CF1.2.1.1
Type Reduce probability.
Effectiveness Formal process makes it difficult not to perform the inspection. But effectiveness
depends on availability of inspection resources (satellites, exterior cameras, etc.)
and skill of inspectors (ground crew or astronauts).
Stability Dependent on the ability of the supporting organizational structure to enforce and
monitor inspections.
Observability Medium. May be difficult to determine if inspections are not properly performed.
Pideal(CF1.2.1.11D1.2.1.1.2) ~ 0 (5.32)
Like D1.2.1.1.1, this option reduces the probability of damage to the wing exterior leading
to an accident because damage is more likely to be identified and can therefore be
addressed. While identifying damage does not mean that it will be addressed, damage that
is not identified is guaranteed not to be addressed. Therefore the probability of damage to
the wing exterior leading to the hazard and hence an accident is reduced from the near cer-
tainty in the original design:
p(HI (damage,D1.2.1.1.2)) < p(Hjdamage) ~ 1 (5.33)
p(HID1.2.1.1.2) can be estimated more precisely based on analyses of the ability of the
chosen inspection procedure to identify damage to the wings. For example, the next
design option uses satellites to image the shuttle exterior.
The evaluation of this design option indicated that the effectiveness depends on the ability
of the supporting organizational structure to enforce and monitor inspections over the life-
time of the shuttle (stability). It may become tempting to omit this inspection, either for-
mally or informally, if a long period of time passes without any damage occurring. Even
formal steps may be performed improperly and it may be difficult to determine whether
inspections are properly performed (observability). These risk factors increase the proba-
bility of an accident given the hazard above the ideal probability suggested above.
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D1.2.1.3.1: Ensure that NASA has pre-planned access to satellite resources to view
the shuttle on orbit.
This design option was suggested to address a control flaw, as indicated below:
e C1.2: The fuselage and wing structure must be examined for possible dam-
age before re-entry.
- ICA1.2.1: The fuselage and wing structures are not examined before re-
entry.
- CF1.2.1.3: Resources are not available to perform a pre-entry examination of
the fuselage and wing structure.
- D1.2.1.3.1: Ensure that NASA has pre-planned access to satellite resources
to view the shuttle on orbit.
The design option evaluation is shown below.
TABLE 5.4 Design Option Evaluation for D1.2.1.3.1
Design Option D1.2.1.3.1: Ensure that NASA has access to satellite resources to view the
shuttle on orbit.
Scope Control Flaw. CF1.2.1.3
Type Reduce probability. This option reduces the probability of damage to the wing exte-
rior leading to an accident because damage is more likely to be identified and can
therefore be corrected.
Effectiveness Depends on satellite imaging resolution and coverage of shuttle exterior surface.
Stability High, as long as these resources are used on every mission. Not using the resources
makes it more likely that they will be difficult to obtain in the future.
Observability Absence of satellite resources is highly visible.
The probability that pre-entry examination cannot be performed can be reduced dramati-
cally by ensuring that satellite resources are reserved for imaging purposes:
p(CF1.2.1.1 |D1.2.1.3.1) = p(reserved satellite resources available) (5.34)
The requirement that satellite resources be available may not always be met. For example,
when there is strong pressure to launch the shuttle, but satellite resources are not available
for some reason, the temptation to ignore the requirement and launch the shuttle may be
strong.
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Like the previous two design options, this option reduces the probability of damage to the
wing exterior leading to an accident because damage is more likely to be identified and
can therefore be addressed. Therefore the probability of damage to the wing exterior lead-
ing to an accident is reduced from the near certainty in the original design:
p(HI (damage,D1.2.1.3.1)) < p(Hj damage) ~ 1 (5.35)
The probability that damage is detected by on-orbit imaging can be estimated based on
analyses of satellite imaging resolution and coverage (i.e., how much of the shuttle exte-
rior can be imaged).
The availability of satellite resources does not guarantee that they will be used. Therefore
this design option should be used together with the previous option that mandates pre re-
entry inspections of the shuttle exterior.
5.9 Current Limitations of the Risk Analysis Approach
Chapter 2 presented a set of criteria that a risk analysis methodology should meet. Con-
sider now whether the proposed technique has the potential to address these criteria.
The approach has the potential to meet all the risk analysis criteria, but more extensive
examples based on real systems are needed to evaluate the approach properly. In its
present form, it has the following limitations:
It does not explicitly address the third criterion, "take psychological and
social attributes of risk into account". This limitation is not an inherent fea-
ture of the approach. Chapter 1 discussed several possible additional risk
attributes (see Table 1.1). Considering these additional risk attributes is
important when setting acceptable risk limits and when discussing risks with
various stakeholders. Decision makers and other stakeholders should deter-
mine which additional measures should be used in the pre-analysis phase of
risk management. The determination of these additional factors is left as a
topic for future work. Future work should consider how representations of
risk can incorporate these attributes to foster an improved understanding of
risk
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- Like other approaches to risk assessment, the accuracy of the assessment
depends on the accurate assessment of the probabilities of basic elements, in
this case, control flaws. The approach shows how individual control flaw
probabilities can be combined, but does not indicate how individual control
flaw probabilities should be determined.
- The approach provides no guidance on the identification of hazards.
- Dependencies between control flaws have not been addressed.
These limitations can be addressed in future research. This approach to risk analysis has
the potential to overcome many of the limitations of existing approaches.
5.10 Summary
This chapter has developed and advocated the concept of continuous participative risk
management (CPRM). CPRM is continuous: it addresses risk throughout the lifetime of a
system, thus ensuring that risk is maintained at an acceptable level throughout the sys-
tem's lifetime. In addition, CPRM is participative: it draws decision makers, members
from all levels of the organization, as well as other stakeholders into the risk analysis pro-
cess. Including all stakeholders in the process increases the quality of the risk analysis,
nurtures understanding of risk across the organization, and encourages commitment to risk
management strategies.
One crucial aspect of risk management is risk analysis. This chapter also introduced a new
approach to risk analysis, which builds on hazard analysis and uses concepts from the
STAMP model of accidents developed by [Leveson, 2004a]. The proposed approach
includes a set of parameters by which different options to address risks can be evaluated.
The proposed approach addresses some of the limitations of existing risk analysis tech-
niques, and both encourages and enables the continuous risk management approach advo-
cated here.
Finally, the organizational aspects of risk in the proposed approach were discussed in
detail. Guidelines were presented for (1) identifying organizational contributors to risk
and (2) evaluating options to address risks from an organizational perspective. An exam-
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ple based on the Space Shuttle was presented to illustrate the risk analysis approach and in
particular the incorporation of organizational factors.
5.11 Addendum 1: Gas Leak Hazard Analysis
This section describes a hazard analysis for a hypothetical gas leak in an office building.
The results of these steps are used to help illustrate the new risk analysis approach. They
are presented here for completeness.
1: Identify High-Level Hazards
An office building is being designed, and one concern is that gas leaks in offices could be
set off by ignition sources such as matches or cigarette lighters. For the sake of this exam-
ple, it is assumed that ignition sources are beyond the control of the building developers.
In this case, the hazard is:
- HI: Gas leak in office.
2: Identify Safety-Related Requirements and Constraints
The following safety constraints can immediately be identified based on the basic system
design:
- C1.1: Gas lines may not be placed in offices.
- C 1.2: Gas lines and joints must be leak-resistant.
- C1.3: The gas supply must be shut off in the event of a gas leak.
- C1.4: The building must be evacuated in the event of a gas leak.
- C1.5: The building sprinkler system must be activated in the event of a fire.
- C1.6: Other [Placeholder]
C1.1 (most preferred) eliminates the hazard, C1.2 reduces the probability of the hazard,
C1.3 controls the hazard, and C1.4 and C1.5 (least preferred) minimize the damaged asso-
ciated with the hazard. Step 5 discusses the different approaches to hazard elimination and
mitigation in more detail.
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The final constraint, 'Other', is used as a placeholder to indicate that other constraints may
be possible and/or necessary. Explicitly noting this possibility encourages analysts to con-
sider it during initial iterations of the risk analysis during system development and during
updates of the analysis in later phases of the system lifecycle.
3: Identify Possible Inadequate Control Actions
Continuing the gas leak example, the following inadequate control actions can be identi-
fied for the constraints associated with the hazard, "gas leak in office".
- C1.1: Gas lines may not be placed in offices.
ICAl.1.1: The building design erroneously places gas lines in one or more
offices.
ICAL.1.2: The builders erroneously install gas lines in one or more offices.
- C1.2: Gas lines and joints must be leak-resistant.
ICA1.2.1: The building design specifies the wrong kind of gas lines and
joints.
ICA1.2.2: The builders install the wrong gas lines and joints.
ICA1.2.3: The builders incorrectly install the gas lines and joints.
ICA1.2.4: Defective gas lines and joints are installed.
ICA1.2.5: Deterioration of the gas lines and joints over time is not noted or
corrected.
- C 1.3: The gas supply must be shut off in the event of a gas leak.
ICA1.3.1: The gas leak sensors are defective and the leak is not detected.
ICA1.3.2: The gas leak is detected, but gas is not shut off.
C1.4: The building must be evacuated in the event of a gas leak.
ICA1.4.1: The gas leak is not detected.
ICA1.4.2: The gas leak is detected, but the evacuation alarm is not sounded.
ICA1.4.3: Evacuation is impeded by locked doors.
- C1.5: The building sprinkler system must be activated in the event of a fire.
ICA1.5.1: The fire is not detected.
ICA1.5.2: The fire is detected, but the sprinkler system is not activated.
ICA1.5.3: The sprinkler system is activated, but is not effective.
- C1.6: Other [Placeholder]
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The next step identifies control flaws and design options.
4: Identify Control Flaws and Design Options
For example, the following control flaws can be identified for the gas leak example:
SC 1.1: Gas lines may not be placed in offices.
ICA1.1.1: The building design erroneously places gas lines in one or more
offices and this error is not detected or corrected.
CF1. 1.1.1: The requirement that gas lines not be placed in offices is not com-
municated to the designers and the placement of gas lines is not monitored
by safety personnel.
CF1.1.1.2: The designers disregard the requirement that gas lines not be
placed in offices and the placement of gas lines is not monitored by safety
personnel.
CF1.1.1.3: Other
ICA1.1.2: The builders erroneously install gas lines in one or more offices
and this error is not detected or corrected.
CF1.1.2.1: The building plans are unclear about the gas line restriction and
the placement of gas lines is not monitored by safety personnel.
CF1.1.2.2: The builders disregard the building plans and placement of gas
lines is not monitored by safety personnel.
CF1.1.2.3: Other.
- C1.2: Gas lines and joints must be leak-resistant.
ICA1.2.1: The building design specifies the wrong kind of gas lines and
joints.
CF1.2.1.1: The requirement for leak-resistant gas lines and joints is not com-
municated to the designers.
CF1.2.1.2: The designers disregard the requirement for leak resistant gas
lines and joints.
CF1.2.1.3: The designers erroneously select the wrong type of gas lines and
joints.
CF1.2.1.4: The specification of gas lines and joints is not monitored by
safety personnel.
CF1.2.1.5: Other.
ICA1.2.2: The builders install the wrong gas lines and joints.
CF1.2.2.1: The specification for the gas lines and joints is not properly com-
municated to the builders and installation of gas lines and joints is not moni-
tored by safety personnel.
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CF1.2.2.2: The builders disregard the specification and installation of gas
lines and joints is not monitored by safety personnel.
CF1.2.2.3: Other.
ICA1.2.3: The builders incorrectly install the gas lines and joints.
CF1.2.3.1: The builders do not have the proper installation skills and instal-
lation of gas lines and joints is not monitored by safety personnel.
CF1.2.3.2: The builders disregard the installation rules and installation of
gas lines and joints is not monitored by safety personnel.
CF1.2.3.3: Other.
ICA1.2.4: Defective gas lines and joints are installed and installation of gas
lines and joints is not monitored by safety personnel.
CF1.2.4.1: Defects are not detected.
CF1.2.4.2: Gas lines and joints are installed despite detected defects.
CF1.2.4.3: Other
ICA1.2.5: Deterioration of the gas lines and joints deteriorate over time is
not noted or corrected.
CF1.2.5.1: Deterioration is not detected.
CF1.2.5.2: Deterioration is detected but is not corrected.
CF1.2.5.3: Other.
C 1.3: The gas supply must be shut off in the event of a gas leak.
ICA1.3.1: The gas leak is not detected.
CF1.3.1.1: Sensors to detect leaks were not installed.
CF1.3.1.2: Defective sensors were installed.
CF1.3.1.3: Sensors were incorrectly installed.
CF1.3.1.4: Sensors stopped working and were not replaced.
CF1.3.1.5: Other.
ICA1.3.2: The gas leak is detected, but gas is not shut off.
CF1.3.2.1: Sensors not connected to gas shut-off system.
CF1.3.2.2: Sensor signal corrupted.
CF1.3.2.3: Gas shut-off system incorrectly interpret sensor signals.
CF1.3.2.4: Gas shut-off system does not issue shut-off signal.
CF1.3.2.5: Shut-off signal corrupted.
CF1.3.2.6: Shut-off signal incorrectly interpreted.
CF1 .3.2.7: Shut-off actuator fails.
CF1.3.2.8: Shut-off signal sent too late.
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CF1.3.2.9: Other.
- C1.4: The building must be evacuated in the event of a gas leak.
ICA1.4.1: The gas leak is not detected.
CF1.1.1.1: See CF1.3.1.1-4
CF1.1.1.2: Other.
ICA1.4.2: The gas leak is detected, but the evacuation alarm is not sounded.
CF1.4.2.1: Sensors not connected to evacuation alarm system.
CF1.4.2.2: Sensor signal corrupted.
CF1.4.2.3: Evacuation alarm system incorrectly interpret sensor signals.
CF1.4.2.4: Evacuation alarm system does not issue shut-off signal.
CF1.4.2.5: Signal to sound alarm corrupted.
CF1.4.2.6: Alarm signal incorrectly interpreted.
CF1.4.2.7: Alarm actuator fails.
CF1.4.2.8: Alarm sounded too late.
CF1.4.2.9: Other.
ICA1.4.3: Evacuation is impeded by locked doors etc.
CF1.4.3.1: Building violates fire safety codes.
CF1.4.3.2: Other.
- C1.5: The building sprinkler system must be activated in the event of a fire.
ICA1.5.1: The fire is not detected.
CF1.5.1.1: Sensors to detect fires were not installed.
CF1.5.1.2: Defective sensors were installed.
CF1.5.1.3: Sensors were incorrectly installed.
CF1.5.1.4: Sensors stopped working and were not replaced.
CF1.5.1.5: Other.
ICA1.5.2: The fire is detected, but the sprinkler system is not activated.
CF1.5.2.1: Sensors not connected to sprinkler system.
CF1.5.2.2: Sensor signal corrupted.
CF1.5.2.3: Sprinkler system incorrectly interpret sensor signals.
CF1.5.2.4: Sprinkler system does not issue shut-off signal.
CF1.5.2.5: Sprinkler signal corrupted.
CF1.5.2.6: Sprinkler signal incorrectly interpreted.
CF1.5.2.7: Sprinkler actuator fails.
CF1.5.2.8: Sprinklers activated too late.
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CF1.5.2.9: Other.
ICA1.5.3: The sprinkler system is activated, but is not effective.
CF1.5.3.1: No water available.
CF1.5.3.2: Sprinklers blocked.
CF1.5.3.3: Other.
- C1.6: Other [Placeholder]
For the gas leak example, the hazard can be directly addressed by the following design
options, which implement the high-level constraints identified in Step 2:
- D1.1: Remove gas line from offices/do not install gas lines in offices.
- D1.2: Use leak-resistant tubing and joints.
- D 1.3: Periodically inspect gas lines and joints for damage and/or leaks.
- D1.4: Use leak sensors and shut down gas in event of gas leaks.
- D1.5: Detect gas leaks and evacuate building.
- D1.6: Detect fires and activate building sprinkler system.
- D1.7: Other.
In a complete hazard or risk analysis, design options should also be developed to address
the inadequate control actions and control flaws identified in steps three and four.
The inadequate control actions and control flaws developed above are used to (1) update
the initial risk estimates as shown in Step 4b; (2) aid in evaluating the design options as
shown in Step 5; and (3) drive the development of further design options in subsequent
iterations. For example, if D1.1 is selected, the inadequate control actions and control
flaws associated with C 1.1 should be considered when developing further design options.
Thus CF1.1.1.3 (the designers disregard the requirement that gas lines not be placed in
offices) gives rise to the following design option:
- D1.1.1.3.1: Installation of gas lines must be monitored and inspected by
safety personnel.
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5.12 Addendum 2: Partial Hazard Analysis of Space Shuttle
This section presents a partial hazard analysis of the space shuttle, which is used as a basis
for the risk analysis presented earlier in this chapter.
Step 1: Identify Hazards and Risks
The Space Shuttle Columbia accident occurred when a hole in the leading edge of the
wing allowed hot air to enter the internal wing structure during re-entry [Gehman, 2003].
The overheating of the internal wing structure led to structural failure of the wing and sub-
sequently the disintegration of the shuttle. Here the hazard of interest is "overheating of
the wing internal structure". This hazard can occur if there is a hole in the wing exterior
during re-entry. The associated risk is an accident involving structural failure during re-
entry.
e HI: Overheating of the wing internal structure.
- R1: Disintegration of the shuttle during re-entry.
The following design options can be used to directly address the hazard:
- D1.1: Redesign the internal wing structure to make it resistant to the hot
gases to which the shuttle is exposed during re-entry.
- D1.2: Equip the shuttle with a crew escape pod to protect and evacuate the
crew in the event of a shuttle disintegration.
Step 2: Identify Constraints
The following safety constraints can immediately be identified based on a high-level
understanding of the space shuttle design:
- HI: Overheating of the wing internal structure.
- C1.1: The wing structure must not be damaged by pressures of up to TBD
MPa.
- C1.2: The wing structure must be examined for possible damage before re-
entry.
- C1.3: Re-entry with a damaged wing structure is not permitted.
- C 1.4: Damage to the wing structure must be repaired before re-entry.
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- C1.5: Other [Placeholder]
Step 3: Identify Possible Inadequate Control Actions
The following inadequate control actions can be identified for the constraints associated
with the hazard, "overheating of the wing internal structure".
" C 1.1: The wing structure must not be damaged by pressures of up to TBD
MPa.
ICAL .1.1: The wing structure is exposed to larger than expected impacts.
ICA1.1.2: The wing structure does not withstand within-specification
impacts.
ICA1.1.3: The wing structure fails for some other reason. [This is a 'place-
holder' inadequate control action used to ensure that additional failure
modes are considered as the design progresses.]
- C1.2: The wing structure must be examined for possible damage before re-
entry.
ICA1.2.1: The wing structure is not examined before re-entry.
ICA1.2.2: The examination misses damage to the wing structure.
ICA1.2.3: Other.
* C1.3: Re-entry with a damaged wing structure is not permitted.
ICA1.3.1: Damage to the wing structure is not noted. Addressed by C1.2.
ICA1.3.2: Wing structure damage is noted but not communicated to the rele-
vant organizational members.
ICA1.3.3: The damage is communicated to the appropriate people but a
decision is made not to respond.
ICA1.3.4: Other.
- C 1.4: Damage to the wing structure must be repaired before re-entry.
ICA1.4.1: Damage to the wing structure is not noted. Addressed by C1.2.
ICA1.4.2: The wing structure cannot be repaired for some reason. For exam-
ple, material to repair the damage is not available on the shuttle.
ICAl.4.3: The repair is not done properly.
ICA1.4.4: Other.
In some cases inadequate control actions may already be addressed by existing con-
straints, as shown above for ICA1.3.1 and ICA1.4.1.
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Step 4: Identify Possible Control Flaws and Design Options
This step identifies the control flaws that could lead to the inadequate control actions. For
example, consider the control flaws underlying ICA1.2.1:
- C1.2: The fuselage and wing structure must be examined for possible dam-
age before re-entry.
- ICA1.2.1: The fuselage and wing structure is not examined before re-entry.
CF1.2.1.1: The possibility of damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not
considered.
CF1.2.1.2: Engineering analyses incorrectly indicate that damage is negligi-
ble.
CF1.2.1.3: It is not possible to perform a pre-entry examination of the fuse-
lage or wing structure.
CFl.2.1.4: Decision makers incorrectly interpret ambiguous data.
CF1.2.1.5: Other.
The following design options can be used to address the identified control flaws:
- CF1.2.1.1: The possibility of damage to the fuselage or wing structure is not
considered.
D1.2.1.1.1: Change assumptions about the risk associated with foam impacts
(e.g., by showing employees a video of test demonstrating destructive
impact).
D1.2.1.1.2: Make a pre re-entry inspection of the external structure part of
the formal re-entry preparation process.
These two options are complementary. The first option addresses the under-
lying incorrect assumptions, while the second option forces consideration of
possible damage.
D1.2.1.1.3: Other.
- CF1.2.1.2: Engineering analyses incorrectly indicate that damage is negligi-
ble.
D1.2.1.2.1: Encourage and enforce application of sound engineering prac-
tice, such as using models only within the range for which they are validated
and calibrated.
D1.2.1.2.2: Other.
- CFl.2.1.3: It is not possible to perform a pre-entry examination of the fuse-
lage and wing structure.
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D1.2.1.3.1: Ensure that NASA has access to satellite resources to view the
shuttle on orbit.
D1.2.1.3.2: Ensure that astronauts are equipped and trained to perform a
space walk to examine and repair the wing structure.
D1.2.1.3.3: Ensure that on-board imaging devices are available to the astro-
nauts and that they are trained to use these devices.
D1.2.1.3.4: Other.
5.13 Addendum 3: Incorporation of Design Option Side-Effects
in Residual Risk Assessment
Design options may have side-effects that increase or decrease the probabilities of existing
control flaws or introduce additional control flaws. These effects can be incorporated as
shown below for the single design option case:
p(C|Dk) = 1-
nCF
G -p( E|CFk) -p(CFk|Dk)) x ( - p( |CFi) -p( CFi|Dk))x
i= 1
i k
nCF + nnew CFs (5
x H (1-p(eCCFi)-p(CFjDk:
i = nCF+
it k
where nnew CFs is the number of new control flaws introduced by the design option. Simi-
lar calculations can be used to account for side-effects in the other probabilities.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS AND THOUGHTS ON
FUTURE WORK
Research should have not only results, but also pointers toward the incomplete; who
should know better than the author the limits of the work?
Kenneth J. Arrow, I Know a Hawk from a Handsaw
This is our true state; this is what makes us incapable of certain knowledge and of abso-
lute ignorance. We sail within a vast sphere, ever drifting in uncertainty, driven from end
to end. When we think to attach ourselves to any point and to fasten to it, it wavers and
leaves us; and if we follow it, it eludes our grasp, slips past us, and vanishes for ever.
Nothing stays for us. This is our natural condition and yet most contrary to our inclina-
tion; we burn with desire to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to
build a tower reaching to the Infinite. But our whole groundwork cracks, and the earth
opens to abysses.
Blaise Pascal, Pensdes, 1660
Complex socio-technical systems pose a challenge to risk managers. The complexity of
these systems makes it difficult to identify and assess risk. When risks are not identified or
are underestimated disaster can ensue. In particular, recent accidents have demonstrated
that an understanding of the way organizational behaviour contributes to risk is critical to
effectively managing risk.
Existing risk analysis methodologies do not provide a good understanding of the risks
associated with complex socio-technical systems. These methodologies are appropriate
for simple systems where 'mechanical' failures prevail. But they are fundamentally lim-
ited when it comes to complex socio-technical systems because they are all event-based
and do not adequately capture emergent behaviour.
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This thesis has developed an alternative approach to risk analysis that accounts for the
characteristics of modem socio-technical systems. The proposed approach moves beyond
event-based models to include risks that do not depend only on component or subsystem
failures, and incorporate human, organizational, and societal factors. By taking an explicit
lifecycle view of systems, the approach enables (1) the early identification of risks and
risk mitigation strategies, (2) aids in the allocation of resources to best manage risk, and
(3) provides for the continuous monitoring of risk throughout the system lifecycle. In
addition, the approach emphasizes and enables the participation of members at all levels
of the organization as well as other stakeholders in order to best identify, assess, and man-
age risks. The proposed approach addresses technical, human, organizational, and other
factors.
6.1 Thesis Summary
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of risk and the nature of accidents in modem complex
socio-technical systems.
Chapter 2 looked at risk management as a decision-making process and developed a set of
criteria for what makes a good risk analysis. Based on these criteria, current risk analysis
techniques were evaluated. In particular, an extensive evaluation of probabilistic risk
assessment revealed significant limitations.
The importance of organizational factors in accidents has gained increasing acceptance.
Numerous authors have written on the topic. In particular, sociologists have developed
several theories to explain why accidents occur and how they can be prevented. Chapter 3
reviewed three of the most popular sociological and organizational approaches to safety:
normal accidents theory (NAT), high reliability organizations (HRO), and normalization
of deviance. While these approaches do provide some useful insights, the chapter showed
that they all have significant limitations.
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Chapter 4 discussed the dynamic aspects of risk in organizations. First, a framework was
developed to analyze the strategic trade-off between short and long term goals and under-
stand why organizations tend to migrate to states of increasing risk. The apparent conflict
between performance and safety was shown to result from the different time horizons
applying to performance and safety. Performance is measured in the short term, while
safety is indirectly observed over the long term. A short-term view creates the impression
that safety and performance necessarily conflict. Expanding the time horizon attenuates
the tension. By increasing awareness of the often implicit trade-offs between safety and
performance organizations can avoid decisions that increase risk.
Next, a set of archetypes of organizational safety was presented. Accidents in diverse
industries, while unique in their technical aspects, often exhibit common patterns of orga-
nizational behaviour. Chapter 4 identified several such patterns, or archetypes, and dem-
onstrated their application in diverse industries. In addition, NASA specific archetypes
were developed based on investigations into the Challenger and Columbia accidents.
Chapter 5 developed a new approach to risk analysis that is applicable to modern, com-
plex socio-technical systems. First, the concept of continuous participative risk manage-
ment was introduced. In this approach to risk management, risks are addressed throughout
the lifetime of a system, and members from all levels of the organization are involved both
in risk analysis and in risk mitigation.
Next, a new approach to risk analysis, which builds on hazard analysis and uses concepts
from the STAMP model of accidents developed by [Leveson, 2004a] was developed. The
proposed approach moves beyond event-based models to include risks that do not depend
only on component or subsystem failures, and incorporate human, organizational, and
societal factors. By taking an explicit lifecycle view of systems, the approach enables the
early identification of risk mitigation strategies, aids in the allocation of resources to best
manage risk, and provides for the continuous monitoring of risk throughout the system
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lifecycle. The proposed approach addresses some of the limitations of existing techniques,
and both encourages and enables the continuous risk management approach.
6.2 Future Work
The limitations of event-based approaches to understanding accidents and risk and the
importance of organizational factors are gaining increasing importance. However, while
the problems are now well-recognized by many scholars, there is still little available on
how to address these problems and prevent accidents. The risk analysis approach pre-
sented in this thesis is but one small step towards safer systems.
The following areas provide fertile ground for future work.
6.2.1 Representation of Risk Analysis Results
Throughout this thesis the importance of employee input and commitment has been
emphasized. The importance of management commitment and understanding should not
be underestimated either. Both the organizational safety archetypes and the risk analysis
approach suggested here are intended to improve understanding of risk and how it arises.
It would be useful to develop graphical techniques, and possibly animations, to illustrate
the risk analysis results and archetypes. For example, One way of improving understand-
ing at all levels of an organization is to run simulations of problem behaviours [Senge,
1990; Sterman, 2002a]. It would therefore be useful to develop executable models of the
archetypes using the system dynamics modelling language.
6.2.2 Stakeholder Involvement in Risk Analysis
Stakeholder involvement is a crucial aspect of building and operating complex systems.
For example, community stakeholders can determine whether or not nuclear power plant
operators gain local and federal government approval to site plants in particular areas. By
involving and including community stakeholders in the system development process and
risk analysis, operators may be able to increase the chances of obtaining community
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approval and ensure that they properly address community concerns. Similarly, involving
other stakeholders in system development and risk analysis may also yield benefits. For
example, involving employees at all levels in risk analysis ensures that all available infor-
mation is obtained and therefore increases the likelihood that an accurate representation of
risk is made. In addition, involving employees in the risk analysis process increases the
likelihood that they will be committed to the risk management plan.
Determining who to involve in the risk analysis process, and how best to ensure that all the
necessary stakeholders are heard and understand the process, provides an interesting topic
for future research. While professional risk analysts may feel comfortable discussing
probabilities and domain experts may feel comfortable reading technical drawings, ade-
quately representing risk-related issues to people with different qualifications presents
more of a challenge.
6.2.3 Addressing Dependencies in the Risk Analysis
The risk assessment equations presented in Chapter 5 assume that control flaws are inde-
pendent. While the two example analyses showed that this assumption may often be true,
and that dependencies between control flaws often do not affect the risk assessment, one
can expect cases where dependencies are a concern. Future work should address this issue,
and develop ways of addressing dependencies. Much research in probabilistic risk assess-
ment has focussed on dependencies, and may therefore provide a useful starting point.
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Appendix A
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
AND RISK
Much of what occurs in the organization is only vaguely related to top management direc-
tives. The organization has an institutional own life, which is notoriously difficult to con-
trol and manage.
Frank Mueller, 19971
Many accidents are partially blamed on organizational factors but it is not clear how,
exactly, organizational features relate to safety. This appendix introduces a framework for
analyzing organizational risk based on two related perspectives on organizations: organi-
zational structure and safety culture. This approach is complementary to the hazard-based
risk analysis method proposed in Chapter 5.
A.1 A Framework for Analyzing Organizational Risk Factors
This section discusses a framework for analyzing organizational risk based on two related
perspectives on organizational risk: organizational structure and safety culture, as illus-
trated in Figure A.1. Each view provides different, yet linked, perspectives on organiza-
tional risk. Different metaphors and perspectives are useful because they allow one to
focus on and understand particular aspects of a problem or situation [Morgan, 1996, p. 5].
For example, the organization could be seen through a political lens, focussing on how
257
1. [Mueller, 1996, p. 773]
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power and influence are exerted, how different stakeholders are involved in and excluded
from decision making, and how conflicts are resolved [Ancona et al., 1998, M2-10].
Structure
Organizational Accidents
Risk Factors
Safety
Culture
Figure A.1 A Framework for Analyzing Organizational Risk
This research focusses on organizational structure and culture because they are closely
intertwined and provide substantial insight into the organizational antecedents of high risk
and eventually of accidents. For example, in its report on the Columbia Space Shuttle
accident the CAIB noted that [Gehman, 2003, p. 201]:
"Structure and hierarchy represent power and status. For both Challenger and Columbia,
employees' positions in the organization determined the weight given to their information,
by their own judgment and in the eyes of others. As a result, many signals of danger were
missed. Relevant information that could have altered the course of events was available
but was not presented."
At the same time, relying exclusively on too few perspectives may blind one to important
aspects of behaviour. While the analysis in this appendix does not take an explicit political
perspective, power and influence relationships are considered from the structural and cul-
tural perspectives.
This appendix is organized as follows. First, the concept of organizational structure is
examined more closely. Next, two common organizational factors in accidents are pro-
vided. These factors are used to illustrate the identification of structural antecedents to
organizational risk factors. The next appendix uses these factors to demonstrate the identi-
fication of cultural antecedents to organizational risk factors.
259
A.2 Organizational Structure: A Contentious Concept
Intuitively it is clear that a relationship exists between the way an organization is struc-
tured and the organization's ability to operate in safe manner. For example, the investiga-
tion into the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia concluded that NASA's defective
organizational structure was a significant contributor to the defective safety culture [Geh-
man, 2003, p. 184]. Several authors have commented on aspects of the relationship
between organizational structure and risk. For example, Perrow argued that accidents are
inevitable in interactively complex and tightly coupled systems (see [Perrow, 1999a] and
Section 4.1.2), while Heimann argues that parallel organizational structures are more
prone to errors that lead to accidents (see [Heimann, 1997] and page 123). This appendix
provides a comprehensive analysis of the features of organizational structure that decrease
organizations' ability to operate in a safe manner.
But organizational structure is a contentious concept. While early research in organiza-
tional behaviour asserted that behaviour could be largely controlled by appropriately
designing the formal structure (e.g., reporting relationships and procedures), later work
has noted that structure is far more nebulous and that formal aspects of structure are only
one piece of the puzzle. Before the relationship between structural characteristics and
organizational risk factors can be considered, it is necessary to understand what is meant
by structure and how structure relates to behaviour. This section therefore begins by
reviewing the history of research into organizational structure.
Early work in organizational behaviour regarded organizational structure as a "formal
configuration of roles and procedures, the prescribed framework of the organization"
[Ranson et al., 1980, p. 2]. In this definition, structure is primarily viewed as an imposed
and static framework. Organizations are designed and set up in a certain way and remain
that way until they are redesigned in a conscious and deliberate manner. This 'framework'
view of structure focuses on hierarchical and departmental arrangements, formal rules and
procedures, information systems, decision support systems, incentive schemes. Such a
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view gives rise to structural dimensions such as size, complexity, degree of formalization,
and degree of centralization [Robbins, 1983]. More recent work emphasizes the fluid
nature of organizations with descriptors such as 'grouping' and 'linking' [Ancona et al.,
1998].
An opposing viewpoint defines structure as the "patterned regularities and processes of
interaction" [Ranson et al., 1980, p. 2]. This definition focusses on the interaction of social
actors with each other and with formal manifestations of structure such as maintenance
procedures. Structure, in this view, is created by this interaction and does not exist inde-
pendently of it.
Other work observed that the 'structure in practice' is dynamic and often differs consider-
ably from that indicated by organizational charts, formal rules etc. This observation can be
explained by noting that structure (framework) and behaviour (interaction) are inter-
twined: people shape and are shaped by social structures, which both create and restrict
opportunities for human behaviour [Giddens, 1984]. Structures are constantly being
adapted by and contributing to adaptation in the people that interact with them
(Figure A.2). This interaction gives rise to the dynamic nature of structure: "Structure, in
this sense, is not the same as design: the design is merely the bare bones framework on
which a more organic, emergent social structure develops as people interact, argue, fall
out, come together and otherwise manage their day-to-day situation" [Bate et al., 2000].
Because the nature of this interaction is not determined solely by structure, the same struc-
ture will not necessarily result in the same behaviour in different organizations. For
instance, in a study of new technology implementation at three different organizations
Orlikowski found that the organizational context and culture significantly affected how
the technology was applied and used [Orlikowski, 2000]. The effect of formal structure on
organizational behaviour is mediated, and on occasion counteracted by, the interaction
between the framework and the members of the organization. Thus organizational struc-
ture "describes both the prescribed frameworks and realized configurations of interaction,
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and the degrees to which they are mutually constituted and constituting" [Ranson et al.,
1980, p. 3].
Framework Interaction
Time
Figure A.2 Structure and Actiona
a. Adapted from [Rose, 1999]
An understanding of an organization therefore cannot be gained by looking only at the
designed structure (framework) or static formal descriptions of the structure; additional
study is needed to discover how employees interact with formal and informal aspects of
the structure to create the structure in practice. In considering the effect of organizational
structure on risk, the interactions between social actors must also be taken into account.
Further insight can be gained by determining where, how, and why the structure-in-prac-
tice differs from the formal, or intended, structure. Analyzing organizational risk requires
looking at intended, assumed, and actual structural aspects, both in terms of frameworks
and interactions.
Differentiating between these two points of view is more than semantic hair splitting: each
perspective has significant implications for the management of organizational risk, as
indicated in Figure A.3. The 'anticipatory model' of risk management is based on a view
of structure as design [Schulman, 1993, p. 368]. According to this model organizational
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safety arises from constancy, certainty, and predictability, or 'control by anticipation'. It is
assumed that a correct way of acting under varying circumstances can be determined and
that in striving for safety organizations should therefore aim to determine their functions
unambiguously and completely. Once the 'correct' way of acting has been determined it
should be adhered to rigorously through the application of formal procedures that force
behavioural invariance. This approach is rarely successful in the long term because it is
impossible to anticipate all future scenarios and because forcing people to conform to
strict procedures and rules makes it difficult for them to adapt when unforeseen situations
arise [Dekker, 2003].
Framework Interaction
Uncertainty can Uncertainty
be eliminated always present
Anticipatory Model Resilience Model
Structural and Cultural Influences
on Organizational Safety
Figure A.3 Understanding the Contribution of Structure and Culture to Safety
An alternative approach argues that safety arises not from rigid control and behavioural
invariance but from organizational resilience in an uncertain environment [Schulman,
1993, p. 368]. The 'resilience model' of risk management recognizes that organizations
always operate with some degree of uncertainty and that it is not possible to foresee all
future circumstances. Unforeseen events and problems may arise from the technology the
organization operates (e.g., new physical phenomena) or from unidentified or unforeseen
aspects of organizational behaviour (e.g., a culture that precludes speaking up about prob-
lems). Control of the formal structure provides at best only partial control of behaviour,
and as mentioned above, may prevent necessary adaptations when unforeseen situations
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arise. In this view safety is therefore best ensured by a combination of control by anticipa-
tion as well as an expectation of the unexpected.
The analysis of the structural antecedents of organizational risk factors in this appendix is
primarily informed by the resilience model, while recognizing that formal aspects of struc-
ture do have an effect on safety (anticipatory model), as shown in Figure A.3. This and the
next appendix identify structural and cultural features, both formal and informal, that
make it difficult for organizations to seek out and recognize potential problem areas or
respond appropriately to unforeseen events and problems. Dimensions of structure sug-
gested by the framework view are used as a starting point. Although the above discussion
has shown that organizational behaviour is not determined by an organization's framework
(both formal and actual) alone, it does have a significant effect on an organization's ability
to operate safely. Further, valuable insight can be gained by identifying where and how the
actual structure differs from the framework. For example, formal procedures may not be
followed because they are inadequate, too time-consuming, or poorly specified. Thus one
potential beneficial side-effect of performing this type of analysis at an organization is the
initiation of discussion on structural aspects that contribute to, or detract from, safety [cf.
Carroll, 1998b].
The remainder of this appendix introduces a comprehensive analysis of how the different
aspects of organizational structure relate to organizational risk. Two common organiza-
tional factors in accidents, the low status and influence of safety and poor communication
and coordination are used to focus and illustrate the discussion. The interdependencies
between organizational structure and (safety) culture are identified. Specific safety-related
aspects of organizational structure, such as design of safety inspections and the location of
the safety function, are also discussed.
The analysis is performed using the following high-level structural characteristics of orga-
nizations: complexity, formalization, and centralization. These characteristics are fre-
quently used to characterize organizations and provide a good starting point. The size of
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an organization is not considered explicitly, but rather through its influence on the other
characteristics. From an organizational structure viewpoint complexity is characterized as
the degree of differentiation and integration within an organization [Hendricks, 1991].
Differentiation can be further divided into vertical differentiation, horizontal differentia-
tion, and spatial dispersion, as shown in Figure A.4.
Formalization
Figure A.4 Characteristics of Organizational Structure
A.3 Two Common Organizational Factors in Accidents
This section discusses two organizational factors that are frequently implicated in acci-
dents: low status and influence of safety; and poor communication and coordination.
While the factors are listed as discrete entities here, they rarely if ever occur on their own
and tend to overlap. Thus, poor communication may be partly attributed to poor safety
culture which suppresses comments about safety problems. Many additional and more
specific organizational factors in accidents can be identified. The two factors selected here
are purposely general in order to cover as many 'sub-factors' as possible. The remainder
of this appendix analyses how the structural characteristics relate to these organizational
risk factors, as shown in Figure A.4.
Organizational Complexity
Differentiation
Vertical Differentiation
Integration
Horizontal Differentiation
Spatial Dispersion
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Figure A.5 Structural Characteristics and Organizational Risk Factors
A.3.1 Low Status and Influence of Safety
When safety has a low status compared to other organizational goals such as performance
and cost, accidents become more likely in several ways. First, if safety has a low status it
will not be put first, or even considered at all, when it conflicts with other organizational
goals. Second, safety is less likely to be on people's minds. The potential adverse safety
impacts of decisions may therefore not even be identified, much less considered. Third,
personnel who are in charge of ensuring safety will find it more difficult to exert authority
and encourage pro-safety decisions.
In the days after the launch of Columbia the Mission Management Team was primarily
concerned with the effect of the debris strike on launch turn-around time and did not really
entertain the possibility that the debris strike could be a safety-of-flight issue. This preoc-
cupation can be partially attributed to pressure from top management to maintain launch
schedules, as demonstrated by the "Countdown to Space Station Program US Core Com-
plete" launch screensaver issued to all NASA employees [Gehman, 2003, p. 133].
Although NASA top management has consistently paid lip service to safety, the emphasis
on schedule implicitly downgraded the status of safety and adversely affected decision
making about the debris strike.
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Low safety status arises for diverse reasons. The structural analysis in the remainder of
this appendix identifies structural antecedents of low safety status. Figure A.6 summarizes
the structural antecedents of low status and influence of safety identified in this appendix.
For example, a structural contributor to low status of safety is low pay for safety person-
nel. This analysis demonstrates the value of looking at organizational risk from both struc-
tural and cultural viewpoints. Low status of safety is a poor safety culture attribute, but
arises as a result of both structural and cultural features of an organization.
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personnel from other Independence of
personnel Low Status Safety Function
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Access to Senior Professional Certification
Management
Figure A.6 Structural contributors to the low status and influence of safety
The cultural analysis in Appendix B identifies cultural antecedents to the low status and
influence of safety. For example, a cultural contributor to low status is management
emphasis on performance or cost-management.
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A.3.2 Poor Communication and Coordination
Poor communication and coordination contribute to accidents in several ways. When com-
munication does not occur, crucial feedback links may be broken. For example, changes in
one part of a system may render assumptions about the system invalid, or be incompatible
with other aspects of the system. Communication is therefore essential to ensure compati-
bility of decisions and update assumptions and mental models of the system. Communica-
tion is also essential when problems arise. Problems that are not recognized by the
appropriate members of an organization will not be solved. For example, if a maintenance
technician notices that a part must be replaced more often than expected but does not
inform his superiors, a potentially incorrect design problem cannot be identified or
addressed.
The Debris Assessment Team (DAT) assembled to investigate the debris strike on Colum-
bia found it difficult to communicate their concerns to Mission Management because man-
agement was convinced, long before any analysis had begun, that the debris strike was not
a safety-of-flight issue. The DAT was unable to conclusively state that the debris strike
was a safety-of-flight issue and therefore could not break through management's precon-
ceptions about the strike. The CAIB concluded that "at every juncture of STS-107, the
Shuttle Program's structure and processes, and therefore the managers in charge, resisted
new information" [Gehman, 2003, p. 181].
Poor communication and coordination arise for diverse reasons. The structural analysis in
the remainder of this appendix identifies structural antecedents of poor communication
and coordination. Figure A.7 summarizes the structural antecedents of poor communica-
tion and coordination identified in this appendix. For example, long decision making
chains impede accurate information transfer and spatial dispersal of organizations makes
communication and coordination more difficult.
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Figure A.7 Structural Contributors to poor Communication and Coordination
Appendix B continues the analysis by identifying cultural antecedents of poor communi-
cation and coordination. For example, confrontational atmospheres and bad organizational
habits such as 'killing the messenger' discourage communication.
A.4 Horizontal Differentiation
Section A. 1 argued that organizational risk factors like low status and influence of safety
and poor communication and coordination can be partially attributed to the structural fea-
tures of an organization. This section introduces the first structural characteristic, horizon-
tal differentiation, and examines its relation to organizational risk.
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Horizontal differentiation refers to the degree of job specialization and departmentaliza-
tion in an organization. Specialization is the degree to which individuals have detailed
knowledge and experience of a specific field or area. Departmentalization refers to the
way that specialists are arranged into units. Increasing specialization increases organiza-
tional complexity but can also increase the efficiency with which the organization per-
forms tasks. Specialists are essential in organizations that operate complex technologies or
perform innovative research. For example, an aerospace company requires in-depth exper-
tise in diverse areas such as fluid dynamics (e.g., internal and external flows, computation
fluid dynamics), materials science (e.g., metal matrix composites), and software engineer-
ing (e.g., real-time systems).
Specialization and departmentalization can be detrimental to safety because they increase
the difficulty of communication and the burden of coordination. Specialists in different
areas may find it difficult to communicate when their technical backgrounds are very dif-
ferent. For example, problems frequently arise when hardware engineers do not properly
communicate their requirements to software engineers. Increasing specialization increases
the potential for miscommunication and therefore increases risk. Similarly, departmental-
ization also increases the potential for poor communication and coordination (see
Section A.4.2), for example when projects are improperly handed off from one department
to another or when departmental rivalries preclude open communication.
Poor communication and coordination increases the risk that potential safety problems
will not be identified or resolved. Because the likelihood of miscommunication and the
potential for poor coordination increases as specialization and departmentalization
increases, horizontal differentiation increases risk. This risk can be ameliorated by ensur-
ing that sufficient resources are allocated to coordinating functions such as systems inte-
gration or engineering. Hence, all else being equal, risk increases as horizontal
differentiation increases but can be decreased by emphasizing coordinating activities:
Risk oc HorizontalDifferentiation (A. 1)Coordination
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This relationship is useful because it highlights the risk associated with horizontally differ-
entiated organizational structures and points to the need for active coordination.
The next four subsections focus on specific safety problems associated with horizontal
differentiation. First, organizations are commonly divided according to speciality (depart-
mental structure), by program or project, or by a combination of both, the matrix structure.
The safety implications of each type of division are identified. Second, whenever respon-
sibility is divided among divisions, be they project teams or departments, the potential that
things will fall into the gaps between subdivisions arises. This problem of 'diffraction of
responsibility', and its relation to 'diffusion of responsibility', is discussed. Third, the very
different implications for safety arise of parallel and serial organizational structures are
discussed. Finally, subcontracting and industrial partnerships can be seen as an extreme
form of horizontal differentiation where specializations are moved outside the organiza-
tions. Some potential safety pitfalls of subcontracting and industrial partnerships are pre-
sented.
A.4.1 Departments, Project Teams, and the Matrix Structure
The two most popular ways of structuring organizations are the department structure and
the project structure. In the department structure employees are arranged according to
their speciality, for example, fluid dynamics engineers in one department, software engi-
neers in another department. In the project structure employees are grouped together
according to project. Each project team will therefore consist of many different types of
specialists. The basic trade-off between these two arrangements is shown in Figure A.8
[Allen, 2001]. Project teams promote coordination members but decouple engineers from
colleagues in the same speciality. Specialists are therefore less likely to stay informed
about new developments in their area. Departmental arrangements facilitate communica-
tion between specialists in the same area, but make coordination on projects more diffi-
cult.
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Figure A.8 Departmental and Project Team Arrangements
The matrix structure is an attempt to reap the benefits of both approaches while limiting
the disadvantages. In practice it does not always work as well as hoped. It is difficult to
determine how much to emphasize project teams versus departmental structures. Project
teams also have different goals than departments. For example, a project team manager
wants the best candidates on her team while the department manager must maximize
income for his department and ensure that employees have sufficient time to stay informed
of new developments in their speciality (e.g., by attending conferences). Project and
department managers may disagree about which specialists are assigned to which projects
and for how long.
Both arrangements have potential safety benefits. On the one hand, coordination between
people working on a project is essential. The project team therefore has clear advantages
for safety. On the other hand, knowledge of new developments in, or problems with, the
underlying technologies is also essential, giving the departmental structure some advan-
tage in terms of safety implications. Managers can at least minimize the negative impact
of each option by promoting coordination and communication. For example, internal con-
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ferences on technologies and their safety implications can be used to inform specialists of
new developments elsewhere in the organization. Communities of practice also provide
some promise in counteracting the insulating effect of project-based division of labour and
replacing the support offered by technically specialized departments is the community of
practice.
Communities of practice are groups of people who are informally joined by "bonds of
shared expertise and a passion for a joint enterprise" [Wenger and Snyder, 2000]. For
example, signal processing specialists from different organizational divisions may regu-
larly meet to apprise each other of new developments or problems they encountered. Early
evidence indicates communities of practice can encourage knowledge sharing, learning,
and change. Such communities may also allow the sharing and rapid dissemination of
potential safety pitfalls, thereby counteracting the potential insulating effect of project-
based division of labour. Management cannot forcibly create these communities but they
can create the right conditions, such as bringing the right people together and providing
infrastructure support.
A.4.2 Diffraction of Responsibility
Diffraction of responsibility (the 'not my department' problem) can occur when organiza-
tional divisions do not take adequate responsibility for the way their output fits into the
larger organization [Freudenburg, 1992]. Diffraction of responsibility has critical implica-
tions for safety. Accidents can arise in overlap or boundary areas where two or more par-
ties (individuals, automated controllers, or organizational divisions) have responsibility
for the same process or for processes with common boundaries [Leplat, 1987]. In these
areas the potential for ambiguity and for conflicting decisions arises when responsibility is
not clearly assigned and decisions and actions are not carefully coordinated.
Gaps in responsibility can have unfortunate consequences. For example, Catton blames
"corporate gaps" for the controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) of Air New Zealand Flight
273
901 into Mount Erebus, an Antarctic volcano, in 1979 [Catton, 1985; quoted in Freuden-
burg, 1992]:
"When the plane collided with the mountain, killing everyone on board, it was flying in
clear air, beneath a cloud ceiling that diffused the daylight in a way that made the upward
sloping white surface of the mountain directly ahead indistinguishable from the horizontal
white expanse all five pairs of eyes in the plane's cockpit had every reason to suppose they
were seeing. According to the destination coordinates the pilot had been given in his pre-
flight briefing, they were on a safe route down the middle of ice-covered McMurdo
Sound. Due to changed destination coordinates the airline's Navigation Section had
inserted into the aircraft's computer, they were instead flying toward a point lying directly
behind the mountain.
It was not the job of the person who had "corrected" a supposed error in the flight plan to
notify the pilot that a change of coordinates had been made. It was not the computer pro-
grammer's job to inspect the pilot's navigation chart to see if his preflight briefing had
agreed with the information going into the Inertial Navigation System computer. It was
not the responsibility of the Williams field controller to ask the pilot whether his preflight
briefing and his computer held the same information. It happened from the division of
labor and it was nobody's fault. Two hundred fifty-seven lives fell through the cracks."
Diffraction of responsibility occurs partly due to 'diffusion of responsibility', a social phe-
nomenon where no-one in a group takes responsibility if it is not explicitly assigned. Dif-
fusion of responsibility occurs in hierarchical organizations when subordinates claim that
they were just following orders, or when superiors claim that they simply issued orders,
but did not actually do anything wrong.
Another source of diffraction of responsibility is structural: when tasks and responsibility
are divided between two or more subdivisions the possibility arises that the division will
not be clear and that things will fall into the gaps. For example, a Milstar satellite was lost
in 1999 during launch because of inadequate attitude control of the Titan/Centaur launch
vehicle [Leveson, 2004b]. The attitude control system was using an incorrect process
model because of erroneous input data on the software load tape. The investigation into
the accident revealed that no-one had tested the attitude control software using the actual
load tape because each group involved in testing and assurance had assumed that one of
the other groups was doing so.
Such incompatible actions make accidents more likely. For example, as in the above Mil-
star case, each division may assume that another division is responsible for a safety task,
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with the result that no-one performs the task. Or a division may make changes in a system
design without informing other divisions of the changes. Unilateral and un-communicated
changes contribute to asynchronous evolution and make accidents more likely because
they render assumptions and mental models about the system and its behaviour invalid.
Diffraction of responsibility becomes more acute in organizations that have many hierar-
chical elements and many specializations. As the number of departments or areas of spe-
cializations increases the probability that at least one will act in an incompatible way (i.e.,
in a way that runs counter to the expectations of other divisions) increases. Consider the
simple case of an organization with n hierarchical elements, each with a probability, pi,
of acting in an incompatible way. The probability that at least one element will act in an
incompatible way is then (assuming that the pi are independent):
n
Ps= - (1 -P) (A.2)
i = 1
Figure A.9 illustrates how rapidly this probability approaches one, for the case where each
element has the same probability of acting in an incompatible manner.
The Air New Zealand example illustrates that blurred lines of accountability and gaps in
responsibility can have disastrous consequences even when the underlying technological
systems are well understood. When the underlying technologies are poorly understood,
the problem is further exacerbated. For example, the CAIB in commenting on the safety
organization structure at NASA noted that [Gehman, 2003, p. 186] (emphasis added):
"The detached nature of the support provided by the Space Shuttle Division Chief, and the
wide band of the positions responsibilities throughout multiple layers of NASA's hierar-
chy, confuses lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability in a manner that almost
defies explanation."
An awareness of the negative safety implications of diffraction of responsibility can pro-
vide organizations with the impetus to examine the allocation of responsibility and report-
ing structures to ensure that responsibility is clearly assigned and decisions and actions are
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Figure A.9 Probability of at least one unit acting in an incompatible way
carefully coordinated. In addition, such awareness, coupled with a safety culture that
stresses the importance of safety and promotes cooperation between divisions (See
Appendix B), can encourage organizational divisions to consider more closely how their
actions, or inactions, affect other divisions and the organization as a whole.
A.4.3 Parallel and Serial Organizational Structures
This section examines the impact that parallel and serial arrangements of organizational
divisions have on safety. A widely cited paper comparing these arrangements indicates
that parallel organizational structures should decrease the likelihood of accidents because
such structures have multiple check points [Heimann, 1993]. However, by considering the
dependencies between divisions this section shows that in some cases these dependencies
may render parallel structures effectively serial, thus decreasing their resistance against
decisions that lead to accidents.
In reliability theory, parallel arrangements of components are used (with varying effec-
tiveness) to decrease the probability that the failure of any one component will cause a
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system to stop performing. Serial structures, on the other hand, require that each compo-
nent be working in order for the series of components to work. Heimann applies similar
thinking to organizational structures to analyze the propensity of an organization to acci-
dents or missed opportunities [Heimann, 1993]. Borrowing from the literature on hypoth-
esis testing, he defines accidents as Type I errors, and missed opportunities as Type II
errors. Thus a Type I error involves choosing to act when acting is incorrect (e.g., launch-
ing when it is unsafe to do so). A Type II error involves choosing not to act when it is safe
to do so (e.g., delaying launch when launching is safe). Completely avoiding Type I errors
therefore necessarily involves accepting some Type II errors and vice versa .
Heimann uses equations from the theory of reliability to determine the propensity of paral-
lel and serial arrangements to Type I (accidents) and Type II (missed opportunities) errors,
and then derives some tempting equations that would appear to allow one to design the
'optimal' organization, given certain assumptions. Unfortunately these assumptions are
rarely valid, as shown below. Consider first the propensity of each arrangement to the two
types of errors.
A serial organizational structure is defined as one where each organizational unit must
agree with a decision before the next unit can consider it. The decision will not be acted on
if any one unit does not agree with it. The probability of a Type I error (accident) in a
serial structure (assuming independent components) is:
P(Type I) = H ax (A.3)
i = 1
where ci is the probability of component i making a Type I error. The probability of a
Type II error in a serial structure is (assuming independent components):
1. See also Chapter 4.
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P(Type II) = 1 -H (1 - P) (A.4)
i= 1
where Pi is the probability of component i making a Type II error. Thus, for a simple
serial system of m = 10 components where u, $ = 0.05, P(Type I)= 10-15 and
P(Type II)= 0.4. Serial arrangements therefore appear to provide good protection against
unsafe decisions.
A parallel organizational structure is one where each unit can independently make a deci-
sion. Implementation may rely on one, some, or all of the units successfully passing the
policy. In the case where only one functioning unit is required the probability of a Type I
error in a serial structure is (assuming independent components)':
m
P(Type I) = 1 - J (1 -a (A.5)
i = 1
and probability of a Type II error in a parallel structure is (assuming independent compo-
nents):
m
P(Type II) = fJ $i (A.6)
i= 1
Thus, for a simple one-out-of-m parallel system of m = 10 components where
a, Bi = 0.05, P(Type I)= 0.4 and P(Type II)= 10-15
Serial organizational structures are therefore less likely to make Type I errors (accidents)
but more prone to Type II errors (lost opportunities); the converse holds for parallel sys-
tems. It would appear that organizations are therefore doomed to accept one or the other
error and that organizations that wish to ensure safety must adopt serial structures. But
1. Equations for m-out-of-n systems are similar.
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Heimann argues that by using a combination serial-parallel (or parallel-serial) structure
and increasing the number of organizational units the overall probability of making either
Type I or Type 1I errors can be reduced to a minimum1 , assuming independent units.
Based on these equations Heimann next derives some tempting equations that would
appear to allow one to design the optimal organization, assuming that the consequences of
Type I and Type II errors are equally weighted and that components are identical and inde-
pendent. The assumption of equal weighting can easily be lifted but lifting the assump-
tions of identical and independent components brings the existence of an optimal
arrangement of organizational units into doubt. Mathematically speaking that means that
when axi and i are dependent and non-identical an optimal solution is not guaranteed to
exist (see, for example, [Vanderplaats, 2001]).
Unfortunately neither the assumption of independence nor that of identical error probabil-
ities are likely to hold in organizational settings. The probability of making an error of
Type I or Type II depends on various factors, including the data on which the decision is
based; the skills, experience, and training of those involved in the decision; and percep-
tions about the desirability of different courses of action. Different organizational units
will only have the same probabilities of error if these factors coincide, which is highly
unlikely in real organizational settings.
Organizational units are unlikely to be independent. In general, they do not have access to
the same information. In a hierarchy, each level is dependent on the levels above and
below it for information. When information is passed up or down the hierarchy it is fil-
tered. For example, technical data is typically summarized before it is presented to man-
agement. Similarly, top management may only provide a limited picture of strategic
decisions to mid-level management. In addition decisions are not only driven by pure
information, but also by perceptions of what is appropriate and organizational politics. In a
1. This minimum depends on the component probabilities of Type I and Type II errors.
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serial chain of decision making, each link's decisions are therefore biassed by the preced-
ing and following links.
Because the assumptions of independence and identical error probabilities are unlikely to
hold in real organizations, it may be impossible to identify an 'optimal' arrangement of
units in serial and parallel structures. Heimann's work identifies the basic structural weak-
nesses of serial and parallel arrangements with respect to Type I (accidents) and Type II
(missed opportunities) errors. But his findings are less useful for designing safe systems
because they oversimplify the problem by assuming identical error probabilities for orga-
nizational units and ignoring the dependencies between units. In particular, serial systems
may be less effective at protecting unsafe decisions than indicated by Equation A.3, and
parallel systems may not provide as much protection against missed opportunities than
indicated by A.6, as shown below.
Consider first the usefulness of serial organizational arrangements in preventing Type I
errors. Equation A.3 shows that each additional unit in a chain provides only an incremen-
tal reduction in the probability of error, as shown in Figure A.10, where (o = 1) for each
unit.
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Figure A.10 Probability of Type I Error for Serial Structure
280
Nevertheless, the overall probability of error is still reduced by a factor of a for each unit
added. But because the assumption of independence does not hold in general, serial chains
may be much less effective at preventing Type I errors than indicated by Equation A.3. A
back-of-the-envelope calculation illustrates the problem. The dependence between succes-
sive units can be roughly modelled as an influence factor, I, ranging from zero to one. An
influence factor of zero indicates that a unit is not affected by the preceding (or succeed-
ing) unit at all; a factor of one indicates that the unit follows the lead of the preceding unit.
Then the influence of unit k on unit (k + 1) is:
ak +1 = k + Ik - (1 - a) (A.7)
assuming that the influence factor is scaled appropriately. A similar relationship holds for
influence down the hierarchy. Figure A. 11 indicates the effect of dependency on the over-
all probability of making a Type I error in the simple case where the influence factor is the
same between each successive pair of units. Dependency between units has a significant
effect on the overall probability of error.
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Figure A.11 Effect of Dependency on Serial Probability of Error
Serial organizational structures are therefore of limited benefit in preventing unsafe deci-
sions. However, equation (A.3) also indicates that adding independent external audits of
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decisions can provide benefits (see page 314). While independent auditors may be subject
to the same information biases, they are likely to be less susceptible to influence by the
organization's culture and politics. This analysis shows that organizations can decrease the
likelihood of Type I errors by identifying the serial chains involved in safety critical deci-
sions and requiring independent external audits. In addition, steps to reduce the attenua-
tion and distortion of information between units can reduce the overall probability of error.
For example, managers should make it clear that they are more interested in accurate
information than in good news (See Appendix B).
Similarly, parallel units are also dependent on one another for information and are there-
fore subject to the same biases. Parallel structures may therefore be less effective at pre-
venting missed opportunities than indicated by Equation A.6. Because parallel
arrangements have a greater tendency to accidents (Type I errors) than serial arrangements
and only a limited ability to prevent missed opportunities (Type II errors), they should be
avoided by organizations that operate high-risk systems.
Organizations or subset of organizations may operate in a parallel mode despite being
designed to be serial. When the dependency between units is high, the structure becomes
effectively parallel because once one unit has made a decision other units are likely to con-
cur. In the case of the Challenger Space Shuttle accident, the decision makers who decided
to go ahead with the launch were operating in an effectively parallel structure. Once
Thiokol gave the go-ahead for the Challenger launch Marshall did not investigate the
potential risk of launching any further [Rogers, 1986]. Thiokol managers put pressure on
the engineers to give the go-ahead, although Marshall management later claimed that they
would have accepted scrubbing the launch if that was Thiokol's final recommendation.
The serial structure where Marshall was supposed to provided a check on Thiokol's deci-
sions was effectively operating in a parallel mode where Thiokol's decision to give the go-
ahead was accepted without further question from Marshall.
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A.4.4 Subcontracting and Industrial Partnerships
Subcontracting and industrial partnerships are two ways of spreading development risk
and obtaining access to the necessary talent [NASA, 1995]. Distributing financial risk is a
good strategy for reducing the individual financial risk to each organization, but the price
may have to be paid in increased risk of accidents. This section discusses the potential
adverse safety impacts of subcontracting and industrial partnerships and provides some
recommendations on how to minimize the risk to safety.
Working with outside organizations increases the burden of coordination and makes it
more likely that crucial safety information may slip through the gaps. Knowledge of the
relevant technologies and insight into the systems being developed or operated becomes
spread out across the 'parent' organizations and its partners. In addition, contractors may
offer higher salaries than parent organizations, thus attracting the most talented employ-
ees. For example, government agencies are tightly bound by civil service salary rules. The
prospect of increased compensation may tempt both existing and prospective employees
to contractors, thus depleting internal talent pools. This dispersal of talent and information
may lead to crucial safety issues not being discovered or communicated because the orga-
nizations do not necessarily share the same goals. For example, subcontractors naturally
tend to be motivated primarily by their own survival needs. When subcontractors are eval-
uated according to their ability to deliver on time, they may be reluctant to look for or
reveal potential safety issues. Section 4.3.2 discusses some of the problems NASA has
experienced with subcontracting.
Another issue when using subcontractors is assignment of responsibility for safety.
Assigning responsibility for safety to contractors who are primarily evaluated on other cri-
teria such as timely delivery and cost creates conflicts of interest that may result in safety
being compromised. Responsibility for safety should not be contracted out.
The United Space Alliance (USA) is responsible for operating the Space Shuttle. NASA
establishes safety requirements, which are implemented by USA. Full responsibility for
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the safe launch of the Shuttle remains with NASA. In theory, this approach ensures that
NASA ultimately makes the tough safety decisions such as delaying launches. But a 2002
audit into NASA oversight of USA's safety procedures at Kennedy Space Center noted
that while the division of safety responsibilities between USA and NASA were clear,
Kennedy's procedures for monitoring USA's implementation of safety procedures were
inadequate [NASA, 2002, p. ii]:
Kennedy's procedures for ensuring that USA properly implemented those safety
requirements were not the same procedures defined in the SFOC [Space Flight Operations
Contract]. The SFOC states that NASA is to provide direct safety oversight of all USA
operations. Nevertheless, Kennedy did not provide direct safety oversight of USA's
ground operations but rather obtained insight into USA's safety operations through sur-
veillance and audits. Further, Kennedy did not perform any level of safety oversight for
integrated logistics, a high-risk area for injuries and mishaps. Implementing a level of
oversight contradicting that required by the SFOC could lead to lapses in safety oversight,
which increases the risk of harming personnel and damaging Space Shuttle hardware."
When safety procedures are not monitored it becomes more likely that they will not be
adhered to, because other pressures such as production schedules and budget limitations
make it difficult to put safety first, especially when there is a history of safe operations.
Not following safety procedures makes accidents more likely. Organizations must monitor
the safety compliance of their subcontractors or industrial partners in a way that does not
depend solely on indirect techniques such as surveillance or audits. For example, frequent
unannounced safety inspections provide subcontractors with an incentive to observe
safety requirements, with the added benefit of making it easier for top management to con-
vey the importance of safety and for lower level employees to raise safety concerns (see
Appendix B).
Organizations that engage subcontractors or partner with other organizations must care-
fully consider the contractor incentive structures and also the impact on internal familiar-
ity with the systems and their internal talent pools. When organizations are no longer able
to understand the systems they develop or operate, the risk of accidents increases dramati-
cally.
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A.5 Vertical Differentiation
Section A. 1 argued that organizational risk factors can be partially attributed to the struc-
tural features of an organization. The previous section illustrated how one structural fea-
ture, horizontal differentiation, affects organizational risk. This section introduces another
structural characteristic, vertical differentiation, which also has serious implications for
safety.
Vertical differentiation is the maximum number of hierarchical levels in an organization
[Hendricks, 1991]. In general, larger organizations have greater vertical differentiation
because each manager can only exert effective direct control over a certain maximum
number of people, referred to as the span of control' [Graicunas, 1933; Urwick, 1956].
This section explores the relationship between the span of control and safety.
When managers are expected to supervise too many direct subordinates, problems may
arise. For example, the manager may be unable to keep track of what everyone is doing or
subordinates may be reluctant to 'bother' an obviously harried superior. There is therefore
less opportunity to build trust between subordinates and superiors, and important informa-
tion about safety may be lost. In addition, overloaded managers may not be able to find the
time to report to their managers, thus extending the problem to the next hierarchical level.
The problem of excessive managerial responsibilities is likely to be especially acute dur-
ing periods when the organization is under pressure. When organizations are doing well
they can afford more staff, including managerial staff. Smaller spans of control may there-
fore be possible. Managers that do have excessive responsibilities can be identified and
helped. But when organizations are under severe financial pressure small spans of control
are impractical. Managers are therefore likely to be under workload pressure at precisely
1. The concept of span of control has had a contentious history, mostly because of early attempts to make
hard quantitative assessments and because of the ease with which contrary examples could be found. Gra-
icunas's formulas suggested that managers should never supervise more than six people. However,
detractors noted that the military provided numerous examples where officers effectively supervised sig-
nificantly more people.
285
the time that they are most stressed by the organization's strategic problems. This combi-
nation of workload pressure and stress arising from concerns about the organization's
future can make it especially difficult for managers to perform their communication and
coordination functions properly. For example, they may be too stressed to notice or
respond to vague safety concerns from their subordinates.
Organizations where managers manage too many people expose themselves to higher than
necessary risk because communication may be stifled and managers may not be able to
coordinate the activities under their command properly. Thus the risk of poor communica-
tion and coordination, and hence accidents, scales with the number of managers whose
actual span of control (Sactuai) is greater than the appropriate span of control
(Sappropriate):
nzanagers
Risk oc Z Sactual, i > Sappropriate,i (A.8)
i = 1
where nmanagers is the number of managers in the organization, Sactual, i is the actual
span of control for manager i., and Sappropriate, i is the appropriate span of control for
manager i.
It would therefore appear that organizations can decrease the risk of poor communication
and control by decreasing the span of control. Unfortunately the situation is more compli-
cated, because decreasing the span of control may be politically difficult to do, and
increases the vertical differentiation, which also has potential negative safety implications.
Organizations may encounter resistance to plans to reduce spans of control from both
supervisors and subordinates. Supervisors' standing is often related to the number of peo-
ple they supervise. An attempt to reduce their spans of control may therefore be inter-
preted as an attack on their status. Similarly, subordinates' standing is partially related to
the status of the person to whom they report-reporting to an intermediate manager there-
fore reduces their standing.
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Increasing vertical differentiation increases the separation between the top and the bottom
layers of the organizational hierarchy. Increased vertical differentiation also has an
adverse impact on communication and hence on safety. Organizations with high vertical
differentiation are more susceptible to attenuation and distortion of information as it flows
up or down the hierarchy. Information can rarely be transferred from one individual to
another without distortion, because individuals focus on different aspects of situations or
problems and interpret information differently. Information may even be completely
silenced as it passes up the chain of command, for example if employees do not feel com-
fortable going around a superior who does not listen to their concerns. Managers may find
it difficult to build trust with their subordinates. Employees or organizational units may
also elevate bureaucratic barriers to communication when they wish to assert their inde-
pendence.
The greater the number of links in a communication chain, the greater the potential distor-
tion. Important pieces of information may therefore be lost. As an illustration, consider a
communication chain where the correlation between what any given person knows and
what that person's supervisor knows about the same issue is a generous 0.7 [Freudenburg,
1992]. With just two links the correlation is only 0.49 = 0.7 x 0.7. Seven links in the
chain reduces the correlation to less than 0.1 (0.77 = 0.0824). Vertical differentiation
therefore increases the likelihood that managers will make decisions (including those that
are safety critical) without being fully aware of the necessary information.
Thus, all else being equal, the risk of receiving distorted information is proportional to the
number of links in the decision chain:
Riski oc linksi (A.9)
where linksi is the number of links involved in making decision i.
Both the Challenger and Columbia accidents involved attenuation of information as it
flowed up the hierarchy. In the case of Challenger several people had expressed concern
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about the potential dangers of launching at low temperatures, yet people at the top claimed
not to have heard anything about such concerns [Rogers, 1986]. In the case of Columbia
the debris assessment team (DAT) that investigated the debris strike felt pressured to be
brief when reporting their findings [Gehman, 2003, p. 192]. They squeezed their initial
report into forty minutes, in order to make it fit into the schedule. When they presented it
to a higher level, the Mission Management Team, they cut it further to just three minutes.
Three minutes is a very short time in which to convey ambiguous and nuanced informa-
tion, especially when management has a preconceived notion that the debris strike did not
represent a safety-of-flight issue. The three minute presentation did not adequately convey
the uncertainties in the DAT's assessment and Mission Management used it as confirma-
tion that the debris strike was not a safety-of-flight issue. The Columbia example illus-
trates how information is distorted as it flows up the hierarchy both by prosaic concerns
like the requirement to fit into a meeting schedule and also by more subtle problems such
as inadequate communication of uncertainty and the difficulty of overcoming precon-
ceived notions (in this case, that the debris strike was not a safety-of-flight issue).
Large organizations are therefore in a difficult situation: smaller spans of control decrease
the risk of poor communication and coordination, but increase management overhead
costs and vertical differentiation, which in turn increases the risk of important information
being lost or distorted.
There are several ways to approach the problem of distortion of information as it flows up
several hierarchical layers in vertically differentiated organizations. Structural approaches
such as decentralization and 'flat' organizational structures focus on reducing the degree
of vertical differentiation. These approaches have limited effectiveness however, as shown
below. An alternative approach is to address the underlying causes of attenuation and dis-
tortion of information.
One structural approach to this problem is to decrease the number of links by decentraliz-
ing decisions to lower levels. In some cases decentralization may be a viable alternative.
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For example, on military aircraft carriers low-level seamen may abort landings if they
think there is a problem [La Porte and Consolini, 1991]. Unfortunately decentralization
can also increase the risk of inappropriate decisions and poor coordination. Lower levels
employees may not fully appreciate the impact of their decisions on other parts of the sys-
tem, as discussed in Section A.9.
Another structural approach to this problem is the so-called flat organization, which has
few hierarchical levels but has a wider spread. Such an arrangement requires that high-
level managers have a very large span of control. Flat hierarchies may also be subject to
information attenuation and distortion as information travels from one end of the organiza-
tion to the other. Structural approaches are therefore of limited effectiveness.
A better approach to this problem is to address the underlying reasons for information
attenuation and distortion. First, the cultural reasons for information suppressal or distor-
tion should be addressed, as discussed in Appendix B. For example, there seems to be a
taboo against 'skipping a level' in the formal hierarchy. Subordinates who speak to their
superior's superior are accused of 'going over her head' while superiors who speak to a
subordinate's subordinates are accused of weakening that person's authority. Of course
formal channels should still be used for formal processes in general. But informal commu-
nications between people not necessarily related in the formal structure are a way of rap-
idly disseminating information and of building trust. Such trust may be essential when
subordinates do need to use formal channels to go around their superior for some reason.
Second, improved information systems can facilitate the sharing of information-but only
if cultural blocks to open sharing of information are first removed, as discussed in
Appendix B.
Factors Affecting the Appropriate Span of Control
The appropriate span of control for a given manager depends on the environment in which
the organization operates, the nature of the functions for which she is responsible, the
training experience and ability of the subordinates, and the managerial skills of the man-
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ager. Determining the appropriate span of control therefore requires both an appreciation
for technical challenges and also a knowledge of subordinates' and superiors' abilities.
Nature of environment. The appropriate span of control is smaller for organizations that
operate complex or highly innovative technologies in volatile environments than for orga-
nizations that operate relatively simple technologies in stable environments.
Nature of functions. the functions for which the manager is responsible determine the
appropriate span of control in four ways. First, the appropriate span of control decreases as
the required depth of insight and control into each function increases. For example, if sub-
ordinates can be easily monitored because their tasks are simple and independent, a man-
ager can closely control twenty subordinates [Perrow, 1999b]. The required depth depends
on the nature of the system, the culture of the organization, and the skills of the subordi-
nate employees. Second, the appropriate span of control decreases when executing the
functions correctly (incorrectly) can have large positive (negative) consequences. In such
cases reducing the span of control can decrease the likelihood that the manager will make
costly mistakes. From a safety point of view the possibility of negative consequences is
more serious. Third, the appropriate span of control decreases as the variety of functions
increases. Managing a wide range of functions is more difficult because the manager must
have in-depth insight into unrelated areas. Finally, the appropriate span of control
decreases as the functions become more interdependent or as the interfaces become more
complex because more coordination is required to ensure that all the functions are suc-
cessfully executed. Systems like the Space Shuttle that are tightly coupled, interactively
complex, or have higher degrees of uncertainty will generally require a smaller span of
control because managers must spend more time ensuring that different parts of the system
interact correctly (see Section A.9). Uncertainty makes it more difficult to predict behav-
iour and thus further increases the burden of monitoring and coordination.
The skills, experience, character, and other attributes of the manager and the subordinates
also affect the span of control. While a comprehensive consideration of psychological fac-
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tors is beyond the scope of this research, this section highlights some potential areas of
concern for future work.
Employees. Different types of employees require different levels of supervision, depend-
ing on their skill-set and experience. For example, young and inexperienced employees
require more supervision than more experienced employees. In addition, the ease of inter-
facing between employee groups (e.g. between software and hardware engineers) affects
the appropriate span of control: When different groups interact easily less managerial
oversight is required, but when groups clash or do not communicate well managers may
have to step in to ensure that project elements are coordinated.
Manager. A manager's ability to manage effectively depends on her experience, training,
and personality. Some managers may be able effectively to manage more people than oth-
ers.
A.6 Geographic Dispersion
Section A. 1 argued that organizational risk factors can be partially attributed to the struc-
tural features of an organization. The previous two sections illustrated how two aspects of
organizational differentiation, vertical and horizontal differentiation, affects organiza-
tional risk. This section introduces the final aspect of organizational differentiation, spatial
dispersion, and discusses its implications for safety.
Geographic dispersion refers to the way that organizations or teams are distributed across
physical space1 . Geographic dispersion may discourage communication, encourage the
development of mutually incompatible subcultures, and increase the problem of diffrac-
tion of responsibility (see Section A.4), thus adversely affecting safety.
1. The term 'geographic dispersion' is usually applied to work teams, while 'spatial dispersion' is usually
used at the organizational level. Spatial dispersion refers to the degree to which an organization's facili-
ties and employees are dispersed across geographic area, that is, the number of geographically separate
units (site index), the average distance of each from the headquarters (separation index), and the number
of employees at each unit in comparison to headquarters.
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This section begins by analyzing the effect of geographic dispersion on safety by consider-
ing five different aspects of geographic dispersion. Next, the effect of physical proximity
on the frequency and quality of communication is discussed.
A.6.1 Effect of Geographic Dispersion on Safety
This section analyses the effect of dispersion on safety using a set of five measures of geo-
graphic dispersion developed by [O'Leary and Cummings, 2002], as shown in Table A. 1.
Together these measures capture spatial, temporal, and configurational aspects of geo-
graphic dispersion.
TABLE A.1 Measures of Geographic Dispersiona
Index Description Spatial Temporal Configurational
Site Number of sites per team *
Isolation Percent of members alone with no *
other team members at their site
Separation Average distance from one member *
to the "average" other member
Overlap Actual shared work hours among *
members divided by the potential
shared hours if team were co-located
Role Average distance to the team leader * *
a. Adapted from [O'Leary and Cummings, 2002].
While these measures were developed to describe geographically distributed work teams,
they can also be applied at the organizational level. In most engineering organizations,
work is usually accomplished by some form of team-based structure.
Site Index. A large number of sites increases the "technical and social complexity of
coordination, interaction, and communication" [O'Leary and Cummings, 2002].
At the organizational level the site index, (Isite), refers to the number of sites in an organi-
zation. This index therefore depends on where the organizational boundaries are drawn. At
the team level the site index refers to the number of sites at which team members work.
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O'Leary and Cummings note that the definition of 'sites' is not clear and should be opera-
tionalized at the level which is most meaningful for the context studied. For example,
when studying a team housed in a single facility separate floors or hallways could be con-
sidered as sites. Subcontractors could be counted as part of the organization if frequent
communication, coordination, and interaction is required.
Because safety is an emergent system property it is best assured by considering it from the
beginning of system development and by establishing and maintaining high degrees of
coordination, interaction, and communication throughout the system life-cycle. Organiza-
tions with multiple sites may find it more difficult to achieve and maintain the required
degrees of coordination, interaction, and communication throughout a system's life-cycle.
NASA is a highly dispersed organization consisting of a headquarters facility in Washing-
ton DC, seven research centers spread all over the United States, the Jet Propulsion Labo-
ratory in Pasadena California, and a flight facility in Virginia. In addition, NASA
subcontracts a large proportion of its work to the commercial space industry. This dis-
persal causes many problems for safety. For example, the division of labour between sites
is only partially driven by technical concerns such as the technically best way of dividing
projects and which center's technical capabilities are best suited to a given project.
Hence, all else being equal, risk is proportional to the site index, but can be mitigated by
an increased focus on coordination and communication:
Risk oc site (A.10)Coordination, Communication
Isolation Index. The isolation index (isolation) measures the number of team/organiza-
tional members who are alone at each site [O'Leary and Cummings, 2002]. Low values of
the index indicate low isolation: a value of zero indicates that zero percent of members are
alone, a value of one indicates that one hundred percent of members are alone at their
sites.
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Co-location may have both advantages and disadvantages for safety. Sites that have two or
more members have greater potential for person-to-person interaction without travel
[O'Leary and Cummings, 2002]. Interaction increases the potential that safety concerns
will be communicated and resolved. In addition, interaction increases familiarity between
members and may therefore make them more comfortable about airing vague concerns
about safety. On the other hand, familiarity may breed contempt. Clusters of members
may experience inter-group conflict because of their close proximity [O'Leary and Cum-
mings, 2002]. Interpersonal problems that might be masked by distance could become
more apparent when members are co-located. When team members are not comfortable
with one another they are less likely to communicate openly and it is therefore less likely
that potential safety concerns will be identified and resolved.
Isolation is particularly significant when it is the safety personnel who are isolated from
other personnel. Safety personnel are often distrusted and viewed as an impediment to
progress. Physical isolation makes it easier for other team/organization members to
exclude safety personnel, and also makes it more difficult for safety personnel to gain the
trust of other members. This effect, and some potential mitigation techniques, is captured
by the safety expert role index (see page 295).
Separation Index. The separation index is an indication of the spatial dispersal of the
team [O'Leary and Cummings, 2002]. A higher separation index indicates a greater
degree of spatial dispersion. Physical distance can make coordination, interaction, and
communication more difficult because face-to-face meetings are more difficult to arrange
and less likely to occur spontaneously. In addition, the quality of communication
decreases when people do not communicate face-to-face. Spatial dispersion may therefore
have an adverse effect on safety by decreasing the frequency and quality of communica-
tion. Later in this section, it is shown that the frequency and quality of communication
decline with distance.
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One advantage of spatial dispersion is that it provides greater flexibility in selecting team
members. Teams may be formed from the best available or most appropriate personnel
available in, or even outside, the entire organization. For example, a virtual team of
experts created and tested a new engine under budget for Rocketdyne, Boeing's propul-
sion and power division [Majchrzak et al., 2004].
Organizations and teams that are dispersed in the east-west direction as opposed to the
north-south direction face an additional temporal challenge, captured by the overlap
index.
Overlap Index. The (temporal) overlap index indicates the difficulty of arranging syn-
chronous communications during normal working hours for a team or organization
[O'Leary and Cummings, 2002]. The overlap index between two sites i and j is defined
as the number of overlapping work hours (OWH) divided by the potential number of
shared hours for a given workday (WD)) and team size ((n):
owHIo a = 2 (A.11)
WD x (n - n)/2
where
OWH t WD -|TZ- TZj if(| TZj - TZjj < 13) (A. 12)|TZ -TZj-(24-WD) else
and TZ is the time zone at site i defined such that TZ = 0 for Greenwich Mean Time
and increases to 24 progressing eastwards. A larger overlap index indicates that there are a
greater number of overlapping hours, that is, the team/organization is less dispersed.
Dispersal across time zones can be a significant obstacle for organizations or teams. When
the difference in time zones is greater than eight to twelve hours, teams must either work
asynchronously or extend their working hours to create a temporal overlap. East-west sep-
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aration therefore makes communication and interaction even less likely than the same
north-south separation. In addition, east-west distance also makes meeting in person less
convenient because of problems such as jet lag. The adverse effects of physical separation
on communication and safety, as discussed in Section A.6.2, are therefore likely to be
amplified for organizations/teams dispersed primarily along the east-west axis as opposed
to the north-south axis.
Because communication is essential to managing safety, it can therefore be surmised that
all else being equal, risk scales with spatial separation, and is further increased when sepa-
ration is along the east-west axis. This detrimental effect on communication can be miti-
gated by making active efforts (as discussed in Section A.6.2) to encourage
communication and coordination between organizational divisions or team members:
Risk oc iseparation loverlap (A.13)Communication, Coordination
Role Indexes. the position of the team leader or safety experts relative to the other mem-
bers of a team can have a significant effect on safety by affecting the team's ability to
identify and resolve potential safety problems. The team leader and safety expert role
indexes indicate how isolated the team leader and safety expert are from other team mem-
bers.
Consider first the team leader role index and its relation to safety. The team leader role
index measures the average distance from each team member to the team leader:
teamleader (dleader- member) (A'4)
O'Leary and Cummings found that the position of the team leader relative to other team
members had a dramatic effect on team behaviours such as conflict management [O'Leary
and Cummings, 2002]. For example, a study of distributed teams found that team mem-
bers who were co-located with the team leader regularly engaged the leader in impromptu
discussions and were not afraid to tell him when they thought his plans were not good
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[Armstrong and Cole, 2002, cited in O'Leary and Cummings, 2002]. Such impromptu and
open discussions increase the likelihood that potential safety problems will be uncovered
and resolved before accidents occur. In contrast, team members who were located at
another site just 15 kilometres away did not engage in such impromptu discussions and
used formal channels to voice objections. These 'distance' objections took much longer to
resolve and were resolved completely less frequently. In addition, Collinson found that if
senior management is geographically removed from workers then policies may have little
impact [Collinson, 1999].
Isolated team leaders are likely to have more difficulty exerting effective leadership, as
indicated by the above example on conflict management. In addition, team members who
are isolated from the team leader may be less likely to communicate frequently or openly
about vague safety concerns with the team leader. All else being equal, a higher team
leader role index therefore increases the likelihood that teams will fail to surface or
resolve problems. Thus
Risk cc Iteamleader (A.15)
In order to reduce the risk of poor communication organizations should therefore try to
minimize the number of team members who are isolated from the team leader. Additional
measures such as rotating the position of team leader or regular visits to each site by the
team leader may encourage more frequent and open communication about safety between
the team leader and other members.
Consider now the safety expert role index and its relation to safety. Similarly to the team
leader role index, the distance from safety expert(s) to other team members may also be
expected to affect their ability to enforce safety requirements. The distance effect may be
expected to be especially severe for safety experts when safety is perceived as a limiting
factor. In this case other team members are less likely to contact safety experts and may
use distance as a convenient excuse.
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Safety experts are often attached to more than one project, program, or system. They may
therefore be unavailable to a team because they are working with another team. The other
team members may be reluctant to wait on safety experts before making decisions, espe-
cially when time constraints are tight. In other words, the greater the unavailability of the
safety experts, the lower their ability to affect critical decisions.
The safety expert role index is therefore defined as the average distance to the safety
expert(s) divided by the proportion of team hours that the safety expert is available to the
team:
I =fetyexpe_ (dsafetyexpert -members) (A 16safetyexpert h ty expert/OWH
where hsafetyexpert is the number of hours the safety expert is available to the project each
day, and OWH is the number of overlapping work hours (see Equation A.12). A high
safety expert role index indicates that the safety expert is isolated from the rest of the team
and as a result may have only limited ability to identify safety issues or influence the
team's safety related decisions.
Therefore risk increases as the safety expert role index increases:
Risk oc Isafetyexpert (A.17)
Organizations can increase the ability of safety experts to identify safety issues and influ-
ence safety decisions by ensuring that the safety expert is not isolated from other team
members and is co-located with the bulk of the team.
Note that team and organization members' roles are often fluid, changing in both planned
and unplanned ways. In addition, the actual roles may differ from those indicated on for-
mal documents or even those indicated by team members. For example, one team member
may be formally designated as the team leader but another member may actually be lead-
ing the team on an informal basis. Some teams may also rotate the role of team leader.
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Any such analysis should therefore look into actual team member roles and how they
change over time.
A.6.2 Physical Proximity and Frequency of Communication
Physical proximity has a strong effect on frequency of technical communication, as shown
in Figure A.12 [Allen, 1997]. Interestingly, this effect applies to all types of communica-
tion, not only face-to-face meetings. People are more likely to use electronic and other
media to communicate with people they see frequently than with people they never see.
For example, a person might use e-mail to set up a meeting with someone. The plot has
two interesting features. First, the probability of communication declines sharply over the
first 50 metres of separation. Further separation has a much weaker effect on the probabil-
ity of communication. In other words, if people are to communicate frequently they
should be placed close together.
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Figure A.12 Probability of Communicationa
a. Adapted from [Allen, 1997].
Second, the probability of communication declines in a similar way for people in the same
department, and for people on the same project. The only difference is that the curve shifts
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upwards, with project teams showing a stronger effect. Therefore distance has an effect on
probability of communication even in highly interdependent groups such as project teams.
Lack of effective communication has an adverse effect on safety. For example, a new
steam propulsion plant on a navy ship that placed workers at isolated work stations, reduc-
ing personnel interactions and "all the subtle trading of operating information, building of
social ties, and confidence in partners that comes from interactions around an essentially
collective task" [Perrow, 1982]. Organizations should therefore attempt to situate people
who are working on the same project in a way that facilitates communication; [Allen,
1997] has some interesting architectural suggestions'. Of course simply putting people in
close proximity does not guarantee that they will communicate, as discussed in
Appendix B.
The rapid decline in the probability of communication over the first 50 m is probably due
primarily to the perceived inconvenience of initiating communication and the decline in
chance encounters as separation increases. However, people who are located at the same
facility can communicate face-to-face without much effort when the need arises. When
organizations are dispersed across multiple geographically distinct facilities two addi-
tional factors that limit the ease and quality of communication come into play. First, the
difficulty of initiating communication increases. For example, it is more difficult to
arrange telephone conversations, video conferences and so forth if facilities are situated in
different time zones (see Overlap Index).
Second, the quality of communication declines. Decisions about safety in complex sys-
tems often involve ambiguous or partial data. When communication bandwidth is low it is
more difficult to convey ambiguity or uncertainty effectively. Inappropriate decisions may
therefore be made. Distance forces the use of alternative ways of communication. Face-to-
1. Allen provides another perspective on the best way to physically situate employees. Because employees
who work in the same department or on the same project will communicate to some extent, employees
should be situated to promote chance encounters between employees who do not necessarily work
together. Such encounters may give rise to "inspiration" and the generation of new ideas.
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face communication generally offers the most 'richness'; this richness declines steadily as
face-to-face interactions are replaced by telephone conversations, written communica-
tions, memos and other formal documents, and numerical data [Weick, 1987]. Geographi-
cally distinct facilities also tend to develop distinct cultures that may preclude cooperation
(see Appendix B).
Geographically dispersed organizations must therefore actively encourage and enable fre-
quent communication. In a later study O'Leary and Cummings found that frequency of
communication between spatially separated team members increased over time [O'Leary
and Cummings, 2002]. It seems that teams learn to cope with the effects of physical sepa-
ration as time progresses. Organizations should therefore try to 'kick start' this learning,
for example by arranging frequent visits between facilities at the beginning of a project.
Rapidly building familiarity between team members may encourage more frequent com-
munication when they are physically separated (Figure A. 13). While video-conferencing
has not lived up to its initial promise, it is gradually becoming more attractive as the
underlying technology improves. Newer technologies such as virtual reality may further
improve communication across distance in the future.
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Figure A.13 Increasing the Probability of Communication
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A.6.3 Review of Geographic Dispersion Indexes
Table A.2 provides a summary of the geographic dispersion indexes, their implications for
safety, and the recommendations for reducing the potential negative effects on safety of
geographic dispersion.
A.7 Integration
Section A.1 argued that organizational risk factors can be partially attributed to the struc-
tural features of an organization. The previous three sections illustrated how organiza-
tional differentiation affects organizational risk. Numerous examples illustrated the need
for improved communication and coordination in order to reduce organizational risk. The
potential negative effects of organizational differentiation on safety can be counteracted to
some extent by organizational integration, which is a key mechanism for facilitating com-
munication, coordination and control across an organization. This section discusses orga-
nizational integration and its implications for safety.
Integration refers to the extent of structural mechanisms for facilitating communication,
coordination and control across the organization. Structural mechanisms include commit-
tees, system integrations functions, and information and decision support systems. Inte-
gration is necessary to ensure that communication occurs, and, in particular, to prevent
asynchronous evolution.
Initially safe systems or system designs may become unsafe as a result of asynchronous
evolution, where changes in one part of a system are not accompanied by the related nec-
essary changes in other parts [Leveson, 1995]. Asynchronous evolution may lead to
flawed system designs. For example, if a design team makes critical design changes in one
part of a system without informing other teams the resulting final design could be flawed.
Asynchronous evolution may also render initially safe designs unsafe when one or more
parts change without concomitant changes elsewhere. The Ariane 5 trajectory changed
from that of Ariane 4, but the inertial reference system software was not updated [Leveson
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TABLE A.2 Measures of Geographic Dispersion
Index Description Safety Implications Recommendations
Site Number of sites A larger number of sites Increase focus on com-
makes it more difficult to munication and coordina-
coordinate activities and tion to counteract
may exacerbate prob- negative effects of large
lems like diffraction of number of sites.
responsibility.
Isolation Percent of members alone When safety experts are See role index.
with no other team mem- isolated it is difficult for
bers at their site them to exert the neces-
sary influence to ensure
safety.
Separation Average distance from Decreased frequency and Actively encourage and
one member to the "aver- quality of communication enable frequent commu-
age" other member make it more likely that nication. E.g, improved
safety issues will not be video conferencing facili-
Overlap Actual shared work hours raised or resolved. ties. Try to 'kick-start'
among members divided team familiarity by
by the potential shared arranging extended occa-
hours if team were co- sions for face-to-face
located meetings early in project
life-cycle.
Team Average distance to team Members who are iso- Minimize isolation of
Leader leader lated from the team members from leader.
Role leader may be less likely E.g, use rotating team
to raise vague safety con- leaders, regular visits by
cerns to leader. team leader to remote
sites.
Safety Relative isolation of Difficult for isolated Safety experts should be
Expert safety expert safety experts to effec- co-located with as many
Role tively identify potential team members as possi-
safety issues or influence ble.
safety-related decisions.
et al., 2004b]. Ariane 5 subsequently self-destructed on its maiden launch after a larger
than expected variable value caused a memory overflow.
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Asynchronous evolution is more likely when organizations are not integrated because
changes in systems or system designs made by one part of the organization may not be
visible to other parts of the organization [Weick, 2004]. Thus tight coupling of technical
control and coordination is essential in organizations that operate complex high-risk sys-
tems. This requirement for tight coupling runs somewhat counter to the concept of organi-
zational slack [Schulman, 1993]. However, some aspects of slack may be beneficial to
safety, as discussed below in Section A.7.3.
Integrating different activities can encourage communication, as demonstrated in the dis-
cussion of project teams vs. departmental structures (see Section A.4). Physical proximity,
as discussed in the preceding section, is another form of integration: People who sit closer
together are more likely to communicate frequently [Allen, 2001]. For example, by plac-
ing outage planning activities in close physical proximity to control room activities a
nuclear plant encouraged smoother information flow and thus achieved more effective
outage management [Rollenhagen, 2000].
Organizational learning must also be integrated. Valuable lessons may be lost when differ-
ent departments do not share lessons learnt or inform each other of problems they have
encountered. One of the reasons many systems are impractical or difficult to use is that
designers do not always see the consequences of their decisions [Perrow, 1999b]. Encour-
aging interaction between designers, operators, and maintenance personnel may help to
surface issues. For example, workers in the maintenance problem may notice that some
parts need to be replaced more often than originally planned. Frequent parts failures may
be a sign that the part is being used in an inappropriate way.
Integration should not be confused with forcing employees to take on increasing responsi-
bilities. Integration activities should be designed in a way that enables employees to per-
form their primary tasks more effectively. Simply pushing more responsibilities onto
employees can have a negative effect when it requires them to attend to so many different
areas that they are unable to focus on their primary area of responsibility [Rollenhagen,
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2000]. Attempting to cut costs by requiring employees to take on responsibility for too
many additional areas is unlikely to deliver the benefits of integration. There needs to be a
balance and synergy between performing primary activities and interacting with other
groups or functional areas.
Organizations that operate systems that are tightly coupled, interactively complex, or have
high degrees of uncertainty require a higher degree of integration, as discussed in
Section A.9. Organizations that are more horizontally differentiated or spatially dispersed
also require a higher degree of integration to ensure that the necessary communication
occurs and that information is not lost in the gaps (see Section A.4.2). Thus:
Inecessaryo CxTxHxD (A.18)
where
Inecessary: Necessary Integration
C: Interactive Complexity
T: Coupling
H: Horizontal Differentiation
D : Spatial Dispersion
Organizations that are insufficiently integrated therefore expose themselves to the risk of
poor communication and coordination:
Risk o (Inecessary - actua) (A.19)
The next two sections focus on the problem of how the safety function should be inte-
grated into organizations. First, the placement of the safety function is considered, and
then the concept of safety information management is discussed. The last section reviews
the concept of organizational slack, and identifies the potential positive and negative
implications for safety.
305
A.7.1 Integration of Safety
The placement of the safety function has a strong effect on an organization's ability to
ensure safety. For example, following the Challenger accident a separate office of safety
and mission assurance (S&MA) was created. This structure was intended to preserve the
importance of safety as an integral part of system development. In reality however S&MA
was only weakly attached to projects. There are two main problems with having safety as
a separate, weakly connected group. First, it is often difficult to develop trust and coopera-
tion across group boundaries [Williams, 2001]. People tend to see people from other
groups as potential adversaries with conflicting goals (e.g., safety people stop shuttle
launches), beliefs, or ways of interacting. People have immediate and often unconscious
affective reactions to the group memberships of others. If safety is generally seen as a hin-
drance, then safety groups will be handicapped from the outset. People tend to trust mem-
bers of their own group more and perceive people from other groups as being less
trustworthy. But if another group is seen as helping the group (e.g., safety people prevent
costly accidents), this can generate feelings of trustworthiness about the other group.
Second, the combination of separation and weak attachment of the safety function can cre-
ate the impression that system safety is only an after-the-fact or auditing activity [Leveson
et al., 2004b]. Treating safety as an assurance activity increases the likelihood that safety
problems will become visible too late in the development process to have an impact on the
critical design decisions.
Because safety is a systems property, there must be a focused and coordinated safety func-
tion that spans the entire organization, with direct links to decision makers and decision
making so that the safety function can maintain legitimacy and influence [Leveson et al.,
2004b]. Safety personnel must work closely with the people who are responsible for mak-
ing decisions about system development or operation. Direct communication channels are
needed to most parts of the organization to obtain information from a wide variety of
sources in a timely manner without filtering [Leveson et al., 2004b]. Organizations that
develop or operate complex systems require frequent and close involvement of safety per-
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sonnel for three reasons. First, changes tend to occur more often in complex systems than
in simpler systems, thus requiring more frequent consideration of the possible safety
issues that arise from these changes. Second, complexity increases the likelihood that
problems such as dysfunctional interactions will arise. Third, complexity makes such
problems more difficult to resolve effectively. During system development, safety person-
nel should be involved frequently and during all stages of the development process. On
operational systems safety personnel must be brought in whenever changes to the system
are considered, as well as at regular intervals to determine whether any new problems
have arisen. Safety personnel therefore cannot be placed in a separate office from which
they are occasionally called in as consultants. They must be closely and permanently
attached to the relevant operations or development teams. External and independent safety
audits are also required in addition to internal safety personnel, as discussed in
Section A.8.2.
A.7.2 Safety Information Management
Safety information management includes activities to obtain, analyses, disseminate, and
act on information related to safety. The usefulness of safety information systems ulti-
mately relies on employees' willingness to raise issues. This willingness depends on two
factors. First, employees must feel that they will not be penalized for raising issues, and
that their concerns will be heard and taken into consideration. Second, the safety informa-
tion systems must be useful. For example, there must be routines for analyzing, storing,
and disseminating safety information; entering and extracting information must be easy;
and databases should be connected as widely as possible.
When safety information systems are not used, it is usually not because there are no prob-
lems to report. It is more likely that employees are unwilling to use the systems. They
might be reluctant to raise issues, or they might feel that management will not respond to
their concerns. The systems might not be user-friendly or databases might be so frag-
mented that finding information is impossible. An unfortunate dynamic may arise if
307
employees are under the impression that no-one else uses the system. In this case they may
feel that their contributions will not be useful and decide not to use the system. The result
of this dynamic is that no-one uses what could have been a useful system. One approach to
this problem is to encourage initial use of the system by 'seeding' it with past safety prob-
lems and by demonstrating management responsiveness to concerns. If employees find the
system useful in addressing their own concerns they may be more likely to enter new
problems as they arise.
An unused safety information system is a sign of increasing risk. When safety problems
are not reported they cannot be addressed nor can lessons be learnt from previous mis-
takes. Lacking information about safety issues, managers or engineers may make inappro-
priate decisions. Underlying cultural problems that discourage employees from using
these systems may also discourage employees from thinking about safety in other ways.
For example, if employees are discouraged from bringing up safety issues they may start
paying less attention to potential safety issues.
Organizations such as NASA that operate complex systems with high degrees of novelty
and uncertainty have a strong need for sophisticated and usable safety information sys-
tems. Yet numerous reports over the years have repeatedly criticized NASA's safety infor-
mation systems. The CAIB was highly critical of NASA's safety information system, and
implicated it directly in the accident [Gehman, 2003, pp. 188-189]:
"... The Shuttle's Thermal Protection System is on the Critical Item List, and an existing
hazard analysis and hazard report deals with debris strikes... Hazard Report #37 is ineffec-
tual as a decision aid, yet the Shuttle Program never challenged its validity at the pivotal
STS- 113 Flight Readiness Review."
There are many problems with the system, including the failure to collect accurate and
unfiltered data and inadequate methods for analyzing, summarizing, and presenting data
to decision makers [Leveson et al., 2004b]. While these problems persist NASA has little
hope of improving the safety of future missions.
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A.7.3 Organizational Slack
Organizational slack "provides for a margin of error between a lapse in one aspect of an
organization's performance and harmful consequences in every other" [Schulman, 1993,
p. 353] . Two common types of slack are resource slack and control slack. Resource slack
is a surplus in time, money, personnel and so forth which is not committed to ongoing
projects. While resource slack can be interpreted as under-utilization or evidence of poor
planning, it has clear benefits for safety. Safety often suffers when resources are tight. An
'emergency supply' of resources can provide management and workers with the necessary
margins to continue placing a high priority on safety.
Control slack is the existence of individual degrees of freedom that are not tightly con-
strained by formal rules and procedures. Like decentralization, control slack is viewed
positively as source of organizational flexibility and responsiveness (see Section A.9).
However control slack is not appropriate when it comes to safety. Allowing individuals
latitude with respect to decisions with potential adverse effects on safety is dangerous
because they may not be in a position to understand the impacts of their decisions, and
may not inform the appropriate parts of the organization of their decisions. Nor is the solu-
tion as simple as not allowing slack on safety decisions. In complex systems it may not be
immediately obvious that a decision has an impact on safety-further investigations may
be needed to determine all the potential impacts.
Schulman proposes a third type of slack, conceptual slack. Conceptual slack is "a diver-
gence in analytical perspectives among members of an organization over theories, models,
or causal assumptions pertaining to its technology or production processes" [Schulman,
1993, p. 364]. According to Schulman, conceptual slack can have a positive effect on
safety by fostering different perspectives and preventing blind adherence to any given
viewpoint.
1. Refer to Schulman's paper for a detailed discussion of slack and how a nuclear power plant used it to
achieve high reliability (i.e., few power outages).
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This concept is similar to Weick's discussion of "requisite variety" in personnel, in which
he argues that the law of requisite variety applies to an organization's members and the
systems the organization operates [Weick, 1987]. In both cases some clarification from an
engineering perspective may be useful. There is no such thing as "different analytical per-
spectives". Engineers are taught that all models, be they theories, simulations, or hand-
drawn sketches, are 'wrong'. Each model is only an approximation of certain aspects of a
system or phenomenon. Some models approximate some aspects better than others, but
they remain approximations. Unlike social systems, technical systems themselves are not
ambiguous, even though our understanding of the systems may be ambiguous. Schulman
and Weick are arguing that the impact of this ambiguity can be reduced by adding more
people with different viewpoints. But just because a viewpoint is different does not mean
it is better, or that it adds value. Some viewpoints may be very strongly held, and even
supported by 'evidence', but nevertheless wrong. The history of science provides numer-
ous examples of strongly held beliefs that were eventually proved wrong (e.g. the belief
that the earth is flat, which is still held by surprisingly many people). The answer to the
problem of ambiguity is not a "divergence in analytical perspectives" or "requisite vari-
ety". It lies in making active efforts to resolve ambiguity (e.g., conducting simulations and
tests) and in being open to the possibility that beliefs, even those which appear to have
stood the test of time may be wrong. Appendix B discusses the cultural aspects of encour-
aging dissenting viewpoints.
A.8 Formalization
Section A.1 argued that organizational risk factors can be partially attributed to the struc-
tural features of an organization. The previous sections have illustrated how organizational
complexity affects organizational risk. Numerous examples illustrated the need for
improved communication and coordination in order to reduce organizational risk. The pre-
ceding section illustrated the need for integration, and in particular the need for integration
of safety across the organization and throughout the system life-cycle. This section turns
to formalization and its complex relationship to organizational safety.
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Formalization is the degree to which jobs within an organization are standardized [Rob-
bins, 1992, p. 184]. Highly formalized organizations allow little freedom over how, when,
and by whom jobs are done. They have extensive rules and procedures and explicit job
descriptions. Hierarchies are strictly enforced. In organizations with low formalization
employees have more freedom to exercise discretion. In general formalization is more
useful when jobs are simple and repetitive. Excessive formalization may inhibit progress
in organizations that wish to emphasize innovation because formalization not only limits
the possibility of engaging in alternative behaviours, but also reduces the need for employ-
ees to consider alternatives [Robbins, 1992, p. 185].
Professionalism is often seen as the antithesis of formalization. Instead of using rules, pro-
cedures and so forth to control employee behaviour, organizations rely on the socialization
of employees through professional education. Thus, for example, an electrical engineer
has more freedom about the details of doing her job, but is guided by her education.
Organizations that operate complex technologies may require a high degree of formaliza-
tion in addition to professionalism in order to ensure safety. In such cases formalization is
used to ensure that safety procedures and other tasks are properly executed, departments
communicate properly, and that tasks that span departments are properly coordinated. For
example, regular meetings between different technical specialities encourages specialists
to consider interactions between system elements.
Formalization can also have an adverse effect on safety. Defining responsibilities nar-
rowly discourages employees from considering issues outside their area of responsibility.
As demonstrated by the Milstar accident (see Section A.4.2), accidents often occur
because of problems in the interfaces between subsystems. Formal hierarchies can dis-
courage employees from going around their superiors when they are unreceptive to com-
plaints. Blindly following incorrect or incomplete procedures can also have serious
consequences. For example, in its report on the Columbia accident the CAIB noted [Geh-
man, 2003, pp. 200-201] (emphasis added):
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NASA's culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasized chain of command, procedure,
following the rules, and going by the book. While rules and procedures were essentialfor
coordination, they had an unintended but negative effect. Allegiance to hierarchy and pro-
cedure had replaced deference to NASA engineers' technical expertise.
In both cases, engineers initially presented concerns as well as possible solutions - a
request for images, a recommendation to place temperature constraints on launch. Man-
agement did not listen to what their engineers were telling them. Instead, rules and proce-
dures took priority. For Columbia, program managers turned off the Kennedy engineers'
initial request for Department of Defense imagery, with apologies to Defense Department
representatives for not having followed "proper channels." In addition, NASA administra-
tors asked for and promised corrective action to prevent such a violation of protocol from
recurring. Debris Assessment Team analysts at Johnson were asked by managers to dem-
onstrate a "mandatory need" for their imagery request, but were not told how to do that.
Part of formalization should therefore include procedures for reporting problems with
rules and procedures. For example, the Diablo canyon nuclear plant has "formal proce-
dures for the drafting of procedures as well as separate procedures for altering procedures"
[Schulman, 1993, p. 362].
The effect of formalization on risk is therefore complex. On the one hand, procedures and
rules are needed to ensure that information is not lost and that tasks are carried through.
On the other hand, formal hierarchies and job definitions can limit employees' willingness
to identify problems and come forward with them. For example, NASA's engineering
change request (ECR) system can be used by anyone, even the most junior engineer. ECRs
are a way of ensuring that an issue gets addressed and can therefore improve safety. Once
an ECR has been entered it cannot be ignored and must be considered through the formal
chain of command. Because ECRs are taken so seriously, engineers may be discouraged
from using them when they are not completely sure of their data. Unfortunately, early
warnings of potential safety problems are often vague, they may be nothing more than a
'gut feel' that something is not right. Employees may be unable to get the hard data to sup-
port their hunches without management support. When this support is, or appears to be,
contingent on using formal procedures, employees may be discouraged from voicing
vague suspicions. Management should encourage employees to raise concerns, even if
they are vague (see Appendix B). For example, managers could support subordinates in
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generating ECRs, thus making the process less intimidating. Managers could also help
their subordinates to obtain more supporting data before beginning the ECR process.
The need for formalization may vary across an organization's departments and functions.
For example, research and development laboratories may perform better with a low degree
of formalization, while test and acceptance activities require a high degree of formaliza-
tion.
Communication, coordination, and control are usually easier in smaller organizations that
operate in relative isolation. In such organizations intimate knowledge of the systems and
of the organization can replace formal procedures and rules. Regardless of their size, orga-
nizations that have to interact with other organizations (e.g. subcontractors) require formal
procedures and rules to ensure that client organizations' needs are met. As the organiza-
tion becomes larger, there is less personal contact from shopfloor to executive office, and
informal communication is no longer sufficient. Formal systems are needed to ensure that
all the relevant information and control is passed up and down the hierarchy. Similarly,
when organizations experience rapid turnover, rules and procedures are necessary to
encode organizational knowledge
Formal channels, allocation of responsibility and definition of duties are essential but must
be coupled with a culture that encourages the sharing of concerns and consideration of
system aspects beyond employees immediate responsibilities (see Appendix B). Organiza-
tions should examine their rules and procedures as well as how they are perceived by
employees. When formalization hinders communication or cooperation the risk of safety
issues arising or not being resolved increases. In such cases redesign of rules and proce-
dures as well as cultural adjustments may be necessary.
Section A.8.1 discusses the problem of modification of procedures. Procedures will usu-
ally be modified from their initial form to better fit the complex requirements of the work
1. Rules and procedures can only encode part of an organization's knowledge. Much knowledge in an orga-
nization is tacit [Carroll, 1998b].
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environment. By taking an active interest in the process of modification organizations can
ensure that procedure modification does not have an adverse effect on safety. This section
concludes with a discussion of the need for external safety reviews.
A.8.1 Safe Modification of Procedures
Procedures that appear good on paper often require modification to be useful in practice.
When procedures are developed for new systems they are usually based on the 'paper'
design of the system, not the system as it actually operates. Procedures may therefore be
impractical, or they may not allow organizational goals to be reached because they are
excessively complicated or restrictive. In general procedures will be modified to fit with
practical requirements. For example, researchers have found that even in highly rational-
ized and programmed chemical refineries, experienced operators develop their own proce-
dures [De Jong and Koster, 1974]. When procedures are changed without careful
consideration of all the potential ramifications, safety may be adversely affected.
Modification of procedures may serve to develop skills, improve system comprehension,
and provide relief from tedium [Perrow, 1999b]. One study found that when chemical
plant operators begin their shifts they experiment with their plant and develop their own
preferences about how the plant should be run [West and Clark, 1974; Rasmussen, 1974].
Discouraging workers from changing procedures (in a concerted effort with management)
may lead to lower skill levels and system comprehension and increased tedium.
Management can respond to modification of procedures by workers in two fundamentally
different ways. They can lay down the law and insist that procedures be followed to the
letter, while tacitly accepting that procedures will be modified. While this option allows
management to shift blame to operators when accidents occur, it also means that manage-
ment becomes less aware of the true state of the system (because procedures will be mod-
ified despite management), and therefore less able to intervene correctly when problems
arise. A better option is to become actively involved in procedure modification. Operators
have insight into their parts of the system, but may not have the necessary insight into the
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whole system to properly adjust the system. By combining management knowledge of
system-wide issues with detailed operator insight into specific system aspects, procedures
can be modified in the most appropriate ways.
For example, at the North Anna Nuclear Plant foremen and their teams have the authority
to suspend operations if they find that they cannot operate without adjusting procedures
[Bourrier, 2003]. Then they report the problem and any thoughts they might have on solv-
ing it to top management at the daily security and nuclear safety operations committee.
The problem is considered by management and the foreman and decision is immediately
made, allowing work to continue.
This example illustrates three necessary conditions for successful and participative modi-
fication of procedures. First, top management is available to foremen on a daily basis. At
North Anna, meetings can also be convened at night during outages. Second, top manage-
ment is open to suggestions from foremen. In other words, there is a feedback link from
lower to higher levels. Third, management provides quick resolution of the problem. Not
meeting these three conditions increases the likelihood that lower-level workers will try
and manage with ad hoc, unreported adjustments to procedures. The system therefore
becomes different from that assumed by the management, and only major problems
become visible at the management level. Underlying problems are more easily resolved
when they are identified early.
A.8.2 External Safety Reviews
A combination of internal safety processes and external safety reviews is essential to
assure safety. Such a combination allows organizations to reap the benefits of intimate
knowledge gained through close involvement as well as the benefits of a fresh and unbi-
ased perspective, unclouded by extended close involvement.
For example, the United States Navy uses a project-independent board (Weapons System
Explosives Safety Review Board) and an affiliated Software Systems Safety Technical
315
Review Board for external reviews [Leveson et al., 2004b]. The boards assure the incorpo-
ration of explosives safety criteria in all weapon systems by reviews conducted throughout
the life cycle. Similarly, a Navy Safety Study Group is responsible for the study and eval-
uation of all Navy nuclear weapon systems.
Regulators have to walk a fine line between being sufficiently involved with an organiza-
tion to understand how it works, and being sufficiently removed to maintain independence
and objectivity. When a regulator becomes too close to an organization the regulator may
not be able to make appropriate objective suggestions, or to censure the organization when
necessary. Conversely, when a regulator is too far removed from an organization it does
not have enough insight into the organization to make appropriate suggestions. The inter-
ested reader is referred to the extensive literature on regulators and the industries they
attempt to regulate (see, for example, [HSC, 1993]).
A.9 Centralization and Decentralization
Section A.1 argued that organizational risk factors can be partially attributed to the struc-
tural features of an organization. The previous sections have illustrated how organizational
complexity and formalization affect organizational risk. This section turns to the final
high-level characteristic of organizational structure, the degree of centralization or decen-
talization. A substantial literature argues that decentralization improves safety, this
research argues that centralization may be essential for safety in complex systems. This
section reviews the concepts of centralization and decentralization and their impact on
organizational safety. Next, the characteristics of the systems an organization develops or
operates are related to the need for centralization.
Centralization is the degree to which formal decision-making is concentrated in high-level
individuals or organizational units, thus allowing lower level employees only minimal dis-
cretion in decisions affecting the organization. In contrast, decentralized organizations
allow lower level employees to make some decisions that affect the entire organization
directly. In this discussion the focus is on technical decisions about the system(s) an orga-
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nization operates. Whether or not centralization is appropriate for decisions about strategy,
policy, and so forth is not considered here. From a safety viewpoint the question of
whether centralization or decentralization is appropriate is contentious, as indicated in the
discussion on High Reliability Organizations (see Chapter 3 for an extensive discussion).
Centralization limits decision-making about critical issues to employees who have a larger
view of the system and should therefore be able better to assess the impact of decisions. In
tightly coupled or interactively complex systems such insight is essential. Decentralization
is useful when decisions have to be made quickly, increases employee involvement and
hence commitment, and allows experiential training of lower level managers.
Whether centralization or decentralization is more appropriate depends on the type of
technology that an organization operates. Centralization is essential in tightly coupled or
interactively complex systems, or in systems with high degrees of uncertainty. Organiza-
tions that are excessively decentralized relative to the coupling and interactive complexity
of the technologies they operate place themselves at risk of accidents. Lower level
employees may not be aware of the possibly undesired effects their decisions may have
elsewhere in the system. Decentralized responses to problems tend to focus on eliminating
the locally visible symptoms of problems and do not include assessing or addressing the
underlying problems, which may be causing problems elsewhere in the system. More
senior personnel "tend to have a broader perspective than line workers, possess status nec-
essary to resolve problems that cross organizational boundaries, and are capable of imple-
menting solutions on a wider basis" [Tucker and Edmondson, 2003]. In situations where
decisions must be made quickly by lower level employees, the possible negative impact
on the entire system can be limited by allowing lower level employees to make decisions
only in the direction of lower risk. For example, low-level seamen on aircraft carriers can
instantly abort landings, but they cannot order take-offs [La Porte and Consolini, 1991].
The benefits of insights from lower level employees can be retained by maintaining close
contact with lower level employees who have knowledge of specific system aspects.
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Conventional managerial wisdom states that when the business environment is highly
uncertain decentralization is necessary in order to ensure flexibility of responses in the
face of unexpected events. The contrary is true however in the case of safety. Here, uncer-
tainty increases the need for centralization because locally sensible actions may have
undesired effects elsewhere in the system.
Systems that are neither interactively complex nor tightly coupled have a lower need for
centralization. In such systems decentralization may provide other benefits, such as
increased responsiveness.
To summarize, this section and the preceding sections have argued that the need for inte-
gration (Section A.7), formalization (Section A.8), and centralization (Section A.9),
increases as systems become more interactively complex, more tightly coupled, or as
uncertainty increases, as illustrated in Figure A. 14. The figure reads as follows: The axes
represent the degree of coupling and interactive complexity. The size of the uncertainty
associated with the system and its underlying technologies is represented by the size of the
circles in each quadrant. Thus, for example, systems that are tightly coupled, have a high
degree of interactive complexity, and a high degree of uncertainty, have a high need for
centralization, formalization, and integration, as indicated by the 'H' in the large circle in
the upper right quadrant.
Organizations that are excessively decentralized, or insufficiently formalized or integrated
for their technology type expose themselves to unnecessary risk. By determining what
type of technology they operate organizations can select the appropriate structural charac-
teristics.
A.10 Employees
The discussion in the preceding sections has identified the relation between the structural
characteristics of an organization and organizational risk. Consider now the relationships
between an organization's employee base and the organization's ability to develop or
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Figure A.14 Need for Centralization, Formalization and Integration
operate systems safely. This section begins with a discussion of how a lack of appropriate
skills, understaffing, and inexperience can be detrimental to safety. Some incentives and
performance metrics, such as those focussed on production, may encourage unsafe behav-
iour. The problem of appropriately designing incentives and performance metrics from the
safety viewpoint is discussed in Section A.10.2.
Safety requirements often appear to curtail performance, force development delays or
increase costs. In many instances such detrimental effects of safety requirements can be
reduced by addressing safety from the beginning of system development, as discussed in
Chapter 5. But because safety is frequently seen as a 'brake' on development or operation,
special safeguards are needed to ensure that safety is considered from the beginning and
throughout system development. Safety personnel need to have the authority and
resources to ensure that they are included in all relevant processes and decisions. The
placement of safety personnel in the organizational hierarchy, both in terms of who they
work with, and who they work for, is therefore critical. Section A.10.3 illustrates the
importance of appropriate system safety expertise and Section A. 10.4 illustrates the
importance of providing safety personnel with sufficient funding.
H H
M H
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A.10.1 Employee Base Characteristics and Organizational Risk
In order to safely achieve their strategic goals, organizations require employees who are
specialized in the appropriate technical areas, and also employees who have specific sys-
tem safety skills, as discussed in Section A.10.3. If the technical requirements of the
projects in which an organization is engaged stretch the skill and experience levels of its
employees, employees may be more likely to make technical errors. In addition, insuffi-
cient experience of and insight into a technology or system may limit employees' ability
to spot potential safety problems.
Closely linked to the requirement for the appropriate technical skills are the requirements
that these skills be present in sufficient numbers and in the appropriate combinations. If an
organization does not have enough people, safety may be one of the first areas to be
affected. Too few employees trying to do too much work means that corners must be cut.
Because the effects of cutting corners on safety procedures are often not visible immedi-
ately, the temptation for overworked and stressed employees to cut safety corners is
strong. Having an insufficient numbers of employees also increases the likelihood that
employees will have to perform tasks with which they are not familiar, or that are beyond
their area of expertise, as discussed above. They are therefore more likely to make techni-
cal mistakes or miss potential warning signals about safety issues.
In addition to recruiting the appropriate people organizations must ensure that they are
motivated and remain committed to safety goals. One study found that employees who
report high perceptions of job insecurity exhibit decreased safety motivation and compli-
ance, which in turn are related to higher levels of workplace injuries and accidents [Probst
and Brubaker, 2001].
Because safety is an emergent property, ensuring safety requires in-depth insight into tech-
nical systems. When organizations do not employ the right mix of personnel (e.g, scien-
tists, engineers, technicians, craftsmen and administrative personnel) obtaining and
maintaining this insight may be difficult. In 1958 44.2 per cent of NASA employees were
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classified as 'trade and craft' and 33.7 per cent were scientists and engineers [McCurdy,
1993, p. 137]. The high proportion of craftsmen allowed NASA to perform much techni-
cal work in-house and therefore gave the agency a high degree of familiarity with the sys-
tems it was building. Following cycles of decline and growth, by 1991 NASA had only 3.1
per cent employees classified as 'trade and craft'. Meanwhile, the percentage of scientists
and engineers had grown to 56.1 per cent. NASA has lost most of its in-house technical
capability and most technical work is now contracted out. The scientists and engineers
spend most of their time managing contractors instead of doing technical work. The loss
of in-house technical ability limits NASA's ability to perform in-house tests and experi-
ments and therefore reduces NASA's insight into the systems it operates. Relying on con-
tractors, who are ultimately driven by their own survival concerns, for such insight
increases the risk that safety issues will not be identified or resolved (see Section 4.3.2,
Contracting the Culture Away).
Organizations that are unable to recruit or retain people with the necessary skills or that
are making personnel cutbacks must either scale back their goals or find some way of
sharing the burden, such as engaging subcontractors or collaborating with industry part-
ners. Scaling goals back may be difficult to do, especially when the workforce is dedicated
and willing to work long hours. People are not good at recognizing when their abilities are
reduced by fatigue, as indicated by the tendency for people to fall asleep while driving.
Note also that subcontracting or partnerships can also introduce a new set of problems, as
indicated by NASA's experiences (see Section 4.3.2).
Another aspect of the right mix of people is the right mix of experience and inexperience.
New employees bring in new knowledge and fresh ideas, while older employees possess
tacit knowledge that is not easily accessed or transferred. Employees who share a long his-
tory and trust each other may share information more easily [Pate-Cornell and Murphy,
1996]. For example, it may be easier for an employee with vague concerns about safety to
go to a trusted colleague than to someone unfamiliar. When personnel turnover is high or
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when a large part of an organization goes into retirement at the same time, tacit knowledge
and informal communication channels are lost.
System expertise and experience are particularly important for system safety. An appreci-
ation for and understanding of complex system-level interdependencies usually comes
only with experience. Although engineering education at both the college and graduate
level is placing an increasing emphasis on systemic issues, it is not yet clear how effective
education without experience is in developing insight into these issues. On complex sys-
tems such as the space shuttle, there may be no way to gain the necessary deep knowledge
of the system other than through experience.
Following two decades of limited hiring NASA, is facing a 'demographic cliff' with about
one third of its employees scheduled to retire within the next couple of years. While recent
hiring efforts have boosted the number of newly-minted engineers, there is a huge gap
between older, retiring engineers, and younger, inexperienced engineers. It will be diffi-
cult to recreate the lost tacit knowledge and experience.
Organizations should therefore attempt to maintain a smooth gradient of inexperienced to
experienced employees. They can do this by replacing 'hiring and firing cycles' where
large numbers of employees are hired or fired at the same time with a policy of personnel
retention even in hard times and continuous 'smooth' recruitment. Such a policy may be
difficult in highly volatile political or business environments but offers benefits beyond
improved ability to ensure safety.
Table A.3 summarizes the safety implications of insufficient technical skill levels, inap-
propriate combinations of employee types, and insufficient numbers of experienced per-
sonnel.
A.10.2 Design of Incentives and Performance Metrics
Employee incentives and performance metrics have a significant effect on safety. Claims
by management that safety is important are often belied by performance metrics and
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TABLE A.3 Safety Implications of Employee Base Characteristics
Employee Base Safety Implication Recommendation
Characteristic
Insufficient technical skills Increased likelihood of tech- Technical project require-
nical mistakes. ments should be matched to
Decreased ability to identify the technical skills of employ-
potential safety issues. ees. Bring new skills into the
organization by training exist-
ing employees or hiring new
employees. In particular,
make sure there are sufficient
numbers of employees with
system safety expertise.
Inappropriate mix of Decreased ability to obtain Carefully consider the effects
employee types. E.g, many and maintain insight into sys- of successive workforce
administrators, few technical tems. Reduced insight limits reductions and increases on
personnel. ability to identify and resolve the composition of the work-
safety issues. force.
Insufficient experienced Experience is often the only Hiring practices that empha-
employees way to gain the insight into size continuous smooth
systems that is required to recruitment, thus ensuring
ensure and maintain safety. that there is a smooth gradient
of experience in the organiza-
tion.
incentives that focus on productivity. Employees generally attempt to match their behav-
iour to performance metrics and incentives, and try to avoid behaviours that are explicitly
forbidden [Pate-Cornell and Murphy, 1996]. There is often a large grey area of unsafe
behaviour that is not explicitly prohibited. When managers push for or reward productiv-
ity and disregard safety concerns, they are implicitly giving employees permission to
engage in such unsafe behaviour. Penalizing employees for such behaviour when incidents
or accidents do occur fails to recognize the true source of the problem.
Incentive schemes and performance metrics can easily discourage consideration of safety
if they are not carefully designed. For example, bonus schemes that reward productivity
are an incentive to work faster, and may therefore discourage consideration of safety
[Sawacha et al., 1999]. Collective bonus schemes can lead to workers not reporting inci-
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dents or accidents to avoid losing the group its bonus. For example, shutting down a pro-
duction line to do maintenance may have long-term benefits, but when employees are
rewarded for daily production numbers there is little incentive to report problems.
Employees who are eligible for hazard pay have been found to be at greater risk of having
accidents. Hazard pay may be seen as an inducement to take risks [Sawacha et al., 1999].
Even well-intentioned incentives may have adverse effects on safety. For example, a
scheme to improve safety by rewarding workers with the fewest reported incidents had the
opposite effect when workers hid incidents to improve their records (see Chapter 4).
When designing incentives or performance metrics managers should carefully consider
whether they are encouraging or discouraging consideration of safety. For example,
because safety may only be observable in the long term, rewarding all employees at the
end of a year without accidents may encourage consistent concern for safety. Informal
rewards such as social approval are often just as important as formal ones [Pate-Cornell
and Murphy, 1996]. Creating a culture in which unsafe or risky behaviour is frowned is an
important part of encouraging safe behaviour, as discussed in Appendix B.
The impact of incentives on managerial behaviour is considered less frequently with
respect to safety. Ultimately the treatment of risk by organizations is driven by top man-
agement. Careful consideration must therefore be paid to reward schemes for manage-
ment. If top management is rewarded for productivity, and penalized for lower
performance, delays, and so forth, they are unlikely to consider safety until forced to do so
by circumstances such as accidents or regulatory requirements. By appointing an accoun-
tant from the GAO (Sean O'Keefe) to head NASA in 2001, the president sent a strong
message that fiscal discipline at NASA was more important than other concerns.
Another, more subtle, driver of poor safety compliance is lack of accountability. For
example, the maintenance problems associated with high-performance military aircraft or
the unreliability of a new rifle can be partially attributed to a lack of individual account-
ability [Perrow, 1999b]. It is understandable that those in charge of setting specifications
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are more tempted by speed, power and manoeuvrability than by more prosaic concerns
such as safety, reliability and maintainability. By the time the system comes into operation
those who set the original specifications may have moved on, or in the case of the military
they will probably have been rotated to a new position at frequent intervals, thus absolving
them of accountability. If not, they can always point to the new system under develop-
ment, the one that is even faster, even more powerful, and even more manoeuvrable.
A.10.3 System Safety Expertise
In order to ensure safety organizations that operate complex technologies require people
with system safety expertise. System safety is different from reliability engineering or
quality assurance. As discussed in Chapter 1, safety and reliability are different system
properties. While some approaches are effective in improving both safety and reliability,
reliability engineering does not fully address safety. Similarly, safety and quality are also
different properties. Quality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for safety. A
system may be developed with strict adherence to quality control processes, and it may be
composed of high-quality components, but it is not necessarily safe. System accidents can
occur despite all components functioning exactly as required. Quality assurance tends to
have a greater positive effect on system reliability than on safety.
One significant problem with attracting talented people to safety is that safety has a low
status in many organizations. For example, investigations into both the Challenger and
Columbia accidents revealed that safety engineers were either not invited to be part of the
critical decision making groups and meetings or they were silent and non-influential
attendees who knew they would not be heard even if they did speak up. Safety assurance
groups in NASA have been marginalized and do not have the prestige necessary to influ-
ence decision making. In its report into the Columbia accident the CAIB noted that [Geh-
man, 2003, p. 181]:
"Safety and mission assurance personnel have been eliminated, careers in safety have lost
organizational prestige, and the Program now decides on its own how much safety and
engineering oversight it needs."
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Effectively performing system safety tasks requires close and trusting involvement
between safety experts and project teams. Limited contact decreases the ability of safety
personnel to make meaningful safety assessments and contributions. For example, when
safety problems are identified early in the development process it is usually easier to alter
designs to improve safety. When there are too few safety experts, they are unable to spend
sufficient time on each project to monitor safety effectively or suggest timely design
changes where necessary. In addition, when safety experts are infrequent 'visitors' they
are more likely to be perceived as 'brakes' to progress than as partners in identifying an
resolving issues expediently. Project engineers are also less likely to be open with safety
experts that they see infrequently, thus limiting the ability to surface and resolve safety
problems. Safety experts should be present whenever critical design decisions are made
during development of a system, and they should also be consulted whenever design
changes are considered for operational systems.
A.10.4 Funding of Safety Personnel
Close involvement of safety personnel with project or operations teams is essential, but
careful consideration of the source of safety personnel funding is also needed. Ideally,
project or operations divisions should understand the importance of safety and look on the
contribution of safety personnel as essential to success. In such cases safety personnel
would be funded through the project team, much as any other specialists would be. In real-
ity though safety personnel are often disrespected, sidelined, and ignored. Cultural
changes may increase the status of safety personnel and elevate the importance of safety
(see Appendix B) but consistently placing safety first is difficult in the face of other pres-
sures (see Chapter 4). Organizations should therefore expect that there will always be
some degree of conflict between safety and other personnel. Placing safety personnel in a
position of dependence on divisions they may have to criticize creates a conflict between
individual survival concerns and safety concerns. Requiring divisions to pay for safety
personnel who may be perceived to be "holding them back" may exacerbate negative feel-
ings towards them, especially when budgets and schedules are tight. Safety experts may
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be more easily 'co-opted' into rubber stamping safety requirements if they receive funding
from the division for which they are supposed to provide safety expertise. Further, when
division managers must decide between funding safety personnel and other functions (e.g.
fluid dynamics modelling) that are directly linked to meeting performance, cost, and
schedule requirements, it is unlikely that they will choose safety. Safety personnel should
therefore in general be funded externally from the divisions with which they work.
In its report on the Columbia accident, the CAIB noted that project and program managers
were given discretion over safety efforts, but that safety personnel did not have the neces-
sary independence to be effective in monitoring and maintaining safety [Gehman, 2003,
p. 185] (emphasis added):
"NASA's current philosophy for safety and mission assurance calls for centralized policy
and oversight at Headquarters and decentralized execution of safety programs at the enter-
prise, program, and project levels... Safety is the responsibility of program and project
managers. Managers are subsequently given flexibility to organize safety efforts as they
see fit... Signals of potential danger, anomalies, and critical information should, in princi-
ple, surface in the hazard identification process and be tracked with risk assessments sup-
ported by engineering analyses. In reality, such a process demands a more independent
status than NASA has ever been willing to give its safety organizations."
The level of resources (e.g., administrative support, space, and funds) available to safety
personnel affects not only their ability to perform their technical duties (e.g., tests and
experiments) but also their standing and hence their ability to wield influence in the orga-
nization. Personnel that have few resources tend to have lower standing. For example, the
CAIB report notes that [Gehman, 2003, p. 187]:
"Given that the entire Safety and Mission Assurance organization depends on the Shuttle
Program for resources and simultaneously lacks the independent ability to conduct
detailed analyses, cost and schedule pressures can easily and unintentionally influence
safety deliberations. Structure and process places Shuttle safety programs in the unenvi-
able position of having to choose between rubber-stamping engineering analyses, techni-
cal efforts, and Shuttle program decisions, or trying to carry the day during a committee
meeting in which the other side almost always has more information and analytic capabil-
ity."
Organizations can improve the ability of safety personnel to influence decisions by
increasing their fixed resources (e.g., budgets and personnel), as well as their discretionary
resources. Fixed resources such as budgets and personnel are important for group influ-
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ence, but access to discretionary resources (e.g. supplementary funds and temporary per-
sonnel), even if small, may have a more significant effect in maintaining and raising group
status [Perrow, 1999b].
A.11 Summary
This appendix has used a framework based on two related views of an organization, struc-
tural and cultural, to analyze organizational risk factors. The approach is illustrated using
two organizational factors that are frequently identified in accidents, low status and influ-
ence of safety, and poor communication and coordination. This appendix has illustrated
how the structural characteristics of an organization contribute to risk. Several metrics
relating structural features to risk were introduced, and sets of structural factors contribut-
ing to low status and influence of safety and to poor communication and coordination
were identified. The results are summarized in Figure A.6 and Figure A.7.
The next appendix continues the analysis by identifying cultural aspects that increase
organizational risk and, specifically, contribute to low status and influence of safety and to
poor communication and coordination.
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Appendix B
SAFETY CULTURE
She came, after all, not in utter nakedness but cocooned by culture in a web of amatory,
social, and tribal expectations that was not even coherent and unitary.
A.S. Byatt, Still Life, 1985
This appendix continues the analysis of organizational risk begun in Appendix B by inves-
tigating the concept of safety culture and how it relates to the ability of organizations to
operate in a safe manner.
B.1 Origins and Definitions of Safety Culture
Zohar introduced the concept of safety climate' in 1980 [Zohar, 1980]. He noted that orga-
nizational climate has many aspects, such as motivational climate, individual differences
climate, and creativity climate, and proposed that organizations would therefore also have
'safety climates', which could be seen as a summary of employees' molar2 perceptions
about safety in their organization. By comparing high accident rate organizations to those
with low accident rates he identified the following characteristics of a positive safety cli-
mate:
1. Safety climate is generally seen as a 'snapshot' in time of employee safety attitudes. Refer to [Denison,
1996] for an extensive discussion of the differences between organizational culture and organizational
climate.
2. Designating a large-scale unit of behaviour, especially an integrated set of responses serving to bring
about a common goal, as distinguished from an elementary unit of behaviour such as a physiological
response. OED.
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- Top management commitment to safety;
- Safety personnel given high status to reflect importance of safety;
- Emphasis on continuous safety training;
- Open communication links and frequent contact between workers and man-
agement;
- General environmental control and good housekeeping;
- Stable workforce with low turnover and older workers; and
- Distinctive ways of promoting safety. E.g. guidance and counselling, rather
than enforcement and admonition. Individual praise for safe performance,
and enlisting workers' families in safety promotions.
In the 1980's, organizational behaviour scholars placed renewed emphasis on the concept
of culture when it became clear that organizational performance could not be understood
or predicted solely on the basis of tangible organizational attributes like structure (see, for
example, [Deal and Kennedy, 1982]). They noted that organizations had their own specific
cultures, influenced by, but not entirely dependent on, that of the societies in which they
were embedded. Organizational culture is shaped both by the culture of the society in
which the organization finds itself, and by the structure, goals, and experiences of the
organization itself. New employees in an organization bring with them assumptions about
what behaviour works and what does not, based on their social culture and previous orga-
nizational experiences. These assumptions are modified and added to as new and old
employees share knowledge and experiences. As the organization ages, employees
develop coherent shared sets of assumptions regarding behaviour-outcome contingencies,
and behave accordingly. These shared assumptions form the basis of an organization's cul-
ture.
The research of the past two decades has shown that organizational culture is a strong
driver of organizational behaviour. The organizational and social environments in which
decision makers find themselves determine what consequences they will anticipate, what
consequences they will not, what alternatives they will consider, and what alternatives
they will ignore [March and Simon, 1993, p. 160]. To understand an organization or pre-
dict the future behaviour of an organization an appreciation of the organization's culture is
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necessary. In writing about the history of NASA McCurdy notes that [McCurdy, 1993,
pp.4-5]:
"Organizational cultures serve many functions. They guide employee behaviour. They
shape official decisions. When deeply held, cultural norms influence behaviour and deci-
sions in ways that official procedures rarely approximate. As such, an understanding of
cultural norms becomes indispensable for predicting the reaction of employees to a new
policy or changing situation... Such insights are more useful for understanding the behav-
iour of people inside organizations than is knowledge about formal structure, official poli-
cies, or the objectives the organizational structure consciously pursues. Executives who
seek to change the direction of organizations ignore culture at their own peril... Organiza-
tional culture is a powerful means for predicting how members behave. Strong cultures
help to unify organizations that might otherwise fall apart. Cultural norms lend them a
greater degree of cohesion than organizational politics would otherwise allow."
Cultures evolve through a process of problem-solving and learning among groups of peo-
ple with similar problems and goals. In order to survive, a groupi must maintain internal
organization, and find ways of dealing with external changes. In dealing with these inter-
nal and external challenges, the group finds that certain approaches work, and others do
not. Overt behaviour is "determined both by the cultural predisposition (the perceptions,
thoughts, and feelings that are patterned) and by the situational contingencies that arise
from the immediate external environment" [Schein, 1992, p. 14]. Culture is the set of
shared assumptions about what works and what does not that groups evolve in response to
these challenges [Schein, 1992, p. 12]:
"A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of
external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think,
and feel in relation to these problems."
This definition of culture is a useful starting point for the analysis of safety culture.
Numerous other definitions exist. Refer to [Martin, 2002] for a review and critique of sev-
eral different approaches to defining culture.
The concept of safety culture came to the foreground following the Chernobyl accident in
1986, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified the 'human ele-
ment' as the root cause of the accident:
1. Here 'group' refers to social units of all sizes, including organizations and subunits of organizations.
332
"The root cause of the Chernobyl accident, it is concluded, is to be found in the so-called
human element... The lessons drawn from the Chernobyl accident are valuable for all reac-
tor types." IAEA Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Cherno-
byl Accident (INSAG-1, 1986, p. 76).
The investigation into the accident used the concept of safety culture to address issues
such as management quality, productivity/safety trade-offs, and professionalism, that
affect safety but had not been formally dealt with before [Abramovici, 1998].
A later update of the IAEA's findings further emphasized the importance of safety culture
[IAEA INSAG-7, 1992]:
"The [Chernobyl] accident can be said to have flowed from deficient safety culture, not
only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet design, operating and regulatory
organizations for nuclear power that existed at the time... Safety culture... requires total
dedication, which at nuclear power plants is primarily generated by the attitudes of man-
agers of organizations involved in their development and operation."
Following Chernobyl, numerous accident investigations have found that although the
safety management structure of the organization concerned was in place and apparently
adequate, accidents nevertheless happened. The investigations point the finger at deficient
safety cultures, which rendered the safety management policies and procedures ineffec-
tive. For example, in its report on the Columbia accident the CAIB highlighted the contri-
bution of culture to the accident [Gehman, 2003, p. 177]:
"The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space Shuttle Program's his-
tory and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval
for the Shuttle Program, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities,
schedule pressures, mischaracterizations of the Shuttle as operational rather than develop-
mental, and lack of an agreed national vision. Cultural traits and organizational practices
detrimental to safety and reliability were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past
success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why
systems were not performing in accordance with requirements/specifications); organiza-
tional barriers which prevented effective communication of critical safety information and
stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program
elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making pro-
cesses that operated outside the organization's rules."
While safety culture can strictly speaking be good or bad, it is commonly referred to in the
positive sense, that is, the presence of safety culture is good, while the absence of safety
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culture is bad. Thus, definitions of safety culture in the literature tend to be prescriptive
definitions of good, or positive, safety culture, as illustrated by the next two examples.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [JAEA BSS-115, 1996, p. 354]:
Safety culture is the "assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and indi-
viduals that, as an overriding priority, nuclear power plant safety issues receive the atten-
tion warranted by their significance."
The British Health and Safety Commission (BHSE) [HSC, 1993]:
Safety culture is "the product of the individual and group values, attitudes, competencies
and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency
of, an organization's health and safety programmes. Organizations with a positive safety
culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared percep-
tions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventative mea-
sures."
A review of the literature reveals an abundance of similar definitions. The following defi-
nition is unusual because it goes beyond a reliance on technical discipline to explicitly
take the dynamics and systemic nature of organizations into account [O'Hara, 2004]:
Safety culture is "an amalgamation of collective behaviors and engineered work pro-
cesses, that recognize the dynamic and systemic relationships between workers and their
environment, which seek to reduce the risks of operational error and uncertainty through a
shared-mindset that drives an emphasis on inclusion, participation, and forward-thinking
of all members in the organization... Safety culture is a state of organizational maturity,
which relies on static engineered values and constraints to drive organizational behavior
and work processes."
This thesis views safety culture as a construct used to focus on those aspects of organiza-
tional culture that have an impact on safety. Safety culture overlaps with and is influenced
by various industrial (e.g., production, maintenance) and societal cultures (e.g., different
national cultures may have an effect on people's attitudes to safety). Attempting to draw a
sharp distinction between safety culture and other aspects of organizational culture is both
impossible and also risks obscuring the dependencies between aspects of organizational
culture conducive to safety, production, innovation and so forth (see, for example [Apos-
tolakis and Wu, 1995]). Safety culture can therefore only be understood in the context of
the broader cultures in which it is embedded. Further, as shown in Chapter 5, safety cul-
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ture is influenced by and influences ostensibly 'non-cultural' aspects of the organization,
such as structure.
Approaches to Understanding Organizational Culture. Studies of organizational cul-
ture can be grouped into two broad areas based on the academic areas from which they
originated. The socio-anthropological perspective arose from anthropology and focusses
on the underlying structure of symbols (including language, architecture and artefacts),
myths, ideational systems, and ritual [Meek, 1988]. This perspective views culture as an
emergent property, which is deeply rooted in an organization's history and difficult, if not
impossible, to manipulate directly.
The organizational psychology perspective takes a more optimistic view that culture can
be manipulated to achieve strategic goals. Similarly to the socio-anthropological perspec-
tive, this perspective views culture as the assumptions that group members come to share
through shared experience [Schein, 1992]. Here the focus is on the relationship between
organizational culture and behaviour, and how culture might be manipulated to meet stra-
tegic goals.
Within the organizational studies literature there are three main approaches to studying
culture: integration, differentiation, and fragmentation [Martin, 2002]. Each view results
in methodological choices that affect what results will be found. The integration perspec-
tive implicitly or explicitly assumes that "a culture is characterized by consistency, organi-
zation-wide consensus, and clarity" [Martin, in press]. This perspective underlies the
many definitions of safety culture as a set of safety values and beliefs that are shared
across the organization. Also arising from this perspective is the view of culture as some-
thing that management can create, measure and manipulate in order to enhance organiza-
tional effectiveness [Meek, 1988]. In this view, culture is created or changed by
management articulating the desired values, reinforcing these values by selectively hiring
employees with similar priorities, and by attempting to socialize new employees thor-
oughly [Martin, in press].
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However organizations are rarely characterized by a single, homogenous culture and man-
agerial attempts to manipulate culture are often unsuccessful. The differentiation perspec-
tive on culture sees organizations as "composed of overlapping, nested subcultures that
coexist in relationships of intergroup harmony, conflict, or indifference" [Martin, in
press]. Subcultures tend to evolve along lines of functional, occupational and hierarchical
differentiation. For example, the cultures of maintenance, operating, and safety depart-
ments are very different [Rollenhagen, 2000]. A study of Danish manufacturing identified
three different safety cultures across organizations [Richter and Koch, 2004]. The 'pro-
duction' safety subculture held apparently contradictory views that risk was acceptable
and that workers were not at risk. The 'welfare' safety subculture saw risk as unacceptable
and took a proactive approach to managing it. The 'master' subculture also saw risk as
unacceptable but took a reactive approach to managing it. Therefore organizations should
be expected to have several different safety subcultures, whose characteristics are partially
determined by the operating context and experience of each workgroup. Any evaluation of
an organization's safety culture should therefore begin by recognizing that there may be
several safety cultures. Determining how and why these subcultures differ may provide
useful insight into an organization's ability to manage risk. For example, top management
may claim that safety is paramount, but workers on the shopfloor may feel that such man-
agement claims are belied by an emphasis on production. Some subcultures may be enthu-
siastic supporters of managerial views and initiatives while others may actively resist
cooperation with other groups or with management. More integrated and less differenti-
ated (see Chapter 5) organizations may be less prone to the development of highly individ-
ualized subcultures because members of subdivisions work together more closely and
share more goals.
The integration and differentiation perspectives on culture both assume that cultures are
homogenous and unambiguous at either the organizational or subcultural levels. In con-
trast, the fragmentation perspective on organizational culture sees ambiguity as the defin-
ing feature of organizational cultures [Martin, in press]. This perspective acknowledges
that there are often many plausible interpretations of issues or events, making the exist-
336
ence of a shared, homogenous culture unlikely at any level. When cultural consensus does
arise, it is fleeting and centered about a specific issue or event. The fragmentation perspec-
tive can be useful in highlighting the role of ambiguities in accidents. For example, an
analysis of the Tenerife collision uses the fragmentation perspective to understand the dif-
ficulties that pilots, air crews and air traffic controllers encountered in trying to make
themselves understood across language, occupational and status barriers [Weick, 1990].
Unfortunately fragmentation studies do not provide much guidance on how to deal with
uncertainty when attempting to change culture.
The analysis in this chapter draws on all three perspectives to identify aspects of positive
and negative safety cultures and ways of improving safety culture. For example, top man-
agement commitment to safety is essential to developing a positive safety culture (integra-
tion perspective), but this commitment must be backed by managerial actions that promote
safety and by an understanding of the differentiated and ambiguous nature of organiza-
tional culture (differentiation and fragmentation perspectives).
B.2 Safety Culture and Organizational Risk
Safety culture has been extensively studied from an occupational safety viewpoint and in
various industries like nuclear power, chemical production, off-shore oil rigs, and hospi-
tals. Out of this research arose various characterizations of positive safety cultures. The
following high level characteristics of positive safety cultures emerge from this work.
First strong and consistent management commitment to safety. Second, a constant and
pervasive understanding of importance of safety. Third, open and effective communica-
tion channels. Fourth, a commitment to continuous learning by all members of the organi-
zation.
In contrast, bad or negative safety cultures are characterized by a disregard or low priority
for safety, overconfidence and complacency, and flawed resolution of conflicting goals. In
organizations with poor safety cultures the idea that safety must be proven is replaced with
a requirement to 'prove it is unsafe'.
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However, nearly twenty years after the Chernobyl accident some fundamental questions
remain unanswered [Sorensen, 2002]. First, while there is a substantial body of empirical
work relating safety culture to safety of operations, this work is fragmented and it is not
clear that results can be extrapolated from one industry to another. There has been little
direct research on the organizational factors that define a good safety culture [Lee, 1998].
Instead, most research has indirectly identified attributes of good safety culture by assum-
ing that plants with low accident rates must have good safety cultures. It has not been
proven that a positive safety culture is the only way to achieve safety.
Second, performance indicators that can be used to infer changes in safety culture and
thereby potential changes in risk have not been identified. While there are numerous
examples of extensive safety culture or climate assessment questionnaires (e.g, [IAEA
ASCOT, 1996]), they do not provide guidance on when a safety culture is 'good' enough
or suggestions for using the findings to improve safety culture. Poor safety cultures tend to
be identified retroactively by incident or accident investigations.
Much less attention has been paid to safety culture in organizations that develop or operate
complex systems with a high degree of uncertainty. In such systems the potential safety
implications of decisions are not always apparent because of the fundamental uncertainty
associated with incomplete knowledge [Pidgeon, 1998]. This section uses the two organi-
zational risk factors identified in Appendix A, low status and influence of safety and poor
communication and coordination, to identify cultural antecedents of organizational risk in
organizations that develop or operate complex high-risk systems.
The Technical Culture at NASA. Open communications-willingness to discuss con-
flict openly-ability to surface and resolve issues. Technical criteria important in decision
making, bureaucracy and politics less important. Perception that mistakes are accept-
able-desire and willingness to surface issues. Not hiding behind bureaucracy to avoid
conflict
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B.2.1 Cultural Antecedents of Low Status and Influence of Safety
As discussed in Chapter 5, when safety has a low status compared to other organizational
goals such as performance and cost, accidents become more likely in several ways. First,
if safety has a low status it will not be put first, or even considered at all, when it conflicts
with other organizational goals. Second, safety is less likely to be on people's minds. The
potential adverse safety impacts of decisions may therefore not even be identified, much
less considered. Third, personnel who are in charge of ensuring safety will find it more
difficult to exert authority and encourage pro-safety decisions.
Cultures can be characterized according to three dimensions: pervasiveness, strength of
consensus and psychological intensity [Payne, 2000]. Pervasiveness refers to the range of
beliefs and behaviours that are affected by the culture. Strength of consensus refers to the
extent to which there is agreement about appropriate values, beliefs, behaviours and so
forth. Psychological intensity refers to the intensity with which values and beliefs are held.
In organizations where safety has a high status and influence there is agreement at all lev-
els of the organizations that safety is important (high strength of consensus). This sense
that safety is important is strongly held and all members share a desire to improve safety
(high psychological intensity). Safety is considered in all decisions and actions (wide per-
vasiveness). It is important that values and beliefs about the status of safety be widely and
strongly held and that these values and beliefs affect all decisions. An organization may
appear to have a good safety culture because managers express a positive attitude towards
safety. But lower level workers may have a different perception of management priorities
and may feel that safety is not important to management. They may therefore be less likely
to feel strongly about safety. Further, even if everyone in the organization agrees that
safety is important this consensus does not guarantee that safety will receive anything
more than lip service. For example, production and time pressures may preclude active
consideration of safety.
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Numerous studies of safety culture have stressed the importance of management in creat-
ing and maintaining a positive safety culture. Management attitudes and behaviours have a
significant effect on the status and influence of safety because employees' perceptions of
what is important are strongly driven by their perceptions of what is important to manage-
ment. For example, a study of construction sites found that top management attitude to
safety was a significant factor in safety performance as measured by the accident record
[Sawacha et al., 1999]. Similarly, a study of the manufacturing industry in the United
Kingdom found that the main influence of commitment to safety by employees was how
employees perceived "management actions for safety" [Cox et al., 1998].
The Role of Management in Promoting the Status and Influence of Safety
Managers can create a sense that safety is important by ensuring that their attitudes and
actions confirm espoused messages that safety is important. When espoused safety values
are not confirmed by management attitudes or when management attitudes are not backed
up by behaviour that confirms the importance of safety, employees are less likely to feel
that safety should be an important consideration. It is therefore essential that management
believe that safety is important and not just something that must be paid lip-service in
order to satisfy regulators and other external bodies. There are several specific and related
ways in which management can encourage employees to give safety a high status and
influence, as discussed below. Figure B.2 summarizes the influence of management on the
status and influence of safety.
Communicate safety goals clearly and consistently. Safety goals must be communi-
cated clearly and consistently. When these goals conflict with other goals management
must guide and inform employees on how to resolve these goal conflicts. For example, a
study of underground coal mines found that in the safest companies safety policy was
characterized by clarity, consistency, and emphasis (on safety over production). Mecha-
nisms for stressing safety represented complete sequences of activities in which employ-
ees could participate, and which could be implemented, monitored and fed back to
employees and management [Gaertner et al., 1987].
Managers clearly and
consistently communicate
safety goals
Managers ensire safety
personnel have high
status
Safety given a high
priority and visibility by
managers Managers gain
insght into safety
issues
Managers promote
leaming from incidents
and accidents
Managers overstress
performance, schedule,
and cost goals
Managers ignore.
safety concems
re t fo s Managers focus onre pronsbility for safety blame andproblems punishment
Figure B.1 Management Influence on Status and Influence of Safety
Give safety a high priority and visibility. The most obvious way of stressing the impor-
tance of safety is to allow safety concerns to affect other goals such as performance,
schedule, and cost. While delaying production or increasing cost to meet safety require-
ments can be painful in the short term, managers can reap long term benefits from such
events by publicizing them and honouring the employees who raised the safety concerns.
They should make it clear that risky behaviour is frowned upon and make sure that they do
not put pressures on employees that implicitly encourage risk taking. For example, they
must consistently provide adequate resources for safety even in periods of financial aus-
terity.
Management confirms that safety is important by giving safety a high priority in meetings.
For example, a study in the nuclear industry found that team briefings that included safety
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were correlated with positive employee safety attitudes [Lee and Harrison, 2000]. Man-
agement can use meetings to communicate the concept that accidents are not usually the
result of incompetence or malice but that they are symptoms of design faults in the system
or organization. For example, by giving safety a high priority in setting production sched-
ules, management demonstrates an awareness that production pressures can have an
adverse effect on safety and that this concern is being addressed.
Management should make efforts to ensure that all aspects of operations (equipment, pro-
cedures, personnel selection and training, work schedules etc.) are routinely evaluated and
improved to improve safety [Wiegmann et al., 2004]. Managers should arrange frequent
safety inspections and audits, encourage cooperation with these inspections and audits,
and demonstrate commitment to addressing the findings.
Frequent unannounced safety inspections of subcontractors provide them with an incen-
tive to observe safety requirements, with the added benefit of making it easier for top man-
agement to convey the importance of safety and for lower level employees to raise safety
concerns (see Chapter 6).
Frequent safety training events such as seminars and courses raises the visibility of safety
(especially when attended by management) and empowers employees to identify and
address safety concerns. Organizations that develop or operate complex, high-technology
systems should provide employees with training in system safety because such training is
not usually a part of tertiary engineering education. Engineers who are not trained in sys-
tem safety may not be aware of, or know how to identify, the potential safety implications
of their design decisions.
Managers in engineering organizations can increase the status of safety as well as
employee understanding of safety by assigning promising design engineers to a 'tour of
duty' in a safety group. Such rotations provide design engineers with the opportunity to
gain an appreciation for the technical requirements of system safety and may become
more aware of the importance of safety and more adept at identifying safety issues. In
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addition, participating in meetings from the position of safety engineer may create aware-
ness of the difficulties safety personnel face in making their concerns heard and addressed.
They may therefore be more likely to encourage safety personnel in future meeting.
Finally, by making safety rotations a requirement for career advancement, managers rein-
force the message that safety is important and that safety personnel are key components of
the organization.
Gain insight into safety issues. Managers should attend safety meetings, seminars and
training sessions in order to gain insight into safety and to reinforce the importance of
safety. The presence of managers at safety events confirms the message that safety is
important to them. By gaining insight into safety issues, managers can ensure that safety
concerns influence decisions. For example, managers on the Columbia Mission Manage-
ment Team (MMT) did not have a clear understanding of the very different risks posed by
foam strikes on the insulating tiles versus the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) on the
wings. Although the MMT tasked a debris assessment team to investigate the foam strike,
they had already formed the opinion that the foam strike did not pose a safety-of-flight
issue. In addition, they relied on a tile expert for judgements of the risk posed by a foam
strike on the RCC. The DAT was unable to state unambiguously that the strike posed a
safety-of-flight risk. The MMT's preconceptions coupled with their belief in the tile expert
led them to conclude that the foam strike did not pose a safety-of-flight risk.
Ensure safety personnel have high status. Managers should ensure that safety person-
nel have high status and the power to influence decisions. If safety personnel have low sta-
tus it encourages the perception among other employees that safety has low status and
therefore makes it more difficult for safety personnel to influence decisions.
Management can increase the status of safety personnel in several ways. Chapter 5 dis-
cussed structural ways of increasing the status of safety personnel. Managers can also
increase the status of safety personnel by the way they interact with them. For example,
management should ensure that safety personnel are invited to and attend all design and
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specification meetings and make sure that other designers are aware of their presence,
even if they are silent [Perrow, 1999b]. Managers should encourage safety personnel to
speak up at these meetings and provide them with opportunities to do so. For example,
managers could specifically request comments from safety personnel in meetings. By
learning and using the names of safety personnel (in meetings and in casual conversations)
managers further increase their status. Finally, managers should ensure that concerns
raised by the safety personnel are explicitly and visibly addressed.
Another way of increasing the status of safety personnel is to publicize stories of positive
contributions by safety personnel. By informing other employees when safety personnel
are instrumental in preventing potentially disastrous accidents, their importance to the
continued survival and success of the organization is emphasized.
Be open and responsive to safety concerns. By showing that safety concerns are recog-
nized and responded to, management encourages employees to show more initiative in
looking for and raising safety issues (see Section B.2.2). Managers should respond to
employees who raise safety concerns by addressing their concerns and not ignoring or
ostracizing them.
Promote learning from incidents and accidents. Management can promote learning
from accidents by instigating extensive investigations that aim to uncover underlying
problems instead of focussing on symptoms or looking for convenient scapegoats. When
accidents are investigated by external bodies, management should encourage employees
to cooperate and assure them that they will not be penalized for being open with investiga-
tors. For example, following the Columbia accident, the NASA administrator made a
point of repeatedly and publicly stating that NASA wished to cooperate fully with the
investigation. Accident investigations may uncover painful truths or problems that cannot
be solved easily or quickly. By making a commitment to continue until the underlying
problems are solved, management demonstrates its commitment to learning from acci-
dents and preventing future accidents.
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Challenges of Using Culture as Managerial Tool
While culture can be a powerful tool in improving safety, it is also very fragile and can
easily lead to the opposite result. Consider next why management may have limited effec-
tiveness in creating a culture in which safety has a high status and influence.
Isolated management. The influence of management on safety behaviour appears to be
mediated by the autonomy of workers and their distance from top management. For exam-
ple, a study of the transport industry found that employee commitment to safety was less
dependent on management attitudes and actions, perhaps because transport employees are
more autonomous/further removed from management [Cheyne et al., 1999]. In other
words, when managers are far removed from employees they have less ability to influence
employees' values, attitudes, and behaviours.
Limited effect of general policies. General management policies such as "safety first"
can be ineffective because employees tend to pay more attention to specific directives than
to general policies [Pate-Cornell and Murphy, 1996]. Thus, for example, a general policy
such as "safety first" is likely to receive less attention than a directive to meet a deadline.
This behaviour may arise because employees implicitly believe that specific directives
would not be issued if they were not intended to take precedence over standard organiza-
tional procedures, or that general policies are intended to apply only under normal condi-
tions but not in exceptional circumstances. When an organization is permanently in fire-
fighting mode, general policies become essentially meaningless if they continuously con-
flict with short-term requirements. General policies such as "safety first" must be backed
up by specific management actions as discussed below. In addition, management must rec-
ognize that specific directives may conflict with general policies, identify any such con-
flicts, and eliminate the conflicts or explain to employees how conflicts are to be resolved.
The hypocrisy attribution dynamic. Using culture as a management tool to improve
safety can have the opposite effect when management is not seen to "walk the talk".
Employees attend vigilantly to all aspects of managerial behaviour. For example, they
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notice what and who they spend time on, what they ask and fail to ask, what they follow
up, and what they celebrate. Employees' perceptions of what is important and for what
they are likely to be rewarded or punished tend to be based more on these perceptions than
on vision statements and formal policies. It is therefore crucial that managers regularly
examine their own behaviour for any contradictory messages that they might be sending.
When managerial actions are perceived to contradict management policies or supposed
desired cultural attributes, it can become very difficult for managers to use culture as a
tool to improve safety.
The "hypocrisy attribution dynamic" describes a series of psychological processes that
can make it difficult or impossible for managers to maintain or create cultural attributes
such as a positive attitude to safety [Cha and Edmondson, 2003]. Emphasizing cultural
values makes employees more aware of their own behaviour and can be a powerful tool in
improving safety. But employees also become more aware of the behaviour of others,
especially management. If managers behave in ways that (appear to) run counter to the
espoused message that safety is important, employees may conclude that managers are not
personally "walking the talk". Employee commitment to safety is replaced by cynicism.
Worse, because employees may not feel comfortable pointing out these apparent viola-
tions, they say nothing in public, thus precluding a fair test of their conclusions and mak-
ing learning impossible. Subsequent violations are taken as confirmation of managerial
hypocrisy, thus creating a vicious circle that may eventually result in a large number of
employees becoming disillusioned.
In order to successfully use culture as a means of improving safety managers must take the
time to help employees understand both real and apparent violations. Where managers
acted inappropriately they must be prepared to take responsibility and explain their
actions. If they do not, employees will supply their own explanations, which are unlikely
to be charitable [Chatman and Cha, 2003].
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How Management Detracts from the Status and Influence of Safety
This section has illustrated how management can contribute to a culture in which safety
has a high status and influence, and what factors may limit the effectiveness of these
approaches. Consider now some specific managerial attitudes and behaviours that detract
from the status and influence of safety:
Overstressing performance, schedule, and cost. When management emphasizes the
importance of meeting performance, schedule and cost goals, safety may appear to be less
important. Employees may be discouraged from following safety procedures or looking
for potential safety issues. Excessive emphasis on these goals may be perceived as implicit
permission to ignore safety procedures.
Ignoring safety concerns. When managers ignore or minimize safety concerns, or penal-
ize employees who raise safety concerns they create the impression that safety is not
important and that identifying and raising safety concerns is a waste of time.
Refusing to accept responsibility. Refusing to accept responsibility for safety problems
arising from managerial policies directives encourages mistrust of management and belies
espoused messages that safety is important. For example, when managers put pressure on
employees to meet production goals but punish them for ignoring safety procedures in
order to meet these goals, they create an atmosphere of mistrust in which employees.
Focussing on blame and punishment. Blaming incidents and accidents on individual
employees encourages mistrust of management and creates an atmosphere of insecurity in
which employees may be less compliant to safety procedures and more likely to hide
safety problems.
B.2.2 Cultural Antecedents of Poor Communication and Coordination
As discussed in Appendix A, poor communication and coordination contribute to acci-
dents in several ways. When communication does not occur, crucial feedback links may
347
be broken. For example, changes in one part of a system may render assumptions about
the system invalid, or be incompatible with other aspects of the system. Communication is
therefore essential to ensure compatibility of decisions and update assumptions and men-
tal models of the system. Communication is also essential when problems arise. Problems
that are not recognized by the appropriate members of an organization will not be solved.
For example, if a maintenance technician notices that a part must be replaced more often
than expected but does not inform his superiors, a potentially incorrect design problem
cannot be identified or addressed.
This section focusses on one aspect of communication, dissent and the raising of safety
concerns. Preventing accidents requires a willingness to give and receive bad news. When
employees become aware of safety problems but are unwilling to raise them both inside
and outside their peer groups, these problems cannot be properly addressed or solved. The
section begins with an example that illustrates the importance of raising safety concerns,
why it is difficult to do so, and why bad news is not always heard. Next, the reasons why
employees are sometimes reluctant to voice safety concerns are discussed. Next, a model
of how organizational forces and management actions discourage speaking up about
safety concerns is presented. Based on this model, suggestions for encouraging employees
to come forward with safety concerns are made.
Figure B.2 summarizes the cultural antecedents of employee reluctance to raise safety
concerns, as discussed in this section.
The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
The Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986 can be partially attributed to poor commu-
nication about the O-ring problem between the solid rocket booster contractor (Morton
Thiokol) and NASA, and between Marshall Space Center and higher NASA management
[Winsor, 1988]. The Rogers Commission which investigated the accident found that the
physical cause of the accident was later found to be the failure of the O-rings on one of the
SRBs to seal. Consider the attenuation of bad news between Morton Thiokol and Marshall
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Figure B.2 Cultural Antecedents of Poor Communication and Coordination
in the months before the accident. In July 1985, Roger Boisjoly, an engineer at Morton
Thiokol, sent an alarmed memo to the vice president of engineering. In it he warned that
the O-rings on the field joints could fail during launch leading to loss of the shuttle and
that the problem was not being addressed with sufficient urgency. He ended the memo
with an urgent plea for immediate action [Rogers, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 249-250]:
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a
team to solve the problem with the field joint having number one priority, then we stand in
jeopardy of losing a flight along with the launch pad facilities."
This memo was very clear in its statement of the urgency and seriousness of the problem.
However, it was marked "company confidential" and therefore not sent to Marshall.
Although Boisjoly was clearly alarmed enough to alert his superiors, he left the decision to
inform Marshall of the serious nature of the problem to his superiors. Unfortunately his
superiors did not send a copy of this memo, with its clear statement of urgency and seri-
ousness, to Marshall. In August 1985 another engineer at Morton Thiokol sent a memo to
Marshall reporting the results of investigating the effect of cold on the O-rings. The tests
showed that below 50 degrees Fahrenheit it was highly likely that the secondary O-ring
would not seal, confirming Boisjoly's fears. However, in contrast to Boisjoly's memo, this
memo was worded in dry technical language that did not convey the potentially disastrous
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implications of the test results. Managers at Marshall and NASA Headquarters did not
understand the significance of the test results and therefore did not take action to investi-
gate O-ring erosion with greater urgency. They remained unaware of the serious flight risk
posed by the O-rings and of the high degree of concern among engineers at Morton
Thiokol.
Boisjoly and the rest of his team continued to investigate the problem but encountered
administrative resistance and had difficulty convincing management of the seriousness of
the problem. By the eve of the Challenger launch they were still unable to prove unambig-
uously that the O-rings would not seal. At this late stage Morton Thiokol finally decided
to recommend a launch delay because of the cold weather. However, the delay recommen-
dation caught Marshall by surprise and Marshall managers expressed resistance. Because
the Morton Thiokol engineers could not prove that the launch would be unsafe, manage-
ment at Morton Thiokol cancelled the delay recommendation and gave the go-ahead for
the launch. Marshall concurred with Morton Thiokol and the launch was allowed to pro-
ceed.
This example illustrates two problems with communicating bad news. First, it is more dif-
ficult to communicate bad news to outsiders (in this case, NASA) than insiders. Similarly,
it is also more difficult to communicate bad news to superiors than to peers. Managers
must establish an atmosphere of trust in which employees feel comfortable giving bad
news, voicing dissenting opinions, or raising safety issues.
Second, even when bad news is communicated, people may not hear it. Following his first
memo Boisjoly and other engineers repeatedly tried to inform management of the serious-
ness of the problem and the need for support, but management appeared deaf to their con-
cerns until the last minute, at which point it was too late for the engineers to assemble a
convincing case.
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Why Employees do not Communicate Safety Concerns
Employees may be reluctant to voice safety concerns because of the desire to avoid con-
veying bad news, normative and social pressures within groups, fear of retribution, and the
feeling that raising issues will not make a difference (e.g., [Morrison and Milliken, 2003;
Ryan and Oestreich, 1998]).
Discomfort with conveying bad news. People often feel severe discomfort when con-
veying bad news and are therefore reluctant to do so. For example, they may fear upsetting
or embarrassing someone, or getting someone in trouble. This phenomenon has been
termed the 'mum effect' by psychologists [Milliken et al., 2003]. The mum effect is espe-
cially strong when bad news has to be conveyed to superiors.
Group normative and social pressures. Another reason for not speaking up is fear of
being labelled or viewed negatively or damaging relationships. Strong and cohesive
groups can ironically discourage open communication. Group members may choose not to
to express dissent because of fears that doing so might disrupt consensus and cohesion in
the group [Morrison and Milliken, 2003]. In addition, group members raising opinions
that oppose the generally held group views exposes members to being publicly wrong.
Members may fear that by speaking up they risk losing the trust and respect and the accep-
tance and support of other group members. They may therefore avoid speaking up because
the cost of expressing doubts may be too high. It is easier to be wrong as part of a group
than to be wrong as an individual. Employees will only express their concerns if they
believe that doing so will be both effective and not too personally costly.
Fear of retribution. When managers react negatively to dissent and safety concerns
employees may feel that speaking up is risky and bad for their reputations and careers. The
perception that raising concerns is impolitic can also arise as a result of apparently good
management habits, such as being goal-oriented and focussed on solutions. When employ-
ees are encouraged to "bring me a solution, not a problem," they may feel that raising
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vague concerns for which they do not have solutions, or for which the solutions are diffi-
cult or inconvenient (e.g. delay launch), is bad for their reputation with their manager.
Lack of managerial response to safety concerns. Employees are likely to be discour-
aged from raising safety concerns when they feel that their concerns will not be given a
fair hearing or will not be responded to. For example, a study of train drivers found that
drivers were less likely to report incidents if they felt that management would not take
notice or would not be concerned [Clarke, 1998]. A study of offshore oil rigs found poor
management can decrease employee interest in proposing ways to improve safety
[Rundmo et al., 1998].
Safety concerns tend to be vague and uncertain. They are often of the form "this might be
unsafe" rather than "this is definitely unsafe". Obtaining more firm data usually requires
more time and effort and is often not possible without management support. When man-
agement has strong preconceived notions it can be difficult to obtain this support. In its
report on the Columbia accident the CAIB noted that [Gehman, 2003, p. 192]:
Program managers created huge barriers against dissenting opinions by stating precon-
ceived conclusions based on subjective knowledge and experience, rather than on solid
data.
Employees may therefore find themselves in a catch-22 situation where they are unable to
convince management of the seriousness of their concerns because they are unable to
obtain the necessary data without managerial support. For example, the debris assessment
team (DAT) that was assembled to investigate the foam strike on the Columbia Space
Shuttle did not speak when managers declared that the strike was not a flight risk, despite
the lack of clear data. In the engineers' minds, the high uncertainty of the available quanti-
tative data made their opinions irrelevant. Many NASA engineers circulated 'under-
ground' e-mails to debate the resistance of the wing to the foam strike, but they never
communicated their concerns to management. When asked in a post-accident press con-
ference why they did not speak up and voice their concerns to management, the engineers
said that people "need to stick to their expertise" [Gehman, 2003, p.202].
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Consider now how organizational forces and managerial actions discourage speaking up
and contribute to a culture of silence.
Managerial Influence on Employee Silence about Safety Concerns
Employees' perceptions of the risk and effectiveness of speaking up are driven by various
factors including: their individual characteristics (e.g, level of experience, status), psycho-
logical phenomena (e.g., diffusion of responsibility) and affective state (e.g. fear); the
organizational environment (e.g., structure, culture, group dynamics); and the nature of
their relationship with their supervisors [Milliken et al., 2003]. This research focusses on
the organizational factors that create the perception that giving bad news and raising safety
concerns is risky and ineffective.
The problem of silence can be examined from two complementary perspectives: individ-
ual-level variables and contextual variables. One perspective focusses on individual-level
variables and attempts to explain why an individual employee would choose not to speak
up in a particular situation. For example, an employee may remain silent because of fear
of retribution. But this perspective does not explain how or why the perception that
employees who speak up will be retributed arose.
Explanations of employee silence that focus only on individual level variables risk obscur-
ing the way that organizational forces and management actions can systematically rein-
force silence in an organization. Such explanations clear the way for blaming accidents on
'weak' employees who were aware of critical safety issues yet did not raise them with
management, or, when they did raise them, gave up when management did not respond. In
hindsight it can be easy to blame these employees. If they thought the issue was so serious,
why did they not persist until it was dealt with to their satisfaction?
An alternative perspective on employee silence aims to address this limitation by focus-
sing on contextual variables, that is, how the organizational context or environment dis-
courages dissent and contributes to employee silence. For example, why do employees in
some organizations believe that they will be retributed if they speak up? Based on this per-
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spective, Morrison and Milliken developed a dynamic model of organizational conditions
and managerial behaviours that discourage speaking up [Morrison and Milliken, 2000].
Their focus was on employee feedback about managerial behaviour and strategic organi-
zational issues.
This section adapts and augments the model to focus on employee silence about safety
concerns, as shown in Figure B.3. In this model management resistance to negative feed-
back coupled with implicit beliefs lead to managerial practices such as a tendency to react
negatively to dissent or safety concerns and a focus on blame and punishment. These prac-
tices create employee perceptions that speaking up is risky and ineffective. These percep-
tions are shared and strengthened through a process of collective sensemaking between
employees, eventually creating a culture of silence that can be difficult to change.
Chapter 5 has identified structural factors that impede communication; for completeness
structural factors contributing to silence about safety concerns are shown in the diagram in
dashed-line boxes.
Managerial Practices and Organizational Structures
Managers' fear of receiving negative feedback and bad news, especially from subordi-
nates, contributes to the creation of a culture of silence. People tend to feel threatened by
negative feedback, whether it is in the form of criticism about them personally or about a
course of action with which they identify [e.g., Carver et al., 1985]. Managers may be par-
ticularly sensitive to negative feedback, especially from subordinates [Argyris and Schun,
1978]. Feedback from subordinates is seen as less accurate and legitimate and as more
threatening to managers' power and credibility [Ilgen et al., 1979; Korsgaard et al., 1998].
Bad news, such as information that a system may be less safe than assumed, is usually not
welcome either and may be perceived as negative feedback. Safety concerns may also be
perceived as bad news when they indicate that a system is not as safe as thought or when
addressing them is politically, technically or financially difficult. Accordingly, managers
may try to avoid negative feedback, bad news, and other information such as safety con-
Implicit Managerial Beliefs
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- Employees fundamentally self-
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Manager's Fear of -Unity good, dissent bad
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Figure B.3 Dynamics of Employee Reluctance to Raise Safety Concerns
cerns that might be construed as such [Ashford and Cummings, 1983]. When they do
receive it, they may try to ignore it, dismiss it as inaccurate, or attack the credibility of the
source [Ilgen et al., 1979]. Speaking up about safety concerns may therefore be perceived
as being both risky and ineffective, thus contributing to a culture of silence.
354
355
Another crucial factor in employee silence is managers' beliefs, often implicit, about
themselves, their subordinates, the organization, and the technological systems they
develop or operate. Managers often believe that they know best and that they should direct
and control while their subordinates should be unquestioningly obedient [Morrison and
Milliken, 2000]. They may therefore perceive employee concerns as irrelevant or mis-
guided. Managers may also believe that employees are fundamentally self-interested and
only concerned with the welfare of the organization as it pertains to their own well being.
Safety concerns raised by subordinates may therefore be seen as attempts to challenge
managerial authority in order to advance their own careers, or to make sure that they are
covered in case anything does go wrong. Managers tend to see organizational unity, agree-
ment, and consensus as signs of organizational health, whereas dissent and disagreement
should be avoided [Morrison and Milliken, 2000]. They may therefore actively discourage
dissent or employee initiative.
Managers may also hold strong beliefs about the technical properties of the systems the
organization develops or operates. For example, in commenting on the Space Shuttle
Challenger accident Richard Feynman noted that managers and engineers had very differ-
ent perceptions of the risk associated with the space shuttle [Feynman, 1986]:
It appears that there are enormous differences of opinion as to the probability of a failure
with loss of vehicle and of human life. The estimates range from roughly 1 in 100 to 1 in
100,000. The higher figures come from the working engineers, and the very low figures
from management. What are the causes and consequences of this lack of agreement? Since
1 part in 100,000 would imply that one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years
expecting to lose only one, we could properly ask "What is the cause of management's
fantastic faith in the machinery?"
When management and engineers have such widely differing technical beliefs, they may
erect barriers to communication and fail to act on contrary evidence. It can be very diffi-
cult for engineers to convince them that there are safety problems.
Confirmation bias is the tendency to believe only information that confirms decisions or
beliefs, instead of seeking out contradictory information. While the Space Shuttle Colum-
bia was on orbit, negative information about the possible extent of the wing damage was
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discounted to the point where shuttle program managers officially shared their belief that
the strike posed no safety issue before any analysis or discussions had started. Managers
did not only rule out alternative scenarios, but viewed as unnecessary all attempts at con-
sidering them. The Columbia managers' underlying belief that foam strikes were merely a
turnaround issue ruled out the possibility of serious damage in their minds, even before
analysis of the strike had begun. Every manager knew the party line and stuck to it from
the first hour. The official message was that no safety-of-flight issue was expected. Any
contradictory information was discounted and management made every effort to avoid
creating the impression that something unusual was happening. For example, when engi-
neers decided to work over the weekend to analyze the strike, program managers tried to
discourage them because it was not considered a safety issue. In its report on the Columbia
accident the CAIB noted that [Gehman, 2003, p. 192]:
Program managers created huge barriers against dissenting opinions by stating precon-
ceived conclusions based on subjective knowledge and experience, rather than on solid
data.
Managers' belief that they know best coupled with a reluctance to hear bad news may
result in attempts to stifle bad news and a tendency to reject or respond negatively to dis-
sent or safety concerns. For example, they may avoid setting formal structures in place for
upward feedback of information. They may also make it difficult for employees to
approach them informally. Top management, especially, can avoid bad news by isolating
themselves from subordinates further down in the hierarchy ('closed door' policy).
Managers may also be reluctant to admit prior error, or be afraid of the practical conse-
quences (e.g., shuttle launch must be delayed) of safety concerns. They may therefore
appear deaf to bad news and fail to act on safety concerns.
Further, managers' belief in themselves and mistrust of employees can lead them to make
the fundamental attribution error that while their own mistakes or problems result from
systemic flaws, their subordinates' mistakes or problems result from personal weaknesses
or malice. Thus, technical problems are assumed to be the fault of incompetent subordi-
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nates and not the (at least partial) result of managerial pressures or fundamental technical
difficulty. They may therefore place a focus on blame and punishment, instead of reward-
ing employees who raise issues and attempting to learn from situations.
Thus management attitudes and beliefs can lead to practices that create the perception that
speaking up is risky and ineffective. These perceptions are the seeds of a culture of silence
in which employees are reluctant to speak up about safety concerns. Once these negative
perceptions have been created, it can be very difficult to change them, as discussed below.
Collective Sensemaking and the Creation of Shared Perceptions
Culture is created through a process of socialization and collective sensemaking. Employ-
ees share their experiences and perceptions through social interactions that lead to a com-
mon understanding of which behaviours are desirable and undesirable [Schein, 1992]. For
example, groups of employees may discuss negative experiences they have had when rais-
ing safety concerns, and thus build a shared belief that dissent is undesirable.
Employees tend to develop shared perceptions about the efficacy and risk of dissenting
and raising safety concerns when they share the same experiences, interact frequently, and
identify strongly with each other. There are several structural conditions that contribute to
the development and maintenance of shared perceptions, as shown in Figure B.3 [Morri-
son and Milliken, 2000]. Employees tend to identify more strongly with each other when
they see each other as similar in terms of socio-economic status, educational background,
and so forth. They are therefore more likely to develop shared perceptions about dissent-
ing and raising safety concerns. Stable workforces are characterized by more shared per-
ceptions because they have larger shared experience bases and because perceptions
develop over time and new employees are not socialized immediately. When employees'
work is interdependent they also tend to develop more shared perceptions because they
work together more closely and because they share more of the same experiences. Finally,
strong and dense social networks contribute to shared perceptions because members inter-
act more closely and frequently and receive highly similar information.
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The perceptions of others may be a stronger driver of an individual employee's percep-
tions than their own experiences [Nemeth, 1997]. For example, an employee might have a
positive experience when raising a safety concern and therefore form an initial belief that
management is open to such concerns. However, if the general perception among employ-
ees is that management is not open to such concerns, the employee is likely to instead
adopt this view. It can be very difficult to change employee perceptions once they are
formed.
The feedback loop (marked 'R') at the bottom of Figure B.3 illustrates how the perception
that speaking up is risky and ineffective, while initially rooted in managerial practices, can
persist and be exaggerated even when management attempts to encourage speaking up
[Morrison and Milliken, 2000]. For example, if an employee raises a safety concern and
shortly thereafter fails to receive a promotion, the prevailing perception that speaking up is
risky may lead employees to believe that she was being punished for speaking up. This
conclusion, accurate or not, strengthens the perception that speaking up is risky.
Finally, note that shared perceptions can also become over-generalized [Morrison and
Milliken, 2000]. Silence may initially center on a few specific issues, but eventually it
may spread to all issues, and employees may stop sending any information up the hierar-
chy. Managers should therefore consider carefully how they react to all types of dissent
and bad news. If managers begin by ignoring safety concerns they may soon find that they
do not hear about any concerns. Conversely, managers who discourage dissent about top-
ics unconnected to safety may soon find that they no longer hear about safety concerns
either.
The model presented in the preceding pages has argued that implicit managerial beliefs
and attitudes can lead to managerial practices that contribute to employee perceptions that
speaking up about safety concerns is risky and ineffective, thereby creating a culture of
silence. Consider now some ways that management can encourage employees to raise
concerns and encourage a culture of openness and trust.
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Encouraging Open Communication
Conveying bad news or information that could be construed as such may be risky and
makes people uncomfortable. Employees may therefore be reluctant to do so if they feel
that their concerns will not be responded to. They may also try to minimize their risk and
discomfort by attempting to present information in the best possible light. In order to
ensure that they are made aware of safety concerns managers have to create an environ-
ment in which raising safety concerns is convenient (e.g., formal upward communication
channels that are easily accessible, see Chapter 5), an atmosphere of trust in which
employees are comfortable giving bad news (e.g., managers welcome and respond posi-
tively to dissent and safety concerns), and effective.
Employees feel more comfortable dissenting and raising safety concerns when manage-
ment is perceived to be approachable, supportive and ready to listen; there is relatively lit-
tle uncertainty or fear of negative consequences; and they have good relationships with
their immediate superiors and top management [Ashford et al., 1998; Dutton et al., 1997;
Saunders et al., 1992]. Managers should view their subordinates as "field scientists who
can provide unvarnished information about how these systems actually work, or don't
work, under a wide variety of conditions" [Perin, 1998]. They should welcome bad news
and dissent and view it as a way of learning more and improving their systems. They
should make it clear that they are more interested in accurate information than in good
news. Managers create norms of learning by questioning, seeking feedback, experiment-
ing, reflecting on results and openly discussing errors or unexpected results [Edmondson,
1999]. They should praise, reward and support employees who raise safety concerns
instead of 'killing the messenger'.
In addition to being supportive and open to safety concerns managers must show employ-
ees that their suggestions and safety concerns are valued and acted on. Managers have to
face bad news when it comes, and that makes taking problems up to a level high enough to
mobilize enough effort and talent to fix those problems. They should engage employees in
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discussions of safety concerns, help them to obtain the necessary supporting data, and
develop ways of addressing these concerns in concert.
B.3 Summary
This appendix has reviewed the concept of safety culture and why it is important for orga-
nizations that wish to operate high-risk systems in as safe a manner as possible. The
appendix continued the analysis of organizational risk factors begun in Appendix A by
discussing (1) the cultural antecedents of employee reluctance to raise safety concerns and
(2) how management contributes to a culture in which safety has low status and influence.
Appendix C
LEAN ENTERPRISES AND SAFETY
In the past, the attainment of cost, schedule and quality were considered to be incompati-
ble. For example, increases in quality were assumed to add cost. The old mantra was: "I
can do something fast, cheap, or good-pick any two". Lean principles and practices have
broken this paradigm.
C.1 Introduction
Many industries have recognised that it is indeed possible to simultaneously perform well
on all three of these traditional project metrics, and are adopting lean principles and prac-
tices to varying levels of success. But the attainment of safety goals is still commonly seen
as being incompatible with lower cost, faster development or production times, and
improved quality or performance. Is it possible to simultaneously achieve high levels of
safety as well as good cost, schedule and quality performance?
In this appendix I attempt to answer this question. My focus is on the development and
operation of complex, technology-intensive systems, such as spacecraft. However, the
same concepts can be translated to other types of systems, such as chemical production
facilities.
This appendix is organised as follows. Section 2 questions whether it is ever worth not
investing in safety and show that a systems view is essential to ensuring safety. Section 3
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proposes a definition for 'lean safety'. Section 4 investigates the apparent strain between
safety and other project metrics and suggests some safety engineering approaches that can
ease this strain. Section 5 is the conclusions.
C.2 Safety: A case of 'Don't buy now, pay later'?
In the long term, investment in safety always pays off. However, in the short term, safety
is often the loser in system-level trade-offs. The value of safety practices or measures is
not easily measured. Benefits from investments in safety tend to emerge only in the long
run, and may only be indirectly observable, as non-accidents or the avoidance of modifi-
cations or retrofits to improve safety [Leveson, 1998]. However, the apparent costs (time,
financial, performance, etc.) of safety practices or measures can often be measured. Faced
with intangible long-term benefits but visible short-term costs, it is understandably tempt-
ing for project managers to compromise on safety.
An enterprise that is involved in multiple projects over long periods of time cannot afford
to compromise on safety. Consider, for example, a space agency working on various space
exploration missions. On an individual project, seen in isolation, the risk may well be
worth taking: if a single satellite or probe fails the loss can probably be absorbed. Practi-
cally, however, projects cannot be seen in isolation, either from each other or in time.
First, the fall-out from a failed mission can be enormous, ranging far beyond the costs and
lost revenue of the failed mission. Accident investigations are usually launched followed
accidents. For economically, socially, or politically important missions these investiga-
tions can be far ranging and expensive. They may recommend extensive remedial action,
including reviews, modifications, and retrofits on other projects. Investors, the public,
government agencies, and other stakeholders may lose faith in the organisation, and with-
draw their support. The enterprise may be subject to fines and punitive lawsuits. Enter-
prise operations may be suspended. Expensive lobbying and public relations campaigns
may be necessary to restore faith and ensure continued financial and political support.
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Second, it is not possible to conduct safety programs in isolation, or without a clear com-
mitment to safety from the top to the bottom of the enterprise. Engineers who are used to
ignoring safety issues cannot be expected to suddenly turn around and prioritise safety on
a new project. Without explicit support and understanding from top management, it is dif-
ficult for engineers to make and justify tough safety decisions. A good safety culture
across the enterprise is essential if safety is to be ensured [Zohar, 1980].
In other words, the fallout from an individual accident can be far ranging and long term.
An enterprise cannot hope to simply focus on making some projects, missions, or aspects
of the enterprise safe. Nor can it pay attention to safety only during isolated phases of a
system's lifecycle. Safety is an emergent property that is affected by decisions across the
system and across its lifecycle. If we wish to operate an enterprise that designs safe sys-
tems we have to take a systems view, both at the enterprise level and at the level of indi-
vidual projects or missions.
In the next section I discuss the commonalities between this view on safety and lean prin-
ciples and practices.
C.3 'Lean' Safety
Lean thinking can be defined as the "dynamic, knowledge-driven, and customer-focused
process through which all people in a defined enterprise continuously eliminate waste
with the goal of creating value" [Murman et al, 2002, p. 90]. This definition emphasises
the necessity of involvement by all members of the enterprise, and the need for a continu-
ous focus on creating value.
Compare this definition with the description of an ideal safety engineering program:
"Continually performing the system hazard analyses necessary to explicitly identify mis-
sion risks and communicating these risks to all segments of the project team and institu-
tional management; vigorously working to make trade-off decisions that mitigate risks in
order to maximize the likelihood of mission success; and regularly communicating the
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progress of the risk mitigation plans to project, program, and institutional management"
[Leveson, 1995].
The traditional goals of lean thinking are different from those of safety engineering, but
the 'mind-set' that is required in each case is strikingly similar, as illustrated in Table C. 1.
TABLE C.1 Comparison of Lean Thinking and Safety Engineering
Lean Thinking T Safety Engineering
Dynamic
Knowledge Driven
Continuous
Communication is essential
Customer-focussed Safety-focussed
Eliminate waste Limit accidents
Create value Create safety
The table also suggests a route to defining 'lea" safety engineering: Whereas the goal of
lean thinking is to create value, we can view the goal of safety engineering as 'creating
safety'. Continuing the analogy, we can view accidents as a form of waste. Accidents and
their consequences must be limited to create safety. Note that accidents cannot be com-
pletely eliminated. It is theoretically possible to identify and eliminate all the waste (in a
lean sense) in an enterprise. But we cannot eliminate the possibility of all accidents, nor
does the absence of accidents in the past indicate that none will happen in the future.
Strictly speaking then, we wish to reduce the likelihood of accidents, or at least limit their
consequences if they do occur.
As an aside, it might be argued that safety measures that are never used are a form of
waste. I do not think that this argument is valid. Most accidents are not predictable in their
precise details: component failures can only be predicted with a certain probability; and
system accidents may not be easily foreseen in complex systems. Where uncertainty exists
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about whether an accident may or may not occur, we have to accept the possibility that
safety measures may never be needed.
Systems that are lost or temporarily unavailable due to accidents do not provide customers
with value. Safety, then, can be seen as an inherent part of value creation, at least in the
case of complex system development. The same is likely to be true for other enterprises
too. For example, if a chemical plant has poor occupational safety, worker downtime
increases, experienced workers may be lost to safer enterprises, and the enterprise may be
subject to litigation and regulatory investigation. The costs will be translated to the cus-
tomer, effectively decreasing the value of the product.
Lean safety engineering can then be defined by taking elements from lean thinking and
safety engineering: Lean safety engineering is the dynamic, knowledge-driven, and safety-
focused process through which all people in a defined enterprise continuously work to
reduce the likelihood and consequences of accidents with the goal of creating safety with-
out unduly compromising cost, schedule and performance.
Defining a process, however, is only the first step. Is it possible to achieve the goal of cre-
ating safety without unduly compromising cost, schedule and performance?
In the next section I show that safety does not necessarily have to result in an increase in
cost or development time or in a decrease in performance.
C.4 Decoupling Safety
Safety is often viewed as the ball-and-chain on the ankle of progress. It is seen as weigh-
ing programs down with increased cost, reducing performance, and limiting the adoption
of new technologies. In this section I show that this is not necessarily the case: safety can
be decoupled from cost, schedule, and performance. The key, as mentioned earlier, is to
take a systems view of safety.
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C.4.1 Safety vs. Performance
In this section I decouple safety from performance, and show that it is possible to develop
and operate safe systems without compromising on performance. I begin by discussing the
problem in general terms, and show that by approaching the development process in the
correct way, the level of compromise between performance and safety can be minimized.
Next, I discuss the problem of maintaining safety when faced with new technologies.
Finally, I show that there is not necessarily a causal relationship between safety and qual-
ity.
Obtaining safety and performance in system development
Safety is often seen as conflicting with performance. Safety measures are seen as limiting
performance in various ways; for example, speed governors on automobiles limit the max-
imum speed that can be achieved. This view is simplistic. In some cases, such as the auto-
mobile speed governor, safety is maintained specifically by limiting performance. In these
cases, there are safe limits to performance, beyond which accidents are deemed to be
excessively likely. These limits are usually defined by a combination of the system and the
environment in which the system finds itself. To continue the example, the automobile
may become unstable at high speeds, or the road network may not be designed for high-
speed travel.
In other cases, performance may be limited because of the approach that is taken to ensure
safety. Safety can be considered early ('upstream') or late in the development process
('downstream'). The downstream approach tends to follow a 'band-aid' strategy: the basic
design is completed without any concern for safety, and protection devices are added
afterwards to detect and constrain any hazards that do occur [Leveson, 1998]. The advan-
tage (if it can be called that) of this approach is that safety-related decisions can be
delayed to the end of the design process. However, later in the development process there
is usually less freedom of design choice. Designers may find themselves in the position of
having to compromise on performance to maintain safety. It may even be impossible to
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make the system safe, necessitating costly redesign. Band-aid solutions also tend to
increase system complexity, which in itself increases risk. The downstream approach may
therefore result in increased cost and schedule delays, decreased performance, or not
meeting safety goals.
Early in the design process (upstream) the design space is usually much less constrained.
Multiple options for ensuring safety may be available, and performance does not necessar-
ily have to be limited by safety measures. The increased freedom may make it more diffi-
cult to design safety measures; some ingenuity or insight may be required. But the
possibility for elegant solutions that ensure safety without compromising performance or
increasing complexity exists. Redesign late in the development process to meet safety
requirements can be avoided. The potential benefits of the upstream approach therefore
include reduced cost over the entire lifecycle, fewer schedule delays, and fewer safety vs.
performance compromises.
By taking safety into account from the beginning, performance compromises can be lim-
ited, while simultaneously realizing cost and schedule benefits across the system's lifecy-
cle. [Leveson, 1998, Ch. 16] discusses some specific safe design principles and practices.
Obtaining safety and performance with new, untested technologies
There is a common belief that safety goals conflict with the benefits offered by new tech-
nologies [Leveson, 1998]. Technologies exist because of the benefits they offer (e.g.
improved performance, decreased cost). These benefits are usually clear and tangible. But
the associated risks are often difficult to identify and assess, partly due to a lack of experi-
ence with the new technology. This state of affairs can lead to two very different
approaches to adopting new technology: the excessively cautious approach and the head-
in-the-sand approach, as shown in Figure C. 1.
The excessively cautious approach is to completely avoid the new technology. In terms of
avoiding the risks of the new technology, this approach will obviously be very successful.
But if the results of failing to adopt a new technology are cost overruns, schedule delays,
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Figure C.1 Attitudes to Risks of New Technologies
performance penalties, or loss of competitive advantage, we may fairly ask whether it was
the best strategy.
On the other hand, the head-in-the-sand approach completely ignores the risks of adopting
the new technology. This approach is understandable. Faced with clear tangible benefits
and unclear intangible risks, it is tempting to choose the benefits. When risks are difficult
to quantify, programmatic pressure may encourage simply ignoring these risks. But ignor-
ing risks does not make them go away. If the risks do end up being realised, the enterprise
may find itself unprepared to deal with the consequences. For example, the system may
not be fault-tolerant with respect to failures related to the new technology.
What we seek, instead, is to make better-informed decisions about new technologies, and
so move into the top row of Figure 1. New technologies can be safely adopted if their risks
are better managed. Better risk management requires improved identification and assess-
ment of risks, and that measures be put in place for dealing with realised risks. The finan-
cial and schedule costs of improved risk management must be weighed against the value
delivered by such a program, i.e. the benefits of adopting the technology (e.g. improved
369
performance, reduced cost), and the consequences of accidents associated with the new
technology. It is likely that the value of the improved risk management will be signifi-
cantly greater than its cost.
The decision whether or not to adopt a new technology is a risk management problem.
There are risks associated both with adopting and also with not adopting a new technol-
ogy. Only by equipping ourselves with sufficient information can we make informed deci-
sions. The value of informed decision-making is likely to far exceed the cost of improved
risk assessment.
Safety and Quality
Quality and safety are often confused. As a result safety programs often become subsumed
under quality assurance programs. Unfortunately, good quality does not provide any guar-
antee of safety. Quality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for safety. A sys-
tem may be developed with strict adherence to quality control processes, and it may be
composed of high-quality components, but it is not necessarily safe. For example, system
accidents [Perrow, 1999] can occur despite all the components and subsystems meeting
their performance requirements-in this case quality is of no use. Quality tends to have
more of an effect on system reliability than on safety.
Safety does not necessarily require or ensure quality either. Safety and quality address
aspects of systems that only partially overlap. For example, consider an automobile. To be
safe, its brakes must be reliable, the fuel tank must be isolated from sparks, and so on.
Aspects of the car that do not have anything to do with safety make up the impression of
quality, for example the interior upholstery, the paintwork, and so on. The automobile can
be safe without being a quality product.
There is no need to decouple safety and quality. They are by definition only partly depen-
dent.
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C.4.2 Safety vs. Cost
In decoupling safety from performance we have seen that good safety engineering practice
can result in cost savings across the system lifecycle. If we further consider the losses
averted by avoiding accidents (see Section 2), there is a clear argument that ignoring
safety increases lifecycle cost.
C.4.3 Safety vs. Schedule
We have also seen how, if it is incorporated from the beginning of system development,
safety engineering need not contribute to schedule delays. Indeed, it is a lack of good
safety engineering that often results in delays. Skimping on safety, or following poor
safety practices, can result in schedule delays due to redesign or rework during system
development. Once a system is in operation, accidents may result in program delays or
stoppages.
The strain that is often observed between safety, cost, schedule, and performance is not a
fact of nature. Lean thinking showed that it was possible to simultaneously meet cost,
schedule and performance metrics. In this section we have seen that safety too can be
incorporate in this new paradigm. The key to success is taking a systems view.
C.5 Conclusion
Lean principles and practices have brought about a new paradigm in system development
and operation. These practices allow the simultaneous attainment of cost, schedule and
performance or quality requirements. For example, it is no longer necessary to compro-
mise on performance or quality in order to meet cost and schedule requirements.
In this paper I have investigated whether it is possible to incorporate safety into this para-
digm. I began by defining 'lean safety' and showing that safety requirements are not
incompatible with lean principles. Safety can in fact be seen as a part of value creation.
Next, I showed that safety does not necessarily have to increase cost, delay schedules, or
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compromise performance. System development approaches that focus on the lifecycle
view can ensure safety while working toward the other aspects of value creation.
The arguments were put forward with the development and operation of complex, technol-
ogy-intensive systems such as spacecraft in mind. I think that the same arguments can eas-
ily be applied to other enterprises, regardless of the level of technology and human
interaction.
The addendum has some initial suggestions for using lean thinking to create a good safety
culture.
C.6 Addendum: Using Lean Thinking to Help Create a Good
Safety Culture
A good safety culture is an essential element for ensuring system safety [Zohar, 1980]. By
applying lean principles and practices we might work towards encouraging a good safety
culture. For example, consider this excerpt from an article on lean behaviour [Emiliani,
1998]:
"Ignoring problems leads to repetitive errors that consume resources whose focus is usu-
ally on short-term [symptomatic] solutions to appease management. The fear of real or
perceived threats leads to the establishment of unwritten rules and assumptions that domi-
nate the behaviour of all employees. Both the people and the business then lose their abil-
ity to learn from internal or external sources, except, of course, those that teach defensive
behaviours. Activities become less process focussed and increasingly transactional, which
further satisfies the culture's strong desire to limit communication and avoid conflict.
Trust becomes a non-issue because there isn't any. This leads to increasingly destructive
behaviour patterns that promote functional alliance and minimal cross-functional coopera-
tion [which is exactly what is needed to ensure safety]. Conversations are reduced to sim-
ple comments, obligatory discussions, or debilitating debates, and emotions are either flat
due to disinterest [lack of interest?] or enraged in the defence of one's views. Information
becomes closely guarded, the transfer of knowledge is biased towards agreement or good
news, and learning is stunted so that an organization is not able to accurately assess its
competitive [safety] position."
The parallels with safety are obvious. While a detailed examination of how a lean safety
culture might be encouraged is beyond the scope of this research, this section highlights
two aspects of lean that may prove useful starting points.
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C.6.1 The Learning Organisation
One element of a good safety culture is an ability to learn. Lean principles can encourage a
learning environment [Emiliani, 1998]:
"Lean [principles], applied correctly, result in the ability of an organisation to learn. As in
any organisation, mistakes will always be made. But mistakes are not usually repeated [in
the lean organisation] because this is a form of waste that the lean production philosophy
and its methods seek to eliminate. In contrast, most businesses... typically repeat the same
mistake over and over again... In order to learn an organisation must possess an ability to
change how it thinks, which requires a culture characterised by trust, shared responsibility,
and openness to experimentation without fear of failure. Instead, the majority of compa-
nies have functional, results oriented leadership highly skilled at maintaining the status
quo or perpetuating local optimisation strategies."
A large component of becoming lean is encouraging trust and communication, and break-
ing down the barriers between workers and disciplines.
6.2.4 A Systems View
We have seen that if safety is to be achieved it is essential to take a systems view both at
the level of the system being developed and at the level of the enterprise. Lean thinking is
grounded in systems thinking but focuses specifically on industry, and extracts the
attributes of systems thinking that are most relevant to industry. It should therefore pro-
vide an easier way for managers, engineers and other developers to become accustomed to
systems thinking.
For example, [Emiliani, 1998] notes that when everyone strives for their own personal
gain (e.g. empire-building, information withholding, etc.) the result is "a deterioration of
trust between workers, management, suppliers, and investors". Aside from decreasing
quality, value, etc., this type of behaviour must also work against safety. Communication
and cooperation are essential for safety. Most accidents occur at the boundaries (lifecycle
phase or system or organisational); if we wish to reduce accidents these boundaries must
be broken down.
